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Introduction
The year 2000 has been a crucial year for compe-
tition policy in many respects.
The way ﬁrms conduct business and compete with
each other is rapidly evolving and competition
authorities need to respond to these changes. Much
of the activity in year 2000 was devoted to adapt-
ing competition policy to the new social and eco-
nomic environment and to preparing it for the chal-
lenges ahead. 
In taking up my functions I was aware that 
competition enforcement was not a static exercise
and committed myself to improve our policy 
on issues which I felt were of key importance:
greater involvement of consumers in competi-
tion matters; enhanced transparency of our pol-
icy, notably on State aid; modernisation of our
rules through better integration of economic rea-
soning in the legal framework; and, ﬁnally, an
increased awareness of the international dimen-
sion of competition.
In presenting this year’s Annual Report on
Competition Policy I would like to emphasise the
progress achieved in those areas.
Competition policy and consumers
On many occasions I expressed my concern that
consumers are not sufﬁciently aware of the impli-
cations of competition policy on their welfare.
While it is generally understood that competition
policy improves overall economic efﬁciency, it is
surprising that its most evident effect, that on con-
sumers, is often neglected. Consumers should be
better informed of, more closely taken into account
and more directly involved in competition mat-
ters. In turn, this helps competition policy to focus
more clearly on actions, which are ultimately ben-
eﬁcial to consumer’s interests.
European Competition Days
Our efforts towards this objective have led to a
number of concrete initiatives. The most important
was the decision to organise, in association with
the European Parliament, a European Competition
Day every six months in the country holding the
Council Presidency. The purpose being that of
informing the public about the beneﬁts that com-
petition policy can bring them in terms of lower
prices, diversity of supply, improved product and
service quality and to listen to consumers’ com-
ments and concerns on speciﬁc markets for goods
and services.
The ﬁrst European Competition Day was staged in
Lisbon on 9 June and the second in Paris on
17October. The conferences were open to all inter-
ested parties, but individual consumers and con-
sumer organisations were particularly welcome
participants. The debate concerned issues and sec-
tors of great interest to the consumer — the liber-
alisation of the telecom sector and the concentra-
tion in the retail distribution industry — although
the focus was sometimes more on ‘consumer pro-
tection’ than on strictly competition issues. I hope
that in time the European Competition Day will
become an established forum in which to exchange
views with the consumer organisations on impor-
tant aspects of competition policy. This would not
only give citizens a better understanding of com-
petition policy, but also help competition author-
ities to identify possible anticompetitive practices
and take advantage of the consumers’ experience
of the markets.
Impact on consumers of individual
decisions
Apart from ad hoc initiatives, we also tried to high-
light the beneﬁt to the consumers of single deci-
sions in our press releases and publications. In this
annual report, we chose to select a small number
of decisions, which could provide useful exam- 3ples of how consumers can proﬁt from competi-
tion policy.
In the case of Opel Nederland, complaints by con-
sumers prompted the Commission to investigate
practices restricting parallel trade in motor vehi-
cles. The ensuing decision reafﬁrms the right to
buy a car without impediment in Member States
where prices are lower. This case is important
because it shows that consumers are not only pas-
sive beneﬁciaries of competition policy, but can also
provide impulse to the Commission’s action.
In the Telefónica/Sogecable/Audiovisual Sport
case, involving the relatively new market of pay-TV
rights to football matches, the Commission inter-
vened to put an end to an agreement to ﬁx the price
for watching football matches in Spain. As a result,
some cable operators reduced signiﬁcantly their
prices and later the Spanish digital terrestrial oper-
ator cut pay-per-view football prices by up to 50%.
Consumers will also beneﬁt from a much broader
choice: football rights previously available only
to digital satellite operators will be accessible also
to other broadcasters, giving rise to a wide range
of football transmissions on all three digital deliv-
ery systems (satellite, terrestrial and cable).
Even in merger cases, where issues may appear
distant from the concerns of ﬁnal consumers, com-
petition policy can considerably affect their wel-
fare. In the case of the merger between TotalFina
and Elf Aquitaine, the operation was made condi-
tional on the sell-off of transport and storage facil-
ities with a view to preserve competition in the
retail market for domestic heating fuel and for LPG
and, therefore, maintain downward pressure on
prices. On the market for motor fuel on motor-
ways, the required divestment of 70 petrol stations
will allow the entry of a large retail operator
(Carrefour) into the market, which should develop
competition not only on prices, but also on the sup-
ply of additional services to consumers.  
Enhanced transparency of 
competition policy
Better information to consumers should be part of
a wider commitment to transparency towards citi-
zens. In this context I pursue the practice of hav-
ing regular contacts with the European Parliament
to constantly update the democratic representa-
tion of the European citizens on the latest compe-
tition policy developments.
State aid register and scoreboard
Transparency not only responds to a general need
for Community policy to be open to scrutiny, but it
can also improve the effectiveness of this policy. I
am thinking in particular of the possibilities to
enhance, through increased transparency, aware-
ness about the need for the application of the Union’s
strict control rules and to strengthen the process of
peer review. With these objectives in mind, the
Commission has already opened a public register on
the Union’s server, Europa and will establish a State
aid scoreboard, which will also be available on the
Internet. The register contains factual information
on all State aid decisions taken by the Commission
since January 2000 and has been available online
since March 2001. The scoreboard, which will give
a detailed evaluation of the State aid situation in the
EU, will be ready by July 2001.
These initiatives make the system more transpar-
ent and support the call of the Stockholm European
Council on Member States to demonstrate a down-
ward trend in their State aid in relation to GDP.
Notice on remedies in merger proceedings
I would also mention another initiative aimed at
increasing the transparency of our policy, this time
in the ﬁeld of merger control. In December, the
Commission adopted a notice on the subject of
remedies that parties to a merger operation can
propose to eliminate competition problems raised
by a certain operation. The Commission is the ﬁrst
competition authority to issue any such guidelines
or advice on this subject. The notice aims to set out
clearly and objectively the administrative and sub-
stantive principles on which the Commission will
base its assessment of remedies and follows exten-
sive consultations carried out with the Member
States and with the business and legal communi-
ties. I believe this to be an important development,
particularly in light of the fact that in the last two
years alone there have been around 50 cases in
which the Commission has accepted remedial com-
mitments from merging parties before allowing
transactions to proceed.
Modernisation of competition rules
The ongoing process of updating our rules and
procedures is driven by the need to strengthen the
enforcement of EC competition law throughout
the European Union. We believe that this ﬁnal 4FOREWORD BY MARIO MONTI
objective requires a simpliﬁcation of procedures,
a more economic approach to the analysis of cases,
a greater involvement of national competition
authorities and national courts in the application
of EU competition law.
Last year I already had the opportunity to report —
including in my foreword to the annual report —
on this ambitious programme of reforms. This
work has continued in the year 2000 leading to
tangible and — I hope — very beneﬁcial progress.   
Reform of the implementing rules of
Articles 81 and 82
Following the large debate opened by the White
book of 1999 the Commission was able to adopt,
on 27 September 2000, a proposal for a new reg-
ulation designed to replace Regulation No 17 of
1962. I believe this can be described as the main
legislative initiative in Europe in the competition
ﬁeld, since the adoption of the merger regulation
in 1989. I am particularly glad that the main ori-
entations of the project could earn the support of
the European Parliament and of the Economic and
Social Committee and beneﬁt from the opinions of
a wide range of interested parties, including experts
from the Member States’ and EFTA competition
authorities, from academics and practitioners in
the ﬁeld as well as from the general public. I hope
that the fruitful cooperation and effective work
with the European Parliament and Council will
continue and allow approving the reform in 2001.
Vertical and horizontal agreements
The work on vertical agreements, having led to
the adoption, on 22 December 1999, of a new block
exemption regulation, was complemented in 2000
by a set of guidelines on vertical restraints approved
on 24 May. The guidelines will help undertakings
assess the compatibility with the Treaty rules of
agreements not covered by the regulation. Later,
on 29 November 2000, the Commission adopted
new regulations dealing with categories of spe-
cialisation and research and development agree-
ments. Guidelines on the applicability of Article
81 of the Treaty to a wider range of horizontal
cooperation agreements were also issued. While the
new regulations replace two existing block exemp-
tion regulations, the guidelines extend signiﬁcantly
the scope of previous notices and cover a wider
range of the most common types of horizontal
agreements.
The full set of regulations and guidelines on ver-
tical and horizontal agreements establishes a com-
prehensive framework for the application of com-
petition rules to the great majority of agreements
between undertakings. It also responds to the inten-
tion to bring the competition analysis more in line
with economic reasoning, to give economic oper-
ators a clearer understanding of competition issues
and concepts and to relieve enterprises from bur-
densome administrative obligations.
What is also important to underline, is that in the pres-
ent year we were already able to harvest some of the
beneﬁts of the new approach. The number of noti-
ﬁcations fell by nearly 40% over the previous year,
undoubtedly following the new rules on vertical
and horizontal agreements. On the other hand, almost
30% of the new cases were opened ex ofﬁcio, com-
pared to only 20% in 1999. These developments are
fully in line with the policy objective of dealing
with standard agreements through legislative action,
while using the available resources to pursue a more
proactive policy and concentrate on the most dan-
gerous anticompetitive practices.
The international dimension of
competition policy
Economic and technological factors, together with
political developments — such as the enlargement
of the EU — are causing world markets to increas-
ingly integrate. These processes need to be care-
fully monitored and governed.
The enlargement of the European Union has pro-
found social and political implications and we have
a duty to create the conditions for it to be a success,
without undermining the acquisof the Community.
At the same time, the globalisation of markets, while
having the potential for expanding and disseminat-
ing economic welfare, raises the concern that it
might favour the stronger players, to the detriment
in particular of consumers and less developed coun-
tries. Competition policy can help to avoid abuses
and create the framework for a sound operation of
market mechanism at international level.
Enlargement
Following the Commission’s ‘Enlargement strat-
egy paper’ of November, the EU is expected to
assess the situation in the candidate countries in the 5second half of 2001, with a view to the provisional
closure of the competition chapter when the con-
ditions are met.
The EU has consistently taken the view that the can-
didate countries can be considered to be ready for
accession only if their companies and public author-
ities have become accustomed to a competition
discipline similar to that of the Community well
before the date of accession. This is necessary to
ensure that the economic actors in the candidate
countries would be able to withstand the compet-
itive pressures of the internal market resulting from
the full and direct application of the competition
acquis upon accession.
This leads me to a general remark on the role of
competition policy. I believe effective competi-
tion enforcement is an essential part of a func-
tioning market economy, and it clearly plays a cen-
tral role in the internal market of the European
Union. As we have experienced, businesses have
learnt to respect the rules and consumers are
increasingly aware of its beneﬁts. For their suc-
cessful integration in the Union, the candidate
countries need a competition culture too. As acces-
sion approaches, it is, indeed, timely and essen-
tial to encourage the development of such a culture
also in the candidate countries.
During this year we have made special efforts to
help the candidate countries in meeting these
requirements. In addition to the daily technical
assistance to the competition ofﬁces of the candi-
date countries, we also organised intensive joint
training sessions on antitrust and State aid, as well
as annual conferences between the Commission
and the candidates’ competition ofﬁces to help
them prepare for the moment of accession.
When looking at the actual track record of the can-
didate countries two issues stand out clearly.
Firstly, the difference between the State aid and
antitrust ﬁelds. Whereas most candidate countries
already have a functioning antitrust regime, proper
State aid discipline is often lacking. The candidate
countries that have not yet established the neces-
sary legal framework or the functioning adminis-
trative structures for State aid control should now
do so without delay.
Secondly, there is a gap between the legal frame-
work and the actual enforcement. The situation in
the State aid ﬁeld gives particular cause for con-
cern. Several candidate countries notably use
incompatible ﬁscal aid regimes to attract foreign
investment or to keep non-viable businesses alive.
This not only negatively inﬂuences the accession
negotiations, but also places investors in a situa-
tion of legal and economic uncertainty.
Furthermore, aid regimes used to prop up ailing
industries risk jeopardising proper economic
restructuring of key sectors of the candidate coun-
tries’ economies, thereby rendering them unpre-
pared for the internal market.
To conclude, tremendous progress has been
achieved in legislative approximation and in the cre-
ation of market systems in the candidate countries.
However, to make accession a success for the can-
didate countries and to ensure the proper func-
tioning of our internal market after enlargement,
there is still some important work to be done.
WTO and the Global Competition Forum
The rapid globalisation of the world economy
brings major limitations — both legal and practi-
cal — to our ability to apply our own rules extra-
territorially. Even when this possibility is not pre-
vented, there are many drawbacks in doing so: it
can give rise to conﬂicts, or to incoherence, with
the rulings of foreign agencies or courts, and even
to conﬂicts with foreign laws. As a result, under-
takings operating on a global environment may be
able to escape those rules that are essential to gov-
ern economic and social processes.
The main policy response available to competi-
tion authorities is one that calls upon them to estab-
lish networks and instruments of global gover-
nance ensuring that the international integration
of markets leads to maintained competitive out-
comes, thus making the globalisation process both
economically more efficient and socially more
acceptable. In this context, competition policy —
and speciﬁcally international cooperation on com-
petition policy — has an important role to play, if
we are to avoid resentment against globalisation
and a protectionist backlash.
The Commission has reacted to these challenges
by establishing successful forms of cooperation
with foreign competition agencies, in particularly
with the US and, more recently, with the Canadian
authorities. We have also reached an understanding
on the substance of an agreement with Japan that we
hope can be initialled in 2001. Since we cannot real-
istically expect to build the same intensive cooper-
ative relationship with all of our counterparts around 6FOREWORD BY MARIO MONTI
the world, we are also convinced of the need to put
in place a WTO framework agreement ensuring the
respect of certain basic competition principles.
All these aspects are discussed in the international
section of the report; there is one initiative, though,
that I would especially like to point to here. It con-
cerns the idea of creating some kind of a broadly
based global forum for the general discussion of
competition policy issues. I am convinced that the
creation of such a forum would put in place a focal
point for discussion between those responsible for
the development and management of competition
policy worldwide. There are today over 80 countries
that have enacted some form of competition law
regime — many of them having done so only
recently — while more are considering doing so in
the future. There is a clear need for a place where
the whole range of competition policy issues —
substantive, systemic and enforcement-related — can
be debated. The end-objective should be to achieve
a maximum of convergence and consensus between
participants through dialogue, and to exchange expe-
riences on enforcement policy and practice.
In February 2001, I joined a number of like-minded
senior competition law ofﬁcials and professionals
at an informal gathering, for a ﬁrst ‘brainstorm-
ing’ on how we should set about the launching of
what has become known as the ‘Global
Competition Forum’.
We agreed that the forum should not be a new
international institution, and that it should involve
a minimum of permanent infrastructure, with sup-
port primarily provided by its participants. It should
be ﬁrst and foremost a competition authority forum,
but would draw together all interested parties —
both public (for example, other international organ-
isations) and private (for example, business, pro-
fessional, consumer and academic bodies), who
could all be appropriately associated with the forum,
as participants and ‘facilitators’.
I should add that the forum is not being proposed
as an alternative to a multilateral competition law
framework at the WTO. Rather, the two avenues
can be followed in parallel, and be mutually rein-
forcing in their pursuit of the same ultimate com-
petition policy objectives.
The global forum, and indeed a WTO competition
agreement, will — in my view — be of particular
beneﬁt to developing countries. Closed and opaque
markets and the absence of effective competition
between enterprises, are obstacles to economic
growth in much of the developing world. The pur-
suit of a robust competition policy by developing
countries should be an important ingredient in any
economic reforms designed to promote growth: it
encourages industrial competitiveness by reward-
ing efﬁciency and innovation, thereby fostering
investment.
Conclusion
I have so far highlighted some of the initiatives
taken in those areas which I believe constitute
today’s priorities for competition policy. None of
these initiatives would have been possible without
the devoted and professional attitude of the serv-
ices of the Directorate-General for Competition. I
would like to express here my deepest appreciation
for their hard work during the last year.
To sum up, the processes of economic integration
and liberalisation are releasing powerful market
forces. These forces can be disruptive, but can also
be proﬁtably channelled toward the achievement
of greater social welfare. Competition policy is
actively helping to govern these processes, but for
it to be effective, a ‘competition culture’ needs to
develop at all levels. This is why it is important to
achieve deeper consumer involvement, enhanced
transparency and greater international coopera-
tion. I am conﬁdent that the work carried out in
these areas, together with the modernisation of our
legislative framework, places the Commission in
a better position to deal with the changing needs
of the social and economic environment.
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12INTRODUCTION
1. Competition policy is one of the pillars of the
European Commission’s action in the economic
field. This action is founded on the principle,
enshrined in the Treaty, of ‘an open market econ-
omy with free competition’. It acknowledges the
fundamental role of the market and of competi-
tion in guaranteeing consumer welfare, in encour-
aging the optimum allocation of resources and in
granting economic agents the appropriate incen-
tives to pursue productive efﬁciency, quality and
innovation. However, the principle of an open mar-
ket economy does not imply an attitude of blind
faith or, possibly, indifference towards the opera-
tion of market mechanisms; on the contrary, it
requires constant vigilance aimed at preserving
those mechanisms. This is particularly true in the
present context of markets evolving at a fast pace
and becoming increasingly integrated at global
level. Besides, at a European level, the 2000 Review
of the Internal Market Strategy adopted on 3 May
gave a fresh impetus to the creation of a regulatory
and institutional framework which stimulates inno-
vation, investment and economic efﬁciency (1).
Promoting competition by improving the business
environment is also one of the targets set out in
the strategy.
2. Both technological developments and policy
initiatives are reshaping the economic environ-
ment. Economies are increasingly based on knowl-
edge, as evidenced by the growth of the service
sector. Information systems have forced companies
to re-evaluate and adapt their commercial rela-
tionships with both customers and suppliers and
have enabled them to adopt more tightly managed
and efﬁcient business practices. We are now begin-
ning to see the emergence of business-to-business
(B2B) exchanges that are in the process of revo-
lutionising the management of supply chains.
Institutional changes have been added to techno-
logical developments. The single market pro-
gramme culminated in the adoption of a single cur-
rency, further integrating markets and enhancing
competition between ﬁrms. The liberalisation of the
network industries has opened many crucial sec-
tors previously closed to competition. These devel-
opments affect all aspects of competition policy.
3. The year was marked by intense activity aimed
at adapting the rules and practice of competition
policy to the new environment. This activity has
led to the adoption of new block exemption regu-
lations in the ﬁeld of horizontal agreements, sup-
plemented by a set of guidelines, while further
progress was made towards modernising the rules
implementing Articles 81 and 82. New guidelines
were issued on vertical restraints to supplement
the block exemption regulation adopted in
December 1999. More particularly, in the area of
car distribution, an evaluation report was issued on
the present regulation (2), which will serve as the
basis for a review of the car distribution regime in
the near future. In the merger ﬁeld, a simpliﬁed
procedure for certain categories of cases not giv-
ing rise to competition concerns, as well as a notice
on remedies, were adopted by the Commission.
The Commission also introduced three regulations
on the application of the de minimis rule to State
aid, on aid to small and medium-sized enterprises
and on aid for training. Finally, considerable
progress was made with Japan in the preparation
of a cooperation agreement in the area of compe-
tition policy. It is expected that the agreement will
be concluded during 2001.
4. Enforcement of competition rules reﬂected the
reality of new markets and business practices. The
creation of electronic marketplaces and the use by
certain industries of voluntary agreements with
environmental aims are just two examples of
emerging practices which led to Commission deci-
sions. A large part of the Commission’s enforce-
ment activity in 2000 was focused on recently lib-
eralised markets, where a competitive environ-
ment is not yet fully established.
5. Competition has as its corollary the constant
reallocation of resources from declining ﬁrms or
sectors to the emerging and fast growing ones. In
the realm of the ‘new economy’ — characterised
by its largely intangible nature and by its founda-
tion on knowledge and technology — this process
has become extremely rapid. It is of paramount
importance that this reallocation should not be hin-
dered and that transformation and restructuring
should be allowed to take place smoothly, through
mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions. This
process is, however, not without danger. Mergers
may result in a market structure that is too con-
centrated, with poorer choice for the consumer and
greater scope for collusion between a few remain-
ing producers.
6. In a context where markets are tending to
become wider and where the critical mass that is
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(
1) COM(2000) 257 ﬁnal, 3.5.2000. (
2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28.6.1995.necessary to be an active player is tending to
increase, the number and complexity of mergers
and alliances that fall under the Commission’s
scrutiny have been constantly growing during the
last few years. In 2000, the Commission took
345 decisions, up by 18 % on 1999. A number of
these cases raised substantive issues, which led to
developments in the Commission’s analytical tools,
in particular in the practical application of eco-
nomic theory.
7. In an ever more competitive and integrated
environment, it is particularly important that State
aid should not introduce unwarranted distortions
into the functioning of markets. In addition to the
initiatives to update and rationalise the legislative
framework described above, the Commission is
convinced of the need to increase transparency in
this ﬁeld and to introduce, to this end, a public reg-
ister of State aid and a scoreboard. In parallel with
the new initiatives, the Commission has focused
on the correct application of its decisions, notably
concerning the recovery of illegal aid.
8. Two considerations on the international dimen-
sion of competition policy are worth noting: ﬁrst,
the fact that the geographical scope of competi-
tion cases is widening means that more commer-
cial transactions are falling within the jurisdiction
of the growing number of countries that have
adopted competition rules. To analyse these cases
properly and avoid conﬂict, the Commission often
has to liaise closely and exchange information with
other competition authorities. Secondly, the
Commission has to pay close attention to the com-
petition aspects of the forthcoming enlargement.
Enlargement should not create a major imbalance
in terms of State aid or competitiveness. Hence
the importance of working with the applicant coun-
tries and making sure that the same rules apply
with equal effectiveness throughout an enlarged
Union.
Statistics on Commission activity 
in applying Community competition 
law in 2000
9. In 2000, the total number of new cases was 1206,
comprising 297 antitrust cases (under Articles 81,
82 and 86), 345 merger cases, and 564 State aid
cases. Comparable ﬁgures for 1999 were a total of
1 249 new cases, comprising 388 antitrust cases,
292 merger cases, and 569State aid cases. The slight
decrease in the overall number of cases was, there-
fore, due to the reduction in the antitrust ﬁeld, while
the number of State aid cases remains stable and
that of merger cases continues to increase and has
doubled in the course of the last three years.
10. The remarkable reduction in the number of
new antitrust cases can be attributed to recent pol-
icy developments. The new block exemption on
vertical restraints has drastically reduced the need
for notiﬁcation of this type of agreement. Similarly,
the new guidelines on vertical agreements and the
publicly debated proposals for new rules on hori-
zontal agreements have clariﬁed the framework
for assessment under the competition rules and
may have reduced the need for bringing cases to
the Commission’s attention.
11. A second factor in the reduction of new cases
is the drop in the number of complaints. However,
the number of complaints has ﬂuctuated widely
over the years (112 in 2000, 149 in 1999, 192 in
1998, 177 in 1997, 159 in 1996, 114 in 1995, 170in
1994 and 110 in 1993), so it is difﬁcult to draw
any conclusions.
12. It is interesting to note that almost 30 % of
the new cases were opened ex ofﬁcio. In absolute
terms, moreover, ex ofﬁcio procedures increased
over the previous year (from 77 to 84). Taken
together with the reduction in notiﬁcations, this
development is in line with the policy objective
of dealing with standard agreements through leg-
islative action, while using the available resources
to pursue a more proactive policy and concen-
trate on the most dangerous anticompetitive prac-
tices.
13. The total number of cases closed was 1 209,
comprising 379 antitrust cases, 355 merger cases,
and 475 State aid cases (1). Comparable ﬁgures for
1999 were 1 321 cases closed, comprising
582antitrust cases, 279 merger cases and 460 State
aid cases (2). The intense legislative action and
some resource-intensive cartel cases had the effect
of slowing down the antitrust activity; neverthe-
less, the number of cases closed (379) was con-
siderably higher than that of new cases (297), fur-
ther reducing the backlog.
14. As witnessed already in 1999, the globalisa-
tion of markets, the introduction of the euro, the
14
(
1) The ﬁgure for State aid is based on the number of decisions taken
by the Commission. Given that some decisions cover more than
one case, the ﬁgure is a slight underestimate of the number of State
aid cases closed by Commission decision.
(
2) The figure for State aid in 1999 was revised after the 1999
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completion of the single market and the forth-
coming enlargement continued to generate high
levels of merger activity in Europe. Overall,
345new cases were notiﬁed during 2000 (+18%)
and in total, 345 formal decisions were taken dur-
ing the year, 28 % up on 1999.
15. In the ﬁeld of State aid, the number of notiﬁ-
cations remained remarkably stable compared with
1999 (469 in 1999 and 2000); this was also true of
the number of proceedings initiated (67 against
68in 1999) and negative ﬁnal decisions (26 against
33 in 1999). The number of cases pending, how-
ever, has increased signiﬁcantly (564 against 428
in 1999), which can be partly explained by the
numerous proceedings initiated since 1997 taking
up a large amount of resources.
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Box 1: European Competition Day in Lisbon and Paris
When he took up ofﬁce, Commissioner Monti informed Parliament of a series of measures to provide the
public with more information on competition policy and to make Commission activities more transparent
and accessible to consumers, savers, public service users and employees in the Community. The public
needed to be better informed about the beneﬁts that competition policy could bring them in terms of diver-
sity of supply, improved product and service quality and a downward trend in prices. This was the back-
ground to the decision to hold a European Competition Day every six months in the country holding the
Council Presidency.
European Competition Day in Lisbon (9 June 2000)
The ﬁrst European Competition Day took place in Lisbon in June 2000, and was deemed a success by its
organisers.
It formed part of a larger event concerning competition policy which lasted two days, the ﬁrst day being
devoted to national issues.
The ﬁrst round table followed on from Mr Monti’s opening address devoted to the positive impact of com-
petition policy on the day-to-day lives of EU citizens. A speech by Ms Randzio-Plath, Chair of the European
Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, expressed strong support for the views expressed
by Mr Monti. She put particular emphasis on the part played by suppliers of general interest services in a
market economy in which competition rules applied.
Matters of a more speciﬁc nature were also discussed at the European Day, i.e. motor vehicle distribution
in Europe and the application of competition rules to the professions.
Some 250 people attended, representing the groups usually interested in competition policy, e.g. lawyers,
business representatives, competition authorities, embassy staff, etc. Consumer associations were less well
represented.
This inaugural event made it possible to introduce the public to several information tools: a video on com-
petition policy, explanatory posters and display panels and a new information brochure for the general pub-
lic entitled ‘Competition policy in Europe and the citizen’.
European Competition Day in Paris (17 October 2000)
The second Competition Day took place in Paris on the morning of 17 October 2000.
Commissioner Monti opened the event by calling on consumers and their associations to be responsible play-
ers in the market. Paraphrasing Pierre Mendès France, he said that ‘To consume is to choose. Freely and
responsibly’.
The ﬁrst round table on the liberalisation of telephony assessed the positive effects of opening up the sec-
tor to competition, apart from the controversial impact of the increase in telephone subscription charges. A16
very broad consensus was reached on the view that competition and solidarity were not incompatible. And
that regulated competition was the best guarantee for Union citizens. Lastly, some anxiety about the con-
vergence between telecoms, the media and the Internet was expressed by consumers.
The second round table dealt with retail products. One of the major points arising out of the discussion was
the negative impact on the individual consumer of the increase in the purchasing power of the retailing and
distribution industry: curtailed supplies, standardised goods, etc.
The amphitheatre at the conference centre was ﬁlled with over 300 people. A good half of those present was
composed of representatives of consumer associations. The Belgian, Swedish, United Kingdom and German
authorities attended the discussions, as did a representative of BEUC (European Bureau of Consumers’
Unions).
The representatives of the consumer associations played an active part in the discussions. They made state-
ments and asked a number of questions. The number and vigour of the statements lent a decidedly ‘con-
sumerist’ tone to the exchanges with participants, even if the questions did not always concern the ‘com-
petition’ aspects but ‘consumer protection’.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
A — Modernisation of the legislative
and interpretative rules
16. On 27 September, the Commission adopted
a proposal for a regulation designed to modernise
the procedural rules for implementing Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty, which lay down the
Community competition rules applicable to
restrictive practices between businesses and
abuses of a dominant position. This is the most
important legislative initiative in Europe in the
competition ﬁeld since the adoption of the merger
regulation in 1989. It will greatly facilitate the
strengthening of a common competition culture
in the EU.
17. Clariﬁcation and review of the substantive
rules is an essential pillar in the overall reform
process. The review is aimed at simplifying the
rules and reducing the regulatory burden for com-
panies, especially companies lacking market power,
while ensuring more effective control of agree-
ments implemented by companies holding signif-
icant market power. The Commission has recently
completed work in the ﬁeld of vertical agreements
with the adoption of a new block exemption reg-
ulation and guidelines concerning distribution.
These cover all sectors with the exception of car
distribution.
18. In the area of horizontal agreements 
the Commission has adopted revised block exemp-
tion regulations for research and development
agreements and specialisation agreements. 
These regulations are complemented by guidelines
on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal
cooperation agreements. The horizontal guide-
lines recognise that companies need to respond
to increasing competitive pressure and a 
changing marketplace driven by globalisation,
the pace of technological progress and the gen-
erally more dynamic nature of markets.
Cooperation can often be a way of sharing risk,
saving costs, pooling know-how and launching
innovation faster.
1. New Commission competition rules 
in the ﬁeld of vertical restraints
19. On 22 December 1999, the Commission
adopted Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to cate-
gories of vertical agreements and concerted prac-
tices (1). The new block exemption regulation has
a wide scope and block exempts, up to a market
share threshold of 30 % and subject to a limited
number of conditions and the exclusion of ‘hard-
core’ restrictions, all vertical agreements and con-
certed practices between two or more undertak-
ings (2). Above the 30 % threshold, agreements
are not presumed to be illegal but may require indi-
vidual examination. In order to assist undertak-
ings in carrying out such an examination, the
Commission approved on 24 May a set of guide-
lines on vertical restraints (3).
20. The guidelines explain:
— which vertical agreements generally do not
distort competition and therefore fall outside
Article 81(1). This concerns in particular agree-
ments between SMEs, true agency agreements
and agreements where neither the supplier nor
the buyer holds a signiﬁcant degree of market
power;
— which vertical agreements beneﬁt from the
safe haven created by the block exemption
regulation. This is achieved by describing the
conditions for application of the regulation;
— which circumstances may require the beneﬁt
of the block exemption regulation to be with-
drawn by the Commission or by Member State
authorities. Withdrawal may in particular be
necessary when access to the relevant market
is signiﬁcantly restricted by the cumulative
effect of parallel networks of similar vertical
agreements applied by competing suppliers
or buyers. It may also be required when, in
the context of exclusive supply or exclusive
distribution, the buyer has signiﬁcant market
power on the downstream market where he
resells the goods or provides the services;
— a number of market deﬁnition and market share
calculation issues that may arise when com-
panies apply the 30% market share threshold
for application of the block exemption regu-
lation;
— the enforcement policy of the Commission in
cases above the 30 % market share threshold
not covered by the block exemption regulation.
A general framework of analysis is provided
17
(
1) OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.
(
2) See points 8–19 of the 1999 Competition Report.
(
3) Commission notice — guidelines on vertical restraints (OJ C 291,
13.10.2000).and applied to the most important speciﬁc ver-
tical restraints, such as single branding, exclu-
sive distribution and selective distribution.
2. New Commission competition rules 
in the ﬁeld of horizontal cooperation
agreements
2.1. Introduction
21. On 29 November, the Commission adopted
Regulation (EC) No2658/2000 on the application
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of spe-
cialisation agreements (1), Regulation (EC)
No 2659/2000 on the application of Article 81(3)
of the Treaty to categories of research and devel-
opment agreements (2), and guidelines on the appli-
cability of Article 81 of the Treaty to horizontal
cooperation agreements (3)( 4). The new regula-
tions replace the two existing block exemption
regulations on specialisation agreements (5) 
and on research and development (R&D) agree-
ments (6), which expired on 31 December 2000.
The guidelines, while replacing two existing notices
(these provided guidance on certain types of coop-
eration agreement falling outside Article 81 (7) and
the assessment of cooperative joint ventures (8)),
cover a wider range of the most common types 
of horizontal agreement and complement the 
block exemption regulations on R & D and 
specialisation.
22. Companies need to respond to increasing com-
petitive pressure and changes in the marketplace
driven by globalisation, the pace of technological
progress and the generally more dynamic nature
of markets. Cooperation can be a means of shar-
ing risk, saving costs, pooling know-how and
launching innovation faster. In particular for small
and medium-sized enterprises, cooperation is an
important means of adapting to the changing mar-
ketplace. Consumers will share these gains, pro-
vided that effective competition is maintained in
the market. This review was necessary not only to
adapt the rules to new market developments and
economic thinking but also, in the context of mod-
ernisation, with a view to giving clear guidance to
courts and national authorities. The common objec-
tive is to simplify the rules and reduce the regula-
tory burden for companies, especially companies
lacking market power.
23. The new rules embody a shift from the for-
malistic regulatory approach underlying the cur-
rent legislation towards a more economic approach
in the assessment of horizontal cooperation agree-
ments. The basic aim of this new approach is to
allow collaboration between competitors where it
contributes to economic welfare without creating
a risk for competition.
2.2. The block exemption regulations
24. Compared with the existing regulations, the
new regulations have been revised to make them
more user-friendly and to increase their scope and
clarity. The old block exemptions for R & D and
specialisation not only deﬁned categories of agree-
ments that were covered, but also listed the
exempted clauses. These so-called ‘white lists’ are
deleted from the new block exemption regulations,
which instead exempt all R&D and specialisation
agreements, subject to certain conditions and the
exclusion of hardcore restrictions. The new instru-
ments thus move away from a clause-based
approach and give the parties to such agreements
greater contractual freedom.
25. In addition to this increase in ﬂexibility, the
following principal changes have been incorpo-
rated in the new R & D block exemption regula-
tion:
— deletion of the requirement to draw up a frame-
work programme prior to entering into R&D
agreements;
— increase in the market share threshold for
exemption from 20 to 25 %. This increase
recognises that R&D collaboration is partic-
ularly conducive to the creation of efﬁcien-
cies, while on the other hand restrictive effects 18
(
1) OJ L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 3.
(
2) OJ L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 7.
(
3) OJ C 3, 6.1.2001.
(
4) The two block exemption regulations and the guidelines are avail-
able on the Competition DG’s web site at: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/.
(
5) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 417/85 of 19 December 1984
on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of
specialisation agreements (OJ L 53, 22.2.1985), as last amended
by Regulation (EC) No 2236/97 (OJ L 306, 11.11.1997).
(
6) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of 19 December 1984
on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of
research and development agreements (OJ L53, 22.2.1985), as last
amended by Regulation (EC) No2236/97 (OJ L306, 11.11.1997).
(
7) Commission notice concerning agreements, decisions and con-
certed practices in the ﬁeld of cooperation between enterprises (OJ
C 75, 29.7.1968).
(
8) Commission notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint
ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (OJ C 43,
16.2.1993).I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
are less likely than for other types of cooper-
ation;
— if the agreement provides for joint distribu-
tion of products that have been jointly devel-
oped, the market share threshold will be
increased from 10 %, as at present, to 25 %;
— increase in the safety margin for market share
ﬂuctuations from 2 to 5 %;
— increase in the period during which joint
exploitation of jointly developed products is
covered irrespective of market share. This
period has been increased from ﬁve to seven
years in view of the fact that there are a num-
ber of industries where R & D investments
are unlikely to be recouped within ﬁve years.
The same seven-year period is allowed for
certain restrictions that accompany joint
exploitation;
— deletion of the non-opposition procedure. This
procedure is no longer necessary as all
non-hardcore restrictions are exempted subject
to certain conditions;
— a provision has been added which allows the
withdrawal of the block exemption in those
cases where an agreement would eliminate
effective competition in R & D on a particu-
lar market. This is necessary to protect com-
petition in innovation, as it would not be fea-
sible to apply the normal market share thresh-
olds of the regulation to totally new products.
26. As regards the new specialisation block
exemption regulation, the principal changes are
as follows:
— extension of the scope of the regulation to
cover unilateral specialisation between com-
petitors. This is a form of outsourcing, where
one party agrees to cease manufacture of cer-
tain products and to purchase them from
another party, who agrees to manufacture and
supply them. Unilateral specialisation between
competitors has been covered because of its
increased importance in many industries and
its potential to create efﬁciencies. Unilateral
specialisation between non-competitors is,
subject to certain conditions, covered by the
vertical block exemption regulation (1);
— in the case of reciprocal specialisation, there
is a requirement to incorporate a cross-sup-
ply obligation so that no party leaves the mar-
ket downstream of production. This is neces-
sary to prevent parties from partitioning 
markets under the guise of a reciprocal spe-
cialisation agreement;
— deletion of the turnover threshold;
— increase in the safety margin for market share
ﬂuctuations from 2 to 5 %, as in the R & D
block exemption regulation;
— possibility of exclusive supply or exclusive
purchase obligations.
27. Both regulations provide for a transitional
period of 18 months during which agreements
which do not satisfy the conditions of the new reg-
ulations but which satisfy the conditions for exemp-
tion provided for in the old regulations continue to
be covered.
2.3. The guidelines
28. The guidelines complement the block exemp-
tion regulations. They describe the general approach
which should be followed when assessing hori-
zontal cooperation agreements. They are thus appli-
cable to R & D and production agreements not
covered by the block exemptions as well as to all
other common types of competitor collaboration.
The following types are covered: R & D, produc-
tion, purchasing, marketing, standardisation and
environmental agreements. The guidelines describe
the general approach which should be followed
when assessing horizontal cooperation agreements
and set out a common analytical framework. This
will help companies to assess with greater cer-
tainty whether or not an agreement restricts com-
petition and, if so, whether it would qualify for an
exemption.
29. All types of horizontal cooperation agreement
covered are analysed according to a common ana-
lytical framework. This framework can be sum-
marised as follows: a horizontal cooperation agree-
ment is only able to restrict competition if it is
likely to reduce competition in the market to such
an extent that negative market effects as to prices,
output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods
and services can be expected. To cause a restric-
tion of competition the parties normally need appro-
priate tools to coordinate their behaviour and a
degree of market power. Consequently, coopera- 19
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ing into account both the nature of the agreement
and the parties’ combined market power, which
determine — together with other structural fac-
tors — the capability of the cooperation to reduce
overall competition to such a signiﬁcant extent.
30. These two criteria normally have to be assessed
together. There are, however, some instances where
the nature of the cooperation indicates from the
outset that it is caught by Article 81(1). This con-
cerns primarily agreements that have the object of
restricting competition by means of price ﬁxing,
output limitation or sharing of markets, customers
or sources of supply. These so-called ‘hardcore’
restrictions are considered to be the most harm-
ful, because they directly interfere with the out-
come of the competitive process. It can therefore
be presumed that these restrictions have negative
market effects and do not result in any efﬁciency
gains or beneﬁts to consumers. They are therefore
almost always prohibited.
31. On the other hand, there are also some hori-
zontal agreements regarding which it can be said
from the outset Article 81(1) does not generally
apply. These include agreements between non-
competitors, agreements between competing com-
panies that cannot independently carry out the proj-
ect or activity covered by the cooperation, or coop-
eration concerning an activity which does not
inﬂuence the relevant parameters of competition.
These cooperation agreements could only come
under Article 81(1) if they involve ﬁrms with sig-
niﬁcant market power and are likely to cause fore-
closure problems vis-à-vis third parties.
32. All other agreements need to be examined in
the light of each of the two criteria (nature of the
agreement and market power and market struc-
ture) in order to decide whether they fall under
Article 81(1).
33. The discussion by category of agreement
makes it easier to take account of speciﬁc compe-
tition problems related to the different forms of
cooperation. It also addresses the most common
types of combination, e.g. joint R & D with sub-
sequent joint production.
34. In the absence of hardcore restrictions and
below a certain level of market power, deﬁned in
terms of market share, the guidelines provide so
called ‘safe havens’ for purchasing agreements
and marketing agreements. Similar to coverage by
a block exemption regulation, once inside these
safe havens, economic operators do not normally
have to assess the impact of their agreements on
the market.
35. In the case of purchasing agreements, while
recognising that there is no absolute threshold
which indicates that buying cooperation creates
some degree of market power and thus falls under
Article 81(1), the guidelines stress that in most
cases it is unlikely that such market power exists
if the parties to the agreement have a combined
market share of less than 15 % on the purchasing
market(s) as well as a combined market share of
less than 15% on the selling market(s). Where an
agreement below these market share thresholds
falls under Article 81(1), the guidelines state that
below those levels of market share it is likely to ful-
ﬁl the conditions of Article 81(3) (1).
36. In the case of marketing agreements which do
not involve the fixing of prices, the guidelines
stress that, in most cases, it is unlikely that a suf-
ﬁcient degree of market power exists if the parties
to the agreement have a combined market share of
less than 15 %. Where an agreement below this
level of market share falls under Article 81(1), the
guidelines state that below this level of market
share it is likely to fulﬁl the conditions of Article
81(3) (2).
3. Proposal for a new regulation
implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty
37. On 27 September, the Commission adopted a
proposal for a new regulation implementing
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (3). The new
regulation is designed to replace Regulation No17
of 1962 as well as the procedural rules contained
in Regulations (EEC) Nos 1017/68, 4056/86 and
3975/87 regarding transport. The implementation
of the competition rules in the agricultural sector
is to remain governed by Regulation No 26 of
1962.
38. The proposal for a new implementing regu-
lation follows on from the Commission’s White
Paper of 28 April 1999 on the modernisation of
the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 (now
20
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Articles 81 and 82) of the EC Treaty (1), which
launched a large-scale public and academic debate.
While preparing the proposal, the Commission
consulted a large number of interested parties. In
particular, the Commission held in-depth discus-
sions on a range of topics related to the imple-
mentation of the White Paper proposals with a
working group of experts from the Member States’
competition authorities. Experts from the EFTA
Surveillance Authority and the EFTA member
countries’ competition authorities were included
in the consultations. In drafting the proposal, the
Commission also took into account the results of
the public consultation following the White Paper
and, in particular, the views expressed on the White
Paper in the resolution adopted by the European
Parliament on 18 January 2000 and the opinion
delivered by the Economic and Social Committee
on 8 December 1999. Both institutions supported
the Commission’s approach in the White Paper
while underlining the importance of ensuring con-
sistent application of Community competition law
in a system of parallel powers and maintaining an
adequate level of legal certainty.
39. The general thrust of the proposal for a new
implementing regulation is based on the White
Paper. In particular, the Commission’s proposal
aims at bringing about the transition from the noti-
ﬁcation and authorisation system of Regulation
No 17, which has become inefﬁcient for the pro-
tection of competition in the Community, to an
implementing system based on the direct applica-
bility of Article 81 as a whole. The changeover to
the new system is provided for in Articles 1 and 6
of the proposal: Article 1 lays down the principle
of the direct applicability of Article 81 as a whole,
and Article 6 confers on national courts the power
also to apply Article 81(3) when Article 81(1) is
invoked.
40. In the light of the large-scale debate and tak-
ing into account concern about the risk of ‘rena-
tionalisation’ of competition law (voiced in par-
ticular by the European Parliament) as well as fears
about legal certainty for companies in the new sys-
tem, the Commission reﬁned its proposals in a
number of respects. As a result, the proposed new
regulation focuses on three major objectives:
— more efﬁcient enforcement;
— a more level playing ﬁeld in the single market;
— an appropriate degree of legal certainty for
companies.
3.1. More efﬁcient enforcement
41. The proposed system will result in increased
enforcement of Community competition rules. A
larger number of enforcers will apply the rules as
— following the removal of the Commission’s
exclusive powers to take an exemption decision
under Article 81(3) — not only the Commission,
but also national competition authorities and
national courts will be able to apply Articles 81
and 82 in their entirety. In addition, the abolition
of the notiﬁcation and authorisation system will
allow the Commission to focus on the detection and
prosecution of the most serious infringements.
42. Speciﬁc elements of the proposal are aimed at
reinforcing the overall effect of the transition to a
legal exception system. For example, the
Commission’s proposal makes provision for more
efficient enforcement by national authorities
through horizontal cooperation. Article 12 of the
proposal creates a legal basis for the exchange of
all kinds of information between the Commission
and the Member States’ competition authorities, and
for using such information as evidence in pro-
ceedings which apply EC competition law.
43. In order to guarantee the protection of com-
petition, it is also necessary to ensure that the
Commission’s powers of investigation are sufﬁcient
and effective. From the time the White Paper was
published and in the light of the reactions it elicited,
the Commission’s thinking in this area has evolved
on several points. The proposal contains three main
improvements to ensure more effective applica-
tion of Articles 81 and 82.
44. First, it is proposed that the powers available
to Commission ofﬁcials in carrying out inspec-
tions should be adapted. The experience of the
national competition authorities and the
Commission shows that incriminating documents
are more and more frequently kept at and discov-
ered in private homes. Under the proposed regu-
lation, Commission inspectors will therefore be
empowered, subject to judicial authorisation by
the responsible national court, to search the pri-
vate homes of company employees if it is sus-
pected that business documents are being kept
there. It is further proposed that Commission
inspectors should be empowered to seal cupboards
or ofﬁces in order to ensure that documents are 21
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Finally, Commission inspectors should be entitled
to ask oral questions relating to the subject matter
of the inspection.
45. Secondly, abandoning the idea set out in the
White Paper of centralised judicial review by the
Court of First Instance, the Commission now pro-
poses to codify the rules governing judicial orders
at national level. This will apply in circumstances
where an undertaking refuses to permit the
Commission to carry out an inspection, and will
clarify the scope for intervention by national judges
in accordance with the limits already established
by the Court of Justice.
46. Thirdly, as announced in the White Paper, the
Commission proposes to adapt the ﬁnes for breaches
of procedural rules and the periodic penalty pay-
ments, which were set in absolute terms in the 1960s.
A system based on turnover percentage ﬁgures is
considered the appropriate solution.
3.2. Regulating the relationship between
Articles 81 and 82 and national competition
laws
47. The public consultation as well as Parliament’s
resolution and the Economic and Social
Committee’s opinion identiﬁed the need to ensure
a level playing ﬁeld throughout the single market
as a major challenge of the reform.
48. In the light of these concerns and taking into
account the scope for more efﬁcient enforcement,
the Commission has proposed a new article, on
the basis of Article 83(2)(e) of the EC Treaty, to
regulate the relationship between Articles 81 and
82 and national competition laws (Article 3 of the
proposal). This article stipulates that when an agree-
ment or practice is capable of affecting trade
between Member States, only Community com-
petition law applies.
49. The rationale behind this article in the pro-
posal is as follows: in the present system, the same
agreement or conduct may be subject to
Community competition law and several national
competition laws. In accordance with the princi-
ple of primacy of Community competition 
law, established by the Court of Justice in Walt
Wilhelm (1),national law can be applied only in so
far as it does not prejudice the uniform applica-
tion of the Community competition rules through-
out the single market. The primacy principle
resolves clear conﬂicts in favour of Community
law. It is not, however, effective in preventing
inconsistencies and differences in the treatment of
agreements and practices affecting trade between
Member States under different national laws.
50. Article 3 ensures that agreements and prac-
tices capable of affecting cross-border trade are
scrutinised under a single set of rules, thereby pro-
moting a level playing field throughout the
Community and eliminating the costs which the
parallel application of Community law and national
laws create for both competition authorities and
business. The provision does not limit the scope for
action by national competition authorities, which
will be able to apply Community law. Experience
gained at national level can contribute to the devel-
opment of Community competition policy within
the network of competition authorities.
51. The article also ensures that all cases con-
cerning agreements and practices affecting trade
between Member States are subject to the coop-
eration machinery inside the network, and elimi-
nates the risk that the proper functioning of the
network might be jeopardised by the concurrent
application of Community competition law and
national competition law.
3.3. Cooperation in the network between
the Commission and the national
competition authorities
52. With regard to national competition authori-
ties, the creation of a network in which all mem-
bers apply the same law and policy will greatly
promote efﬁciency, consistency and a level play-
ing ﬁeld throughout the single market. The formal
basis for establishing the network is to be found in
Article 11 of the proposed regulation.
53. The Commission is conﬁdent that close coop-
eration in the network will foster the development
of a common competition culture throughout the
Community. Given the crucial importance of con-
sistent application, certain formal mechanisms
have additionally been proposed. Article 11(4) of
the proposed regulation requires national compe-
tition authorities to consult the Commission before
adopting prohibition decisions, decisions accept-
ing commitments and decisions withdrawing the
beneﬁt of a block exemption regulation. All such
decisions have direct repercussions for the 22
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addressees. It is therefore important to ensure that
they are consistent with the general practice of the
network. In the event of substantial disagreement
within the network, the Commission retains the
power to withdraw a case from a national compe-
tition authority by itself initiating proceedings in
that case.
54. The Commission has no intention of using the
mechanisms of the proposed Article 11 as a basis
for becoming involved in the detail of Member
State competition authorities’ decisions in a sys-
tematic manner. These mechanisms are intended
as a safety net to detect and remedy serious prob-
lems of inconsistent application.
55. In order to clarify further the basis for coop-
eration in the network, the Commission is in the
process of preparing a draft notice on cooperation
in the network, including in particular clear but
ﬂexible arrangements for case allocation based on
the concept of the best-placed authority. This will
replace the notice currently in force. Subsequently,
an in-depth discussion with the Member States’
competition authorities should lead to the adop-
tion of a commonly shared understanding that will
enable the network to start functioning.
3.4. Enhanced cooperation with national
courts
56. The Commission’s proposal is also aimed at
reinforcing cooperation between the Commission
and national courts in order to promote consistent
application of Articles 81 and 82.
57. Article 15 of the proposed regulation entitles
national courts to obtain information in the
Commission’s possession which they need for the
purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82. They can
also ask the Commission for an opinion on ques-
tions relating to the application of the Community
competition rules. The Commission will set out
detailed rules on its practice in this ﬁeld in a notice,
to replace the existing notice on cooperation
between national courts and the Commission. These
rules will include a deadline within which the
Commission must reply to requests from national
courts.
58. The same article would introduce a right for
the Commission and national competition author-
ities to make submissions to national courts in writ-
ten or oral form. In the case of national competi-
tion authorities, the power is limited to the courts
of their own Member State. The Commission may
act under this provision only in the Community
public interest (as amicus curiae), i.e. not in the
interest of one of the parties. This provision is
aimed in particular at permitting the Commission
and national competition authorities to draw the
courts’ attention to issues of considerable impor-
tance for the consistent application of Community
competition law. Using this mechanism the
Commission would for example be able to bring
to the attention of the courts cases from other
Member States in which an identical or a similar
problem was raised. The national courts are not
bound to follow an opinion expressed by the
Commission or a national competition authority.
The information from the Commission may how-
ever be useful to courts when considering whether
to make a reference to the European Court of
Justice.
3.5. Ensuring an appropriate level of legal
certainty for companies
59. Under the existing Regulation No17 an agree-
ment or decision caught by Article 81(1) can
become valid, i.e. enforceable before a civil court,
only if it is notified to and exempted by the
Commission. In practice, most notiﬁed cases are
closed by a non-binding administrative letter from
the Commission departments (‘comfort letter’).
60. The proposed regulation removes the bureau-
cratic obstacles connected with the notiﬁcation
and authorisation procedure while maintaining an
adequate degree of legal certainty. In particular,
under the proposed new system agreements and
decisions which satisfy the conditions of Article
81(3) are valid and enforceable ab initio with no
administrative decision to that effect being required.
Undertakings can therefore rely on civil enforce-
ability as an element of improved legal certainty
independently of any action by an administrative
authority.
61. The proposed regulation does not remove the
need for undertakings to assess their business trans-
actions in order to verify whether they are in com-
pliance with the competition rules. Under the pres-
ent Regulation No 17, this analysis is carried out
by undertakings when preparing a notiﬁcation.
The proposal treats the application of the
Community competition rules in the same way as
other areas of law where undertakings are required
to ascertain themselves that their behaviour is law-
ful. 2362. In the ﬁeld of Community competition law, the
companies’ task of assessing their behaviour is
facilitated by block exemptions and Commission
notices and guidelines clarifying the application of
the rules. Alongside the current reform, the
Commission commits itself to making an even
greater effort in this area. In this context, Article
28 of the proposed regulation confers on the
Commission a general power to adopt block exemp-
tion regulations. This power will ensure that the
Commission is in a position to react sufﬁciently
swiftly to new developments and changing mar-
ket conditions.
63. In addition, under the new system, with a larger
number of decision-makers applying Article 81(3),
case-law and practice on the interpretation of that
provision will rapidly develop where it does not yet
exist, thereby inherently reinforcing the frame-
work for assessment. The Commission will fur-
ther contribute to this development by continuing
to set policy through its own decisions in individ-
ual cases. In addition to prohibition decisions, the
proposed regulation provides that in cases where
it is in the Community public interest to do so, the
Commission, acting on its own initiative, can adopt
decisions ﬁnding that no infringement has been
committed. This will permit the Commission to
set out its position in a landmark case so as to clar-
ify the law for all companies that ﬁnd themselves
in similar situations.
64. To address the rare situations in which a gen-
uine problem of legal predictability arises, the
Commission will remain open to discussing spe-
ciﬁc cases with undertakings where necessary. In
appropriate cases the Commission envisages fur-
thermore to provide guidance to companies in the
form of opinions. This possibility must remain at
the discretion of the Commission so as not to jeop-
ardise the intended refocusing of the Commission’s
enforcement activities. The Commission is in the
process of preparing a notice on the mechanism for
further guidance that will set out the criteria under
which the Commission will examine requests for
opinions as well as the practical arrangements for
these requests.
3.6. State of play in the legislative process
65. The Commission proposal has been trans-
mitted to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee.
66. A Council working group has been discussing
the proposal since the beginning of October. On
5 December, the Industry Council took note of
progress in the working group. Work will continue
under the Swedish presidency in 2001.
67. The European Parliament has referred the pro-
posal to its Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs, and Mr Evans (PPE/UK) has been
appointed rapporteur. The Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs held a ﬁrst exchange of views
on 21 November. A public hearing took place on
27 February 2001. The European Parliament
expects to adopt its resolution in June 2001.
B — Enforcement of Articles 81, 82
and 86
1. Article 81
1.1. Cartels
68. Cartels are secret horizontal agreements con-
cluded by the main economic operators in a given
market in order to eliminate competition between
them, artiﬁcially raise prices and restrict output.
These attempts to replace a competitive environ-
ment — the driving-force of a market economy
— with coordinated and centrally controlled reg-
ulation of the market are by far the most destruc-
tive infringements of competition law.
69. Cartel participants conspire to maintain an
illusion of competition while in reality customers
have no effective choice and must pay higher prices.
This has an immediate effect on the whole chain
of supply and ultimately affects the end consumer.
International cartels are estimated to represent a
drain of hundreds of millions of euros on the
European economy. Moreover, since cartel prices
are commonly ﬁxed in line with the costs of the least
competitive producer, they create disincentives
for more efﬁcient companies to improve product
quality, technology and generally rationalise pro-
duction and sales methods.
70. In a context of economic globalisation where
the potential damage caused by cartels is increas-
ingly severe, the Commission reafﬁrmed its com-
mitment to detecting and punishing them with the
utmost determination. In this respect, after the cre-
ation of a specialised cartel unit in December 1998,
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rently under discussion, will be a major element in
stepping up the European Community’s fight
against cartels. Indeed, the Commission is pro-
posing a signiﬁcant reinforcement of its powers
of investigation so as to be better equipped to meet
the challenge of increasingly active and sophisti-
cated cartels.
71. Since 1998, the number of cartel cases inves-
tigated by the Commission has increased dramat-
ically. Most of these investigations were still ongo-
ing in 2000 and are likely to result in prohibition
decisions in the course of 2001. This signiﬁcant
increase in the number of cases is largely due to the
positive effects of the Commission’s 1996 notice
on the non-imposition or reduction of ﬁnes in car-
tel cases (the ‘leniency notice’) (1). An increasing
number of companies that are or have been involved
in hardcore anticompetitive activities are now con-
sidering the beneﬁts they could receive through
the leniency programme by cooperating with the
Commission.
72. While cartel investigations remain in princi-
ple conﬁdential until a ﬁnal decision is adopted,
press releases may be issued in speciﬁc circum-
stances, where appropriate. The Commission may,
for instance, do this when an investigation was
triggered by complaints, and/or when it wants to
bring a case to third parties’ attention. In this
respect, the Commission conﬁrmed in July the
existence of an ongoing cartel investigation in the
vitamins sector. It also announced in the same
month the opening of proceedings against nearly
120 banks and banking associations with regard to
their possible participation in price-ﬁxing activi-
ties concerning charges applicable to the exchange
of currencies in the euro zone.
73. Three formal decisions prohibiting cartels
were adopted in 2000, in the maritime sector, the
animal feed industry and the chemicals industry.
FETTCSA
74. On 16 May, the Commission imposed ﬁnes
totalling just under EUR 7 million on 15 liner ship-
ping companies for agreeing not to offer discounts
on their published tariffs. The companies were
members of the now defunct Far East Trade Tariff
Charges and Surcharges Agreement (FETTCSA)
and comprised the members of the Far Eastern
Freight Conference (FEFC) liner shipping con-
ference as well as the FEFC’s principal competi-
tors. They included Hapag-Lloyd (Germany),
Maersk Sealand (Denmark) and P&O Nedlloyd
(UK). The addressees of the decision discussed
possible ways of aligning their commercial prac-
tices concerning charges and surcharges. This led
to an agreement not to discount public tariffs (2).
75. The Commission found that that agreement
infringed the cartel prohibition enshrined in Article
81 of the EC Treaty and rejected the companies’
contention that FETTCSA was merely a ‘techni-
cal agreement’ permitted under the competition
rules applicable to shipping services.
76. The Commission calculated the ﬁnes with ref-
erence to its published guidelines. However,
whereas a horizontal price agreement between
competitors with high market shares should nor-
mally be considered a ‘very serious’ infringement
attracting ﬁnes of at least EUR 20 million per com-
pany, it was found appropriate in this case to class
the infringement as simply ‘serious’. An agree-
ment not to discount was ultimately considered
less harmful than actually ﬁxing prices. The fact
that any harmful effects were likely to have been
of short duration was also taken into account.
77. The Commission also took account of the fact
that the FETTCSA agreement was abandoned
immediately after the companies received a state-
ment of objections in 1994 and that no more meet-
ings had taken place after a warning letter was sent
to the companies by the Commission in 1992.
Further considerations were the fact that the
Commission had received a limited amount of
cooperation from the parties and the length of the
proceedings, due largely as this was to the existence
of other, more important, cases in this sector.
The lysine cartel
78. On 7 June, the Commission imposed ﬁnes
totalling EUR 110 million on ﬁve companies for
operating a global price-ﬁxing cartel for lysine,
the most important amino acid used in animal food-
stuffs for nutritional purposes (amino acids are the
building blocks of proteins). The Commission’s
investigation found that Archer Daniels Midland
Co (United States), Ajinomoto Co (Japan), Cheil
Jedang (Korea), Kyowa Akko (Japan) and Sewon
(Korea) ﬁxed lysine prices worldwide, including
in the European Economic Area. In order to main-
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sales quotas and exchanged sensitive information
from at least July 1990 to June 1995 (1).
79. The interest of the decision lies primarily in
the methodology that the Commission followed
to set the ﬁnes at the above levels. This is borne out
by the fact that the major part of the decision’s
legal assessment deals with the question of ﬁnes
and the arguments advanced by the parties con-
cerning this issue. In the decision, the Commission
not only applied the principles set out in its 1998
guidelines concerning the method of setting ﬁnes
(the ‘methodology guidelines’) (2); it also applied
for the ﬁrst time its 1996 notice on the non-impo-
sition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (the
‘leniency notice’), to take account of cooperation
offered by two cartel participants from the very
beginning of its investigation, as well as lesser
degrees of cooperation later offered by the other
participants (3).
80. The conspiracy prohibited by the
Commission’s decision is a straightforward, hard-
core price and sales quota cartel that is per se ille-
gal. None of the companies actually contested the
facts. They operated the cartel from at least July
1990 to June 1995. Two participants joined the
cartel only in mid-June 1992 (ADM and Cheil
Jedang). The Commission started its investigation
in July 1996, shortly after the US antitrust author-
ities had charged several cartel participants with
engaging in an illegal conspiracy. It did so when
one of two ringleaders of the cartel (Ajinomoto, the
other one being ADM) decided to inform the
Commission about the existence of the cartel
between June 1992 (when ADM entered the EEA
lysine market) and June 1995.
81. In order to set the basic amount of the ﬁnes,
the Commission ﬁrst of all assessed the gravity of
the infringement. In this respect, it classes the car-
tel as a very serious infringement with a real impact
on the relevant EEA market in so far as it has led
to price levels which were higher than would have
been the case under normal conditions of compe-
tition. The Commission explains, however, that
there are grounds for differential treatment of the
ﬁve cartel participants. It indeed takes account of
the considerable disparity between their size and
thus between their capacity to cause signiﬁcant
damage to the EEA customers. Worldwide turnover
is taken as the basis for comparing their relative size
because it is this turnover that enables the
Commission to assess the real resources and impor-
tance of the companies involved. On this basis,
the Commission groups together, on the one hand,
ADM and Ajinomoto and, on the other hand, the
other three, much smaller, companies. In the con-
text of gravity, the Commission also explains that
it does not take account of the criminal fines
imposed by the US and Canadian antitrust author-
ities because — according to the information pro-
vided by those authorities — those ﬁnes only took
account of the anticompetitive effects that the
worldwide cartel produced in their own areas of
jurisdiction. Apart from gravity, duration is, accord-
ing to the 1998 guidelines, the other parameter for
setting the basic amount of the ﬁne. In the present
case, the duration is medium (three to ﬁve years),
each extra year adding a further 10 % — again
according to the 1998 guidelines — to the amount
of the ﬁne.
82. As far as aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are concerned, the Commission’s obser-
vations are as follows. It takes the view that both
ADM and Ajinomoto have been ringleaders. This
aggravating factor leads to an increase of their ﬁne
by 50%. The Commission identiﬁes few mitigat-
ing circumstances in the decision. Cheil Jedang’s
passive role in the ﬁnal stages of the cartel earns
that company a small reduction of its ﬁne and all
cartel participants obtain a decrease of 10% for hav-
ing terminated the infringement as soon as a pub-
lic authority (in this case the US antitrust author-
ities and the FBI) intervened.
83. Under the leniency notice, the Commission
can decide not to impose or to reduce the ﬁnes for
parties who have cooperated with it in the course
of the proceedings. In the present case, the com-
panies cooperated with the Commission at differ-
ent stages of the investigation and in relation to
different periods covered by the investigation into
the infringement. For reasons explained at length
in the decision, none of the companies meets the
conditions for obtaining immunity from ﬁnes, a
‘very substantial’ reduction of the ﬁne (i.e. at least
75%) or even a ‘substantial’ reduction (i.e. between
50 and 75 %). All companies obtain, however, a
‘signiﬁcant’ reduction of their ﬁne (i.e. between 10
and 50 %) for their cooperation.
84. Ajinomoto and Sewon are the two companies
which cooperated most with the Commission. 26
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Ringleader Ajinomoto handed over decisive
(though not complete) information about the car-
tel before the Commission had started its investi-
gation. Sewon came in later and furnished com-
plete, decisive evidence, essentially in response
to the Commission’s formal request for informa-
tion. For these reasons, the Commission grants
both companies the highest possible reduction of
the ﬁne, i.e. 50 %.
85. Kyowa Hakko Kogyo and Cheil Jedang also
provided some material, though not decisive, evi-
dence of the cartel’s existence. This earns them a
30 % reduction in the ﬁne.
86. Finally, ADM did not cooperate with the
Commission during the fact-ﬁnding phase of the
procedure. Following the receipt of the
Commission’s statement of objections, however,
it informed the Commission that it did not sub-
stantially contest the facts set forth in that document.
The Commission considers that ADM qualiﬁes
for a reduction in the amount of the ﬁne of 10 %.
87. Since the adoption of the decision, all the com-
panies involved except Ajinomoto have brought an
action for annulment before the Court of First
Instance (1).
Re-adoption of decision annulled on
procedural grounds
88. On 13 December, the Commission re-adopted
a decision imposing a ﬁne of EUR 3 million on
the Belgian company Solvay SA for its participa-
tion in the soda ash cartel in the late 1980s. Soda
ash is a chemical used in the manufacture of glass.
During the period considered, Solvay had con-
cluded an agreement with a German company guar-
anteeing the latter a minimum volume of sales,
with Solvay itself buying up any unsold quantity,
so as to keep the price of soda ash artiﬁcially high
in Germany. This constituted an infringement of
Article 85 (now 81) of the EC Treaty (2).
89. The original decision imposing a ﬁne on Solvay
and the German company was adopted on
19December 1990, but was ﬁnally struck down by
the Court of Justice on purely procedural grounds:
the decision was authenticated by the signatures of
the Commission’s President and Secretary-General
only after its notiﬁcation to the addressees. When
a decision is annulled by the Court on purely pro-
cedural grounds, the Commission is entitled to
re-adopt the decision as far as it remains substan-
tively unchanged. The Commission therefore
re-adopted the decision imposing the fine on
Solvay. The German company did not appeal
against the original decision and has paid its ﬁne
of EUR 1 million.
1.2. Other forms of agreement
90. Article 81 deals not only with cartels, but also
with other forms of agreement between undertak-
ings that restrict or distort competition. This can
be the case with cooperation agreements between
competitors or distribution agreements between
producers and retailers. While such agreements
could nevertheless be exempted from the ban
imposed by Article 81 — if the conditions set out
in Article 81(3) are fulﬁlled — there are cases
when the advantages to consumers of such agree-
ments are not enough to justify the loss of com-
petition that they entail. In those cases the
Commission would ask the parties to modify or
withdraw their arrangements. Ultimately the
Commission may require the arrangements to be
dismantled if they have been already implemented,
as well as impose ﬁnes.
1.2.1. Airline alliances
91. The airline sector is characterised by a num-
ber of alliance agreements. This can be explained
by the regulatory barriers that currently make it
difﬁcult for airlines from different Member States
to merge their activities in other ways. The
Commission has carried out a number of investi-
gations into agreements between European air-
lines leading, in the year 2000, to formal steps in
the case of the Qualiﬂyeralliance and the cooper-
ation between Lufthansa, SAS and Austrian
Airlines. These cases are discussed in greater detail
in the air transport section of this report (3). The
Commission’s investigations into a number of
other airline alliances are continuing, including
some of the transatlantic airline alliances.
1.2.2. Distribution agreements
92. In the case of distribution agreements, the
Commission is particularly concerned with the
risk that they may result in partitioning of the EU
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3) Section I.C, Chapter 2.5.1 on air transport. market, thereby jeopardising the single market
objective.
Opel
93. The right for consumers to buy products more
cheaply in other Member States is one of the main
beneﬁts of the single market. The Commission
showed its determination to guarantee this right
by deciding to impose a ﬁne of EUR 43 million on
Opel Nederland (1). The Dutch importer of cars of
the Opel brand obstructed exports of new cars to
ﬁnal consumers from other Member States, between
September 1996 and January 1998. This is the sec-
ond major Commission decision, following that
taken in Volkswagenin January 1998, where com-
plaints from consumers prompted the Commission
to investigate practices of car manufacturers and
their importers and to impose heavy ﬁnes (2). It
was therefore conﬁrmed that measures taken by
undertakings that undermine the proper function-
ing of the single market constitute a very serious
infringement of European competition rules and are
dealt with severely.
JCB
94. On 21 December, the Commission adopted a
decision ﬁnding that the company JCB Service,
the parent company of the UK-based JC Bamford
Group, had infringed Article 81 of the EC Treaty (3).
The distribution agreements for JCB construction
and earthmoving equipment concluded between
the JCB Group and its network of exclusive dis-
tributors were aimed at walling off the French,
UK, Irish and Italian markets within the
Community. The agreements included a number
of measures designed to restrict sales by distribu-
tors outside their exclusive territories. The
Commission decision requires JCB Service to put
an end to the infringement and to pay a ﬁne of
EUR 39.6 million.
1.2.3. Environmental agreements
CECED
95. Article 6 of the EC Treaty stipulates that
Community policy on the environment must be
integrated into the other Community policies.
Environmental concerns are in no way incompat-
ible with competition policy, provided that restric-
tions of competition are proportionate and neces-
sary for achieving the environmental objectives
pursued.
96. This principle is clearly illustrated by the
CECED decision (4), in which the Commission
approved for the ﬁrst time an agreement to stop
production with a view to improving the environ-
mental performance of products. The participants
in the agreement, nearly all the European produc-
ers and importers of domestic washing machines,
will stop producing or importing into the EU the
least energy-efﬁcient machines in order to reduce
the energy consumption of such appliances and
thereby reduce pollutant emissions from power
generation.
97. Although participants restrict their freedom
to manufacture and market certain types of wash-
ing machine, thereby restricting competition within
the meaning of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty, the
agreement fulfils the conditions for exemption
under Article 81(3): it will bring advantages and
considerable savings for consumers, in particular
by reducing pollutant emissions from electricity
generation. The Commission decision to exempt
the agreement takes account of this positive con-
tribution to the EU’s environmental objectives,
for the beneﬁt of present and future generations.
2. Articles 82 and 86
98. Article 82 prohibits undertakings in a domi-
nant position on a given market from abusing this
situation to the detriment of third parties. Such
abuse consists, inter alia, in limiting production,
charging excessive, discriminatory or predatory
prices, tying sales, and imposing supplementary
obligations unrelated to the product or service sold.
The Commission takes the view that undertakings
which are free from competitive constraint com-
mit a particularly dangerous abuse when they block
or delay — through unfair practices — the entry
of competitors into the market. For this reason the
Commission is particularly alert to the effects of
dominant positions in recently liberalised markets,
where there is a danger that the behaviour of the
incumbent company will deny the beneﬁts expected
28
(
1) Decision of 20 September (OJ L 59, 28.2.2001); IP/00/1028,
20.9.2000. On 1 December, Opel brought an action for the annul-
ment of the Commission’s decision before the Court of First Instance
(Case T-368/00).
(
2) See also Section I.C, Chapter 1.1.1 on motor vehicles. 
(
3) Press Release IP/00/1526, 21.12.2000. (
4) F-1/36.718; OJ L187, 26.7.2000; Press Release IP/00/148, 11.2.2000.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
from these processes in terms of restructuring,
innovation or job creation.
99. Article 86 speciﬁes that competition rules also
apply to public undertakings and undertakings to
which Member States grant special or exclusive
rights, in so far as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance of the particu-
lar tasks assigned to them.
100. Details of decisions adopted or formal pro-
ceedings opened in pursuance of Article 82, and
Article 86 read in conjunction with Article 82, are
given in the sectoral part of this report on postal
services (1) and air transport (2).
Selective rebates in the chemical industry:
re-adoption of decision
101. On 13 December, the Commission re-adopted
two decisions, one imposing a ﬁne of EUR 20 mil-
lion on the Belgian company Solvay SA and the
other a ﬁne of EUR 10 million on the UK company
Imperial Chemicals Industries (ICI) plc, with
respect to their abuse of their dominant position on
the soda ash market during the 1980s. Soda ash is
a chemical used in the manufacture of glass. During
the period in question, Solvay and ICI had estab-
lished a system of rebates designed to avoid any
danger of real competition in their respective ‘ter-
ritories’, that is to say western continental Europe
in the case of Solvay and the United Kingdom and
Ireland in the case of ICI.
102. ICI and Solvay each set up a system of what
were called ‘top-slice’ rebates aimed at keeping
competitors off the market. Most glass manufac-
turers, the major users of soda ash, have one main
supplier for their core requirements, but like to have
a second supplier so as not to be completely depend-
ent on the ﬁrst. To minimise the competitive impact
of second suppliers of this kind Solvay and ICI
developed a two-tier pricing system. The core ton-
nage was sold at the normal price, but the additional
quantities that the customer might otherwise have
bought from another supplier — the ‘top slice’ —
were offered at a substantial (and secret) discount.
103. In some cases this meant that Solvay and ICI
offered the marginal tonnage at virtually half price.
It was made clear to customers that the special
price for the top slice depended on their agreeing
to take most, if not all, of their requirements from
the dominant producer. The effect was to prevent
other producers from entering into genuine com-
petition with Solvay and ICI. In order to compete,
they would have had to offer very large discounts
on their entire sales volume, whereas Solvay and
ICI were doing this only on the top slice. The
Commission took the view that these were very
serious infringements of Article 86 (now Article
82) and adopted on 19 December 1990 two deci-
sions imposing what were considered heavy ﬁnes
at the time. The Court of Justice annulled these
decisions on purely procedural grounds: in such
cases the Commission is entitled to re-adopt the
decision as far as it remains substantively
unchanged (3).
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Box 2: The impact of competition policy on consumers
Consumers are not the only beneﬁciaries of competition policy, but they can be regarded as important ones.
When competitive conditions are in place, producers try to attract customers by offering them a lower price,
higher quality or better service than their competitors. Consumers also beneﬁt in the long run when efforts
made by ﬁrms to overcome their competitors eventually lead to greater innovation and efﬁciency in the pro-
duction of certain goods or services. However, it is not always easy or, indeed, possible to quantify the
impact on consumers of competition policy decisions. As pointed out, ﬁrms compete not only on prices and
there are many other ways in which consumers could gain from certain policy decisions, e.g. by way of greater
product variety or better contractual terms. In other cases, competition policy decisions concern an inter-
mediate stage of production, so that the ﬁnal consumer is not directly involved. When that is the case,
antitrust decisions may increase competition in the input markets, creating the conditions for lower end-
product prices; it is, however, hard to quantify how much the ﬁnal consumer is likely to gain.
In this report the reader will ﬁnd references to many antitrust and merger decisions. Here below we would
like to point out a few of them which we believe can illustrate the sort of beneﬁts that consumers can expect
from competition policy.
The decision against Opel Nederland (
1) is the second main case concerning obstacles to parallel trade in
cars, after that taken in Volkswagen in 1998 (
2). The decision requires the Dutch importer of Opel cars to
lift measures preventing or restricting consumers from other Member States from buying new cars of the
Opel make for immediate re-export. This decision is aimed at guaranteeing the right for consumers to buy
a car without impediment in the Member State where prices are low. Should parallel imports attain a sub-
stantial level, they will exert some pressure on car manufacturers to reduce prices for cars in those Member
States where they are higher. Parallel imports would also create the incentive for car dealers to improve serv-
ice and provide other beneﬁts.
In the Telefónica/Sogecable/Audiovisual Sport case (
3), involving the market in pay-TV rights to football
matches in Spain, the Commission’s action has put an end to the agreement to ﬁx the price for watching
football matches in Spain in pay-per-view. In the early days of September 2000, when the new football sea-
son began, there was evidence of very strong competition between the broadcasters in the form of promo-
tions based on the transmission of football matches. While these offers focused on new subscribers, there
was also evidence that some cable operators reduced signiﬁcantly the prices they charged all categories of
customer. Later, the Spanish digital terrestrial operator cut pay-per-view football prices by up to 50 %.
Thanks to the Commission’s action consumers will also beneﬁt from a much broader choice: football rights
previously available only to digital satellite operators will be accessible also to other broadcasters, giving
rise to a wide range of football transmissions on all three digital delivery systems (satellite, terrestrial and
cable).
In the case of the merger between the German electricity companies Veba and Viag (
4), the operation was
made conditional on full compliance with strict divestment undertakings by the parties. This was to ensure
that competition in the recently liberalised German electricity market would not be impeded by a dominant
duopoly between Veba/Viag and their biggest competitor RWE. In dealing with the case, the Commission
cooperated closely with the German Bundeskartellamt, which had to investigate the parallel merger of RWE
and VEW and cleared it under similar conditions. As a result, German electricity consumers will continue
to beneﬁt from competition in electricity supply, which has already led to signiﬁcant price cuts for both indus-
trial and household consumers since regional monopolies of power utilities were legally abolished two years
ago. Without the far-reaching conditions imposed by the Commission and the Bundeskartellamt, the two
mergers would have led to a situation where, in the absence of effective competition, prices in Germany would
(
1) See also point 106. 
(
2) OJ L 124, 23.4.1998.
(
3) See also point 220.
(
4) See also point 261.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
C — Sector-based survey
1. Basic industries, consumer and
investment goods
1.1. Motor vehicles
104. Under Regulation (EC) No1475/95 (1) motor
vehicle distribution agreements between manu-
facturers and dealers for vehicle sales and servic-
ing are exempted from the ban enshrined in Article
81. The method of distribution covered by the reg-
ulation is a combination of exclusive and selec-
tive distribution. Vehicles are only sold through
authorised dealers, who are allocated an exclusive
sales territory (or a territory in which the number
of other dealers belonging to the same network is
limited), and sales to intermediaries who are not
authorised by the manufacturer are prohibited. The
block exemption was granted on the assumption
that inter-brand and intra-brand competition was
effective in the motor vehicle sector, that the com-
mercial independence of distributors would be
strengthened and that the system would be advan-
tageous to consumers. The exemption granted by
the regulation expires on 30 September 2002.
105. The regulation contains many provisions
aimed at stepping up competition in the distri-
bution of vehicles and spare parts in order 
to enable consumers to take advantage of all 
the potential benefits of the single market, in 
particular by being able to make cross-border
purchases.
1.1.1. Application of the block exemption
regulation in 2000: infringements
106. Despite these provisions, the Commission
found in Opel Nederland (2) that motor vehicle
distribution agreements are not always advanta-
geous to consumers. Between September 1996 and
January 1998, the importer of Opel cars in the
Netherlands, Opel Nederland BV, a subsidiary of
General Motors Nederland BV, put into effect
measures restricting or preventing export sales by
its dealers to both ﬁnal customers and intermedi-
aries, thereby very seriously undermining the proper
functioning of the single market, one of the
Community’s fundamental objectives. Given the
seriousness and duration of the infringement, the
Commission ﬁned Opel Nederland EUR 43 mil-
lion. Coming after the Volkswagencase(3), this is
the second major decision ﬁnding against a motor
vehicle manufacturer since Regulation (EC)
No 1475/95 came into force.
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have been likely to increase again towards the previous level, cancelling out the beneﬁts of liberalisation.
Enhanced competition in electricity supply as a result of liberalisation may also lead to improvement of the
services offered by utilities (e.g. multi-utility services, more consumer choice as regards sources of supply
— ‘green’ power, etc.).
The Commission has also imposed conditions on the merger between TotalFinaand Elf Aquitaine (
1), which
would have risked impeding effective competition on several product markets in France. These included
such vital markets for consumers as the wholesale market in domestic heating fuel, the retail market in 
liqueﬁed petroleum gases (LPG) and the sale of motor fuel on French motorways. The required sell-off 
of a large proportion of the merged entity’s investments in transport and storage logistics will allow non-
integrated producers to remain competitive in the retail market for domestic heating fuel and for LPG and,
therefore, exert downward pressure on prices. On the market for motor fuel on motorways, the required divest-
ment of 70 petrol stations will preserve conditions of effective competition and allow the entry of a large
retail operator (Carrefour) into a sector traditionally monopolised by energy groups. This latter aspect should
develop competition not only on prices, but also on the supply of additional services to consumers.
(
1) See also point 257.
(
1) Commission regulation of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribu-
tion and servicing agreements (OJ L 145, 29.6.1995).
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2) Decision of 20 September 2000 (OJ L59, 28.2.2001); Press Release
IP/00/1028, 20.9.2000. On 1 December, Opel brought an action for
the annulment of the Commission’s decision before the Court of First
Instance (Case T-368/00).
(
2) Decision of 28 January 1998 (OJ L124, 25.4.1998); Press Release
IP/98/94, 28.1.1998.107. In its judgment of 6 July in Volkswagen (1)
the Court of First Instance conﬁrmed the serious-
ness of infringements of this kind, which prevent
consumers from beneﬁting fully from the advan-
tages offered by the single market. The CFI upheld
the substance of the Commission decision but
found that it had not adduced sufﬁcient proof of the
existence of two of the ﬁve measures with which
it found fault. The CFI based its assessment of the
fine on a duration of three years instead of the
10 years taken into account in the decision, and
reduced the ﬁne from EUR 120 million to EUR
90 million.
108. In the same vein, the Commission is contin-
uing to investigate other cases involving motor
vehicle manufacturers to whom it sent statements
of objections in 1999, and is also investigating
other cases in which measures were taken to pre-
vent or restrict cross-border trade.
109. One distinctive feature of the Opel and
Volkswagen cases and of the other investigations
in hand is that they were prompted by complaints.
Each year, the Commission receives hundreds of
letters from consumers and authorised intermedi-
aries complaining of difﬁculties encountered when
buying a motor vehicle in another Member State.
The Commission has performed several surprise
inspections at the premises of various manufac-
turers on the basis of information supplied by these
complainants.
1.1.2. General assessment of the application
of the regulation
110. Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95
requires the Commission to evaluate the impact
of the exempted system of distribution on price
differentials between the different Member States
and to draw up a report on the evaluation of the reg-
ulation before the end of 2000.
111. As regards the differences between the pre-tax
prices charged in the various EU Member States, the
Commission produces a twice-yearly report (2)
assessing these differentials on the basis of infor-
mation supplied by the manufacturers in May and
November each year. The Commission found that,
over the period from November 1999 to May 2000,
there were still large differences in pre-tax prices
for new cars within the European Union, amount-
ing on average to around 20 %.
112. The Commission also carried out its evalu-
ation of the block exemption regulation, adopting
its report on 15 November (3). The aim of the eval-
uation is to determine whether the assumptions
which prompted the Commission to adopt the reg-
ulation are still valid and to assess the impact of the
exempted system of distribution on the evolution
of price differentials, on the quality of service
offered to consumers and, more generally, on the
functioning of the single market for the sale and
servicing of new cars.
113. The evaluation report was drafted on the
basis of replies to questionnaires that the
Commission sent to vehicle manufacturers, con-
sumer associations, associations representing deal-
ers, independent repairers, independent importers
and intermediaries, producers of spare parts and cer-
tain businesses operating on the Internet. It also
drew on recent studies of the motor industry and
motor vehicle distribution, on its twice-yearly
report on price differentials between EU Member
States and on its experience in dealing with the
competition problems it has encountered while
monitoring the application of Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty (4).
114. The evaluation report ﬁnds that the block
exemption regulation has only partly achieved
the expected results. Some of the assumptions
which led the Commission to adopt the regulation
are furthermore open to debate. The report also
sees the exempted system as liable to consider-
ably impede the emergence of new methods of dis-
tribution, in particular via the Internet.
115. Following the adoption of the report, all inter-
ested parties were invited to give their views; in par-
ticular at a hearing held on 13 and 14 February
2001. The Commission also invited all interested
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parties to comment on two studies of motor vehi-
cle distribution carried out by consultants (1).
116. Before the end of 2001, the Commission
intends to publish, proposals for new rules on the
distribution and servicing of new vehicles, which
will take effect when Regulation (EC) No 1475/95
expires.
1.1.3. Structural change in the sector
117. The motor vehicle sector is also the focus of
increasingly frequent link-ups between manufac-
turers. For example, General Motors and Fiat, noti-
ﬁed a reciprocal exchange of shareholdings, as
well as plans to cooperate in the powertrain ﬁeld,
in the joint purchase of car components and spare
parts, in the organisation of ﬁnancial services to
their dealers and customers, and in the development
of common platforms and R & D programmes
linked to the production of passenger cars and light
commercial vehicles. The Commission took the
view that the conditions for exemption from the
Community competition rules were met (2).
118. This process of structural change is also evi-
dent from the number of mergers and acquisitions
and new joint ventures between component sup-
pliers (3), as well as from the continuing trend
towards consolidation among motor vehicle man-
ufacturers (4). Another noteworthy development is
the establishment of Internet business-to-business
(B2B) platforms between vehicle and component
manufacturers with a view to achieving the best
possible economies of scale in purchasing, as well
as optimising the supply chain and production
processes on both the component production and
vehicle assembly sides. For example, the Covisint
platform will group together General Motors, Ford,
Daimler Chrysler, Renault, Nissan and Toyota, on
the one hand, and BASF, Delphi Automotive,
Federal Mogul, Johnson Controls, Lear Corporation
and Yazaki International, on the other. Given that
signiﬁcant players and in particular major motor
manufacturers are involved, the creation and oper-
ation of Covisint will be carefully scrutinised by
the Commission.
1.2. Motor fuel
119. The dramatic increase in the price of motor
fuel during the year sparked a public debate on
competitive conditions in the sector. The
Commission and the national competition author-
ities met and discussed application of the compe-
tition rules in this sector at national and Community
level. A ﬁrst meeting was held on 29 September
at which the national authorities and the
Commission exchanged details of their experi-
ences, and this was followed by a second meeting
on 29 November (5). The national authorities in
several Member States took action during the year
against competition law infringements in the motor
fuel sector within their territories. The Italian and
Swedish competition authorities both carried out
successful cartel prosecutions and the German
competition authority adopted a decision con-
cerning discriminatory pricing (6).
120. It was agreed that national authorities should
focus on cartel prosecution since experience shows
that, where price cartels exist in this sector, they
operate at national or regional level. The national
competition authorities were also invited to exam-
ine the issue of vertical restraints in their national
markets, and in particular the level of foreclosure.
The motor fuel sector in Europe is characterised by
exclusive supply agreements between retailers and
suppliers. The cumulative effect of these contracts
may prevent new entrants and non-integrated, inde-
pendent companies from entering the market (fore-
closure effect). The new block exemption regula-
tion on vertical restraints (7) has shortened the max-
imum duration of non-compete clauses from ten
to ﬁve years, and it is hoped that this will help to
open up the market. The Commission and the
national authorities will cooperate in this assess-
ment.
121. For its part, the Commission, started an inves-
tigation with a view to assessing the position of
non-integrated independent companies in several
Member States. It is important to ensure that inde-
pendent companies are genuinely able to enter the
motor fuel markets, since markets where inde-
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(
7) See also Section I.A, Chapter 1.pendent companies have a signiﬁcant presence
(e.g. France, United Kingdom and Germany) are
more competitive than retail markets where verti-
cally integrated suppliers have a strong presence.
2. Network industries
2.1. Gas
122. Signiﬁcant progress was made during the
year towards the creation a single gas market. The
gas directive (Directive 98/30/EC) had to be trans-
posed into national law by 10 August. Amongst
other things, it provides for:
— the abolition of monopoly rights (such as
import monopolies);
— the introduction of a third party access regime
(allowing eligible gas customers to use the
existing gas network);
— the gradual opening-up of the market (at least
20 % of the total annual consumption of the
national gas market had to be liberalised by
August 2000);
— the unbundling of vertically integrated com-
panies (the minimum requirement being that
a gas undertaking keeps separate internal
accounts for transmission, distribution and
storage).
123. The aim of liberalisation is to introduce com-
petition into the gas markets by making it possi-
ble for customers to switch suppliers. This open-
ing-up of gas markets in the Community will have
an impact on competition policy equivalent to that
which followed the liberalisation of electricity
markets. Community competition policy will com-
plement internal market policy so that liberalisa-
tion becomes a reality for consumers.
124. In total, 11 of the 15 Member States imple-
mented the gas directive on time. Three did not
fulﬁl their obligation at all (France, Luxembourg
and Portugal) and one did not implement the direc-
tive completely (Germany). The Commission there-
fore decided to initiate proceedings against those
four Member States.
125. Of the Member States which transposed the
directive, most chose its procompetitive options
with regard to access to the network. The major-
ity chose a regulated third party access (TPA)
regime, while the remaining Member States opted
for negotiated TPA or a combination of both 
systems.
126. Many Member States opened up their mar-
kets to a greater extent than the minimum required
by the directive. Instead of the 20 % minimum
requirement, countries like the UK and Germany
committed themselves to a 100% market opening.
In the coming years a number of Member States,
namely Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands,
Austria and Sweden, are expected to follow this
example and open up their markets completely.
As of August 2000, on average, approximately
80 % of total gas demand was liberalised.
127. However, although a promising start has been
made in gas market liberalisation and a high aver-
age level of market opening is an encouraging sign
and a very important ﬁrst precondition for cus-
tomers to be able to exercise their right to choose
their supplier, it is not in itself a guarantee that a
competitive gas market will be achieved in Europe,
and not enough to ensure that customers will ben-
eﬁt fully from liberalisation. Much work therefore
remains to be done to make the single European gas
market a reality.
128. Most Member States have decided in favour
of creating an independent regulator to monitor the
gas industry and in particular TPA. The Commission
is closely collaborating with these newly created
authorities. Along the lines of the Florence Forum,
it established an EU Gas Regulatory Forum, which
met twice in Madrid in the course of the year. The
forum brings together representatives from all
Member States, national regulators, transmission
system operators and gas companies and provides
the framework for discussions on the harmonisa-
tion of industry standards and regulatory practice.
During the year the forum dealt mainly with the
creation of an independent European association of
transmission system operators and with network
issues, such as TPA services and cross-border tar-
iﬁcation as well as technical interoperability ques-
tions. The forum also decided to create a working
group in order to step up the discussions on, among
other things, transmission fees, balancing and access
to storage.
129. At its meeting in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March
the European Council decided ‘to speed up liber-
alisation in areas such as gas’ (1). The Commission
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will therefore table a new proposal for a directive
at the European Council meeting in Stockholm in
March 2001 (1), calling for completion of the inter-
nal market for gas.
130. As regards competition law enforcement, in
2000 the Commission dealt mainly with coopera-
tion agreements among producers and providers of
ancillary services and with long-term supply agree-
ments (2).
131. In the course of its investigations, the
Commission established that the structure of the
European gas markets is currently not favourable
to competition. The markets are characterised by
horizontal and vertical demarcation; a situation
partly brought about by the long-term supply con-
tracts signed between the members of a well-estab-
lished vertical supply chain, from gas producers to
end users.
132. Vertical demarcation means that each oper-
ator has its well-deﬁned function and place in the
supply chain and generally refrains from entering
the markets of its customers and/or suppliers (e.g.
no direct sales by producers to end users).
Horizontal demarcation means that each
importer/wholesaler and/or regional/local distrib-
utor has its traditional supply area and — for the
time being at least — generally does not enter the
neighbouring supply area.
133. The Commission also found that most
upstream markets (exploration, production, sales
to wholesalers) are characterised by various forms
of cooperation between competitors. Most down-
stream markets (distribution, transmission and
storage) currently appear to be at most national in
scope. These are generally dominated by former
monopolists, so-called national champions. These
national champions are generally vertically inte-
grated and control the pipelines, which are nor-
mally and will in all likelihood remain natural
monopolies.
134. When setting priorities for future enforce-
ment policy, the Commission will take the current
market structure into account. The Commission is
of the view that competition in the gas markets
can only be introduced if three conditions are met,
namely:
— suppliers are free to compete for customers;
— customers are free to change suppliers;
— an effective, non-discriminatory and
cost-reﬂective TPA regime is introduced and
maintained.
135. In the coming years, the Commission will
investigate as a matter of priority those cases which
assist in creating competitive market conditions.
Priority will thus be assigned to cases that will
help put an end to joint marketing activities on the
upstream markets (e.g. joint sales). Priority will
also be given to cases where the buyer’s ability to
sell gas outside a certain territory or to certain users
is limited. These cases are of particular importance
for the creation of the single gas market.
136. Priority will also be given to network issues.
Without an effective third party access regime,
customers cannot switch suppliers and suppliers
cannot deliver gas to customers willing to switch
suppliers. In line with general principles of EC
competition law, cross-border issues will be the
main focus of the Commission, while national
authorities are encouraged to deal with cases of
national scope.
2.2. Electricity
137. This was the second year of electricity lib-
eralisation. Eleven Member States have fully
implemented the 1996 directive. Of the other four,
three have not yet completed all the legislative
instruments necessary for market participants to
know the framework in which they operate. One
Member State is still exempted from the directive
until 2001. Commission proceedings under Article
226 of the EC Treaty are still pending against those
Member States which are either late or have only
incompletely implemented the directive.
138. On 10 May, the Commission adopted a pro-
posal for a Parliament and Council directive on
the promotion of electricity from renewable energy
sources in the internal electricity market (3). The
strategic objective of the proposal is to create a
framework for a signiﬁcant medium-term increase
in renewable sourced electricity in the EU and to
facilitate its access to the internal electricity mar-
ket. In order to achieve the directive’s aim, Member
States would be required to take the necessary
measures, including measures of public support,
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energy sources accounts for around 22 % of total
electricity consumption in the Community by 2010.
139. Community competition law enforcement
concentrated on two types of case. First, cases
involving contractual links between electricity
generators which have become competitors through
liberalisation. In particular, an investigation was
undertaken on the links between Electricité de
France and Compagnie Nationale du Rhône,
respectively the former French monopolist and a
small local electricity generator.
140. A second relevant issue was access to con-
gested interconnectors, i.e. the lines used to con-
nect together the electricity systems of different
Member States (1). Improvements were made in
access to the cables linking the high-voltage elec-
tricity grids of Scandinavian countries with
Germany following the Commission’s interven-
tion. The Commission will also deal with other
congested interconnectors between EU Member
States, such as those at the UK–French, the
Belgian–Dutch, the German–Dutch and the
French–Spanish borders.
141. The Commission examined its ﬁrst major
merger case affecting electricity markets (2).
142. The guidelines for the treatment of stranded
costs under the State aid rules have not yet been
ﬁnalised. The Commission expects to adopt these
in the ﬁrst half of 2001.
143. The European Council decided in Lisbon on
23 and 24 March ‘to speed up liberalisation in areas
such as […] electricity’ (3), just as it did with gas
markets  The Commission will therefore table a new
proposal for a directive at the European Council
meeting in Stockholm in March 2001 (4), 
calling for completion of the internal market for
electricity.
2.3. Telecommunications
2.3.1. Consolidation of the liberalisation
directives
144. On 12 July, as part of the general review of
the sectoral directives, the Commission adopted a
draft directive grouping together in a single text all
the non-obsolete provisions of Directive
90/388/EEC, as subsequently amended by
Directives 94/46/EC, 95/51/EC, 96/2/EC, 96/19/EC
and 1999/64/EC. Since the process of liberalising
telecommunications markets in Europe has to a
large extent been completed, the only provisions
to be retained will be those still necessary to ensure
that the directive’s aims continue to be fulﬁlled. The
draft directive does not seek to impose any new
obligations on Member States. Several deﬁnitions
have been updated to reﬂect the latest technolog-
ical advances in the telecommunications sector.
145. The Commission will deﬁnitively adopt the
new directive in parallel with six other harmoni-
sation directives which were also adopted, in draft
form, on 12 July.
2.3.2. Sixth report on the implementation 
of the directives
146. On 7 December, the Commission adopted
its sixth report on the implementation of the
telecommunications regulatory package (5), which
takes stock of the situation with regard to appli-
cation of the liberalisation and harmonisation direc-
tives in all the Member States.
147. After three years of full liberalisation of
telecommunications services, the report conﬁrms
that competition has fostered increased penetra-
tion of GSM mobile telephony, which is now as
high as 70% in one Member State and is over 39%
in all others. The market situation shows how tar-
iffs for residential and business users are contin-
uing on a downward path. On the wholesale mar-
ket, overall prices for leased lines are still falling,
particularly where there is competitive pressure.
While leased line prices have decreased signiﬁ-
cantly since 1997, annual rentals for both national
and international lines vary greatly from one
Member State to another. Since liberalisation, inter-
connection charges have decreased by 6.5 % for
single transit and by 20.2% for double transit and
have remained stable for interconnection at local
level.
148. In the report, the Commission highlights a
number of problems that still need to be overcome.
Licensing procedures are still lengthy and bureau-
cratic in several Member States and licence fees
often remain high. This creates a barrier to market
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entry. As regards interconnection, new entrants
complain that regulators do not always have the
powers to check that charges applied by incumbent
operators are cost-oriented. Very few Member
States have ensured that appropriate accounting
tools are in place. Lastly, there are still serious
problems in some Member States where line rental
charges have not been rebalanced, resulting in a
price squeeze as regards charges for access to the
local loop.
2.3.3. Voice communications on the Internet
149. In its 1998 notice on the status of voice com-
munications on the Internet, the Commission
announced that it would review the notice in 2000
in the light of market developments. The
Commission carried out a public consultation exer-
cise to that end and adopted a new communica-
tion on 20 December (1). The new communication
is not intended to replace the 1998 notice, whose
conclusions remain valid until the entry into force
of the new regulatory framework, scheduled for
2002; its main aim is to clear up a number of ambi-
guities.
150. The Commission continues to consider that
telecommunications services on the Internet nor-
mally fall outside the deﬁnition of voice telephony
and cannot therefore be made subject to the sec-
toral legislation. Where, on the other hand, thanks
to its quality and reliability the service offers a
perfect substitute for voice communications pro-
vided by traditional means, there is no reason why
the operator should not have to comply with the reg-
ulatory regime applicable to voice telephony.
2.3.4. Monitoring of the implementation 
of directives
151. The Commission kept up its efforts to ensure
that the liberalisation directives were effectively
implemented in the Member States and that the
regulatory framework was set in place in Greece,
where the transitional period for introducing com-
petition expired on 31 December.
152. Although substantial progress had been made
by the Member States, as of the end of the year 21
infringement proceedings were still pending against
Member States which had not properly transposed
the liberalisation directives based on Article 86(3)
of the Treaty or had not notiﬁed any implement-
ing measures. The Commission pressed ahead in
particular with infringement proceedings initiated
in previous years against Member States which
had failed to transpose the liberalisation directives
correctly. The case against France concerning cal-
culation of the cost of the universal service was
referred to the Court of Justice in April; the eval-
uation methods and calculation rules introduced by
France in 1997 are considered by the Commission
to be non-transparent and to result in overstate-
ment of the cost of the universal service.
153. The Commission also continued with pro-
ceedings against Member States in which the rebal-
ancing of line rental charges in accordance with
Directive 96/19/EC was not complete (Germany,
Italy and Spain, and France in the context of the
proceeding relating to the universal service). It is
essential that this rebalancing should take place
before unbundling of the local loop in order to
avoid price squeezes, i.e. situations in which new
entrant operators would have to incur intermedi-
ate costs (those of the unbundled lines in the case
in point) in order to be able to compete effectively
with the retail prices charged by the dominant oper-
ator, which also happens to be the supplier of the
intermediate good. The Commission thus issued
reasoned opinions to Italy and Spain and sent
Germany a letter of formal notice. The Italian
authorities having subsequently adopted in
December measures enabling Telecom Italia to
adjust the line rental charge by a sufﬁcient pro-
portion, the infringement proceeding against Italy
was suspended.
154. The Commission also issued a reasoned opin-
ion to Luxembourg, which discriminated against
new entrants with regard to rights of way (2), and
sent eight letters of formal notice to Member States
that had not communicated any measures imple-
menting Directive 1999/64/EC, which is aimed at
ensuring that telecommunications networks and
cable television networks owned by a single oper-
ator are separate legal entities.
2.3.5. Communication and sector inquiry 
on local loop unbundling
155. The low level of competition in the local loop
(i.e. the last copper pair lines between the incum-
bents’ exchanges and end-users’ premises) remains
a source of concern. In most Member States incum-
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2001.bent operators hold market shares of between
95 and 100 % in access retail services and local
communications, for which the control of the local
loop places them in a gatekeeper position. On
26April, the Commission adopted a communica-
tion on unbundled access to the local loop (1), in
which it indicated that, even in the absence of spe-
ciﬁc regulatory requirements, the imposition by
an incumbent operator of discriminatory condi-
tions or the outright refusal to grant access to the
local loop may amount to an abuse of a dominant
position in violation of Article 82.
156. On 12 July, when announcing its proposal
for a new regulatory framework for the telecom-
munications services industry (2), including a reg-
ulation on local loop unbundling, the Commission
also indicated that it had launched a sector inquiry
on local loop access. This inquiry deals with com-
petition over the local loop and investigates pos-
sible abuses of a dominant position by incumbent
operators.
2.3.6. Initial results of the sector inquiry 
on leased lines
157. At a hearing held on 22 September, the
Commission presented the initial results of the sec-
tor inquiry on leased line charges. The main ﬁnd-
ings are that leased line charges have fallen con-
siderably since the sector was opened up to com-
petition, particularly for long-distance and
international leased lines. Strong competitive pres-
sure appears to exist at retail level, as witnessed by
the substantial discounts granted by incumbent
operators. There is also spectacular growth in
demand for leased lines, fuelled above all by the
Internet. The situation varies greatly from one
Member State to another, however. The relative
weight of income from leased lines in the total
turnover of the incumbent operators varies widely
(between 1 and 17% for national leased lines and
between 3 and 27% for international leased lines).
Potentially excessive prices have been observed for
the 2, 34 and 155 megabytes per second (Mbps)
bandwidths. The inquiry has also revealed the exis-
tence of possible non-tariff-related abuses such as
strategic discounts and discriminatory waiting
times for the provision of leased lines.
158. In order to examine the reasons for possibly
excessive international leased line prices, the
Commission opened ﬁve ex ofﬁcio investigations,
regarding Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy and
Portugal. As a ﬁrst step, the Commission is hold-
ing bilateral meetings with the national regulatory
and competition authorities of the Member States
concerned.
2.3.7. Sector inquiry on roaming
159. The sector inquiry on roaming was based on
formal information requests concerning costs,
prices and commercial practices related to mobile
roaming that were addressed to almost 200 mobile
network operators, service providers and national
authorities in the EU. Both wholesale and retail
markets were found to remain predominantly
national, with a near-absence of transnational retail
offers. The inquiry established concentration ratios
of over 90 % for the two incumbent operators in
most national wholesale roaming markets, and a
pervasive lack of cost-orientation and of compet-
itive offers in particular at wholesale level through-
out the EU.
160. The Commission discussed the ﬁndings of its
inquiry with the national competition authorities
and experts from the national telecommunications
regulatory authorities of the EU Member States at
a meeting that took place in Brussels on
24 November. At that meeting, the Commission
discussed possible initiatives to be taken to deal with
a number of likely cases of collusion and/or abuse
of single or joint dominance by mobile network
operators identified during the inquiry. The
Commission will also use its ﬁndings to evaluate
standard and preferential roaming agreements, as
well as discounting practices concerning wholesale
and retail roaming rates, and it intends to provide
both national authorities and undertakings with
guidance on the application of the competition
rules on this basis.
2.3.8. Individual cases dealt with under
Articles 81 and 82
Unisource
161. On 29 December, the Commission adopted
a decision (3) repealing the exemption decision it
had taken in 1997 (4) regarding Unisource, a broad,
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global telecommunications alliance between three
incumbent telecommunications operators, namely
KPN (the Netherlands), Telia (Sweden) and
Swisscom (Switzerland).
162. The parties had informed the Commission that
due to market developments and the losses accu-
mulated by Unisource, the shareholders had decided
to severely reduce the range of activities of their
joint venture, which now provided only value-added
telecommunications services to multinational com-
panies. Furthermore, the non-compete clauses pre-
venting the parent companies from competing with
the joint venture had been abandoned, as had the
exclusive distribution arrangements.
163. Given these changes, the parties asked for a
review of the 1997 decision, in order in particular
that they might be released from the extensive con-
ditions and reporting requirements that were
imposed as part of the exemption.
2.3.9. Cases dealt with under the merger
regulation
JV.46 — Callahan Invest/Kabel
Nordrhein-Westfalen and JV.50 — Callahan
Invest/Kabel Baden-Württemberg
164. In two decisions, taken on 19 June and
1 August, the Commission authorised the sale of
Deutsche Telekom’s (DT’s) regional cable TV
network in North Rhine-Westphalia (KNW) and
Baden-Württemberg (KBW) to Callahan Invest
Limited (1). The aim of these operations is to cre-
ate more competition in the different markets for
the provision of communications services. In its
assessment of the notiﬁed mergers, the Commission
found that the operations would not create or
strengthen a dominant position.
165. The Commission found that, while immedi-
ately after the transaction KNW and KBW will
have a de facto monopoly for cable operations in
their territory, the transaction itself does not cre-
ate or strengthen a dominant position on the mar-
ket for pay-television services in Germany, as
KNW and KBW are simply taking over the posi-
tions previously held by DT. After upgrading the
cable TV network, KNW and KBW will be in a
position to compete with DT by offering local
telephony and Internet access services to end-cus-
tomers.
166. KNW and KBW will enter into a number of
agreements with DT’s subsidiary Media Services
GmbH (MSG) to obtain content, technical services,
and certain marketing and sales services associ-
ated with the offering of pay-television services
by KNW to subscribers in North Rhine-Westphalia.
These agreements are not, however, covered by
the Commission decision to clear the operation.
JV.48 — Vodafone, Vivendi and Canal+
(Vizzavi)
167. On 20 July, the Commission approved the
creation of the Vizzavi Internet portal joint venture
between Vodafone, Vivendi and Canal+. The clear-
ance was made possible after the companies sub-
mitted commitments to ensure that competing
Internet portals would have equal access to the par-
ent companies’ set-top boxes and mobile handsets.
168. Vizzavi will develop, market, maintain and
provide a branded multi-access Internet portal
throughout Europe, providing customers with a
seamless environment for web-based interactive
services, across a variety of platforms, such as ﬁxed
and mobile telephony networks, PCs and palm-tops,
as well as television sets. The decision ensures that
the current competitive model of Internet services,
where consumers can choose their content provider
independently of their access provider, is carried
over into the developing markets of Internet provi-
sion via mobile phones and televisions.
169. The Commission’s investigation concluded
that the joint venture would have given rise to com-
petition concerns in the emerging national markets
for TV-based Internet portals and emerging national
and pan-European markets for mobile phone-based
Internet portals. In order to address the competition
concerns identiﬁed by the Commission, the parties
provided undertakings to ensure that the default
portal on the mobile phone or set-top box could be
changed, should the consumer so wish. The under-
takings will allow consumers to access third party
portals, to change the default portal themselves, or
to authorise a third party portal operator to change
the default setting for them.
2.4. Postal services
2.4.1. Commission proposal for further
market opening
170. On 30 May, the Commission tabled its pro-
posal to amend the postal directive, in which the 39
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that would open up a substantial share of the postal
services market to competition by 2003(1). Further
market opening would follow in 2007. The pro-
posed step-by-step approach is intended to lead to
more competition in postal services while provid-
ing safeguards to ensure a universal postal service
throughout the European Union.
171. As of 1 January 2003, the Commission pro-
poses to increase the range of services that Member
States must open up to competition. These would
include postal items weighing more than 50 grams
and items below 50 grams where the price is at
least two and a half times the price of a standard
letter. All outgoing cross-border mail and express
mail would also be subject to competition. The
total market opening resulting from this ﬁrst step
is estimated to represent on average approximately
20% of the universal service providers’ revenues
from postal services. In addition, the proposal for-
mulates a precise deﬁnition of special services,
which cannot be reserved under the present direc-
tive, and requires the transparency and non-
discrimination principles to be applied to special
tariffs.
2.4.2. Monitoring of the REIMS II
agreement
172. On 15 September 1999, the Commission
adopted a decision under Article 81(3) exempt-
ing the REIMS II agreement until 31 December
2001 (2). In REIMS II, 16 European postal oper-
ators agree on remuneration for delivering each
other’s incoming cross-border mail. Remuneration
increases are linked to improvements in the qual-
ity of the receiving postal operator’s delivery serv-
ice. In its decision, the Commission imposed a
number of conditions and obligations on the par-
ties to ensure that the agreement is beneﬁcial to
consumers.
173. In 2000, as a follow-up to its decision, the
Commission monitored price and quality of 
service developments in the markets for
intra-Community mail. In the last few years, the
quality of service for intra-Community cross-bor-
der mail has increased signiﬁcantly, albeit from a
very low level in some Member States. The
Commission also held a dialogue with the parties
to the agreement in order to ensure that they com-
plied with the conditions and met the obligations
set out in the decision. Meetings were also held
with other interested parties such as consumer and
user organisations.
2.4.3. Interception and surcharging 
of cross-border mail
174. The Commission is currently examining a
number of complaints alleging that Deutsche Post
AG is contravening Article 82 by intercepting,
delaying and surcharging ordinary, incoming
cross-border mail. Following a complaint ﬁled
by the UK Post Ofﬁce, the Commission initiated
formal proceedings against Deutsche Post on
25 May (3). The Commission considered that a
number of mailings — intercepted and then charged
as domestic mail by Deutsche Post AG on the basis
of the inclusion of a German reply address in the
contents of the mailings — were normal cross-
border mailings posted in the UK. The Commission
therefore came to the preliminary conclusion that
Deutsche Post had abused its dominant position
in the market for incoming cross-border mail by
charging the full domestic tariff for these mail-
ings. The Commission also considered that sig-
niﬁcant delays resulting from the interception of
such mailings might be regarded as infringements
of Article 82.
2.4.4. Mail order parcels
175. On 8 August, the Commission opened for-
mal proceedings against Deutsche Post AG in a
case concerning the latter’s pricing policy for the
delivery of mail order parcels (4). In its statements
of objections, the Commission considered that
Deutsche Post was abusing its dominant position
by employing a combination of ﬁdelity and target
rebates that foreclosed competition (5). The
Commission also examined the high letter tariffs
applicable in Germany. International comparisons,
taking into account factors such as population den-
sity and quality of service, indicate that standard
letter tariffs in Germany are by far the highest in
the European Union. In order to examine whether
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these tariffs are excessive, i.e. if the prices charged
by Deutsche Post bear a reasonable relationship
to the actual costs or the value of the service pro-
vided, the Commission has requested additional
cost information from Deutsche Post.
176. On 19 October, Deutsche Post announced
that it had annulled all clauses in its agreements with
mail order companies which contain target and
ﬁdelity rebates objected to by the Commission and
stated that alternative arrangements were being
negotiated.
2.4.5. New postal services
177. On 21 December, the Commission adopted
a decision on the provision of new postal services
in Italy offering speciﬁc added value elements, in
particular a guarantee that items created elec-
tronically will arrive at a predetermined date or
time (1). The decision follows a complaint lodged
against Italy on the ground that the delivery phase
of hybrid mail (in which postal items are gener-
ated electronically) had been reserved in all cases
for the incumbent operator. The Commission
takes the view that Italian Legislative Decree
No 261 of 22 July establishing those arrange-
ments, which prevents private suppliers from
offering new hybrid mail services with distinctive
features, is incompatible with Article 86(1), read
in conjunction with Article 82 of the Treaty.
No Member State apart from Italy has reserved
for the incumbent operator the delivery phase of
hybrid mail with guaranteed remittance at a pre-
determined date or time.
178. The delivery phase of hybrid mail may entail
a series of added value elements, such as a guar-
antee that electronically created items will arrive
at a predetermined date or time. The incumbent
operator in Italy does not offer that new service
at present. Delivery at a predetermined date or
time is a separate market which is very different
from traditional delivery services (universal serv-
ice). There are therefore no grounds for reserv-
ing it for a universal service provider that does not
offer that service. In addition, the range of serv-
ices provided by the incumbent operator does not
at present include guaranteed remittance at a pre-
determined date or time, so it would not suffer any
losses if this service were to be allocated to another
operator.
2.5. Air transport
2.5.1. Alliances
179. Consolidation in the air transport sector con-
tinues apace, and the Commission examined a
number of alliances and mergers during the year.
In general, the Commission believes that airline
alliances bring beneﬁts for passengers by extend-
ing networks and improving efﬁciency. However,
alliances can also signiﬁcantly restrict competi-
tion on individual routes and remedies may need
to be imposed to mitigate this.
180. On 28 February, the Commission sent a warn-
ing letter to Swissair, Sabena, TAP, AOM and
Crossair, members of the Qualiflyer alliance,
regarding an agreement that allowed them to coor-
dinate fare prices. The warning letter gave the par-
ties three weeks to conﬁrm to the Commission that
the agreement had been terminated. Otherwise,
the airlines faced the initiation of formal infringe-
ment proceedings possibly leading to the adoption
of a decision ﬁnding that an infringement had been
committed and imposing fines. Following this
warning letter, the parties terminated the pricing
agreement as regards the routes between Portugal
and Belgium, between Portugal and Switzerland
and between Paris (Orly) and Brussels, which are
operated only by Qualiﬂyer group members. The
Commission therefore decided not to open formal
infringement proceedings.
181. In October, the Commission sent letters to
Lufthansa and SAS setting out serious doubts con-
cerning their cooperation with Austrian Airlines,
which was notiﬁed to the Commission in December
1999. The Commission believes that, as they cur-
rently stand, the cooperation agreements would
eliminate competition on a large number of routes
between Austria and Germany and between Austria
and Scandinavia. The issue of these letters was the
ﬁrst formal step in the Commission’s investiga-
tion, which is ongoing. It could lead to a prohibi-
tion decision unless the companies address the
Commission’s concerns.
182. The Commission’s investigations into a num-
ber of other airline alliances are continuing. A deci-
sion on the cooperation between British Midland,
Lufthansa and SAS is expected in early 2001.
183. The Commission also examined the US
Air/Unitedmerger. After the parties had accepted
a number of undertakings the Commission took a
decision clearing the merger in early 2001. 41
(
1) Press Release IP/00/1522, 21.12.2000.2.5.2. Airports
184. The Commission has been examining land-
ing fees at all European airports since 28 June
1995, when it ruled that the system of discounts
operated at the main Brussels airport infringed EU
law. Since then, most Member States have changed
their system of landing fees in order to end dis-
crimination. Decisions were taken against the
Portuguese and Finnish airport authorities in 1999.
The Portuguese authorities are challenging the
Commission decision before the Court of Justice
but the Finnish authorities have undertaken to com-
ply with the Commission decision and to change
their system of landing fees by January 2001.
185. In July, the Commission took a decision
under Articles 86 and 82 (1) ﬁnding that a system
of discounts and different landing fees according
to the origin of the flight, as prescribed by the
Spanish Government, discriminated in favour of
national airlines. For all categories of aircraft, the
Spanish system provided for higher fees for
intra-Community ﬂights than for domestic ones;
it also provided for discounts that increased with
the number of landings per month. The discounts
went from 9 % up to 35 %. De facto, this system
favoured national carriers, in particular Iberia,
Binter Canarias and Spanair, which received aver-
age discounts of 20 to 25 %. There was no objec-
tive justiﬁcation for such discriminatory treatment.
The Spanish authorities subsequently informed
the Commission that their system of landing fees
had been brought into line with Community law.
186. At the same time a letter of formal notice
was sent to the Italian authorities as a ﬁrst step in
the Commission’s procedure possibly leading to
a formal decision. As in the Spanish case, the
Commission found that the Italian system dis-
criminated against foreign carriers and in favour
of Italian airlines, in particular Alitalia. Landing
fees in Italy are set by law. Under a decree of
27 October 1998 domestic ﬂights beneﬁted from
rebates of between 57 and 64 % on the standard
landing fees applying to international flights,
depending on the type of aircraft. Following the let-
ter of formal notice the Italian authorities informed
the Commission that their system of landing fees
had been brought into line with Community law.
187. By asking the Spanish and Italian
Governments to abolish their systems, the
Commission has taken the ﬁnal steps to eliminate
discriminatory landing fees throughout the
European Economic Area.
188. On 11 June 1998, the Commission adopted
a decision (2) under Article 82 of the EC Treaty
requiring Aéroports de Paris (ADP) to introduce
a non-discriminatory system of commercial fees
for groundhandling services. ADP lodged an appli-
cation for annulment of that decision in August
1998.
189. On 12 December 2000, the Court of First
Instance dismissed (3) ADP’s application on all
seven grounds. The CFI’s judgment is important
in at least three respects: it clariﬁes which proce-
dural regulation applies to transport infrastructure;
it classes the operation of an airport as a business
activity and the airport operator as an undertak-
ing; and it conﬁrms, following on from the judg-
ment in Corsica Ferries (4), that the undertakings
in question do not have to be operating on the same
markets to be caught by Article 82.
190. The judgment upholds the policy pursued by
the Commission in relation to transport infra-
structure, and more particularly non-discriminatory
access to that infrastructure.
2.5.3. Reservation systems
191. In July, the Commission closed an Article
82 investigation into Air France’s alleged dis-
crimination against Sabre, an American comput-
erised reservation system (CRS), after the French
airline agreed to a code of conduct offering Sabre
terms equivalent to those offered to its partly owned
CRS Amadeus, as well as to other CRSs. This suc-
cessful investigation was the ﬁrst to have been ini-
tiated by a request from the United States
Department of Justice made in accordance with a
bilateral cooperation agreement between the
European Union and the United States.
2.6. Maritime transport
2.6.1. Block exemption for liner shipping
consortia
192. On 19 April, the Commission adopted
Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 (5) renewing the
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block exemption for liner shipping consortia
embodied in Commission Regulation (EC)
No 870/95 (1), the five-year validity of which
expired on 25 April.
193. The Commission’s favourable view of con-
sortia is due to the advantages of this form of coop-
eration. In general, by rationalising the activities
of the member companies and achieving economies
of scale, consortia help improve both the produc-
tivity and the quality of liner transport services
offered to transport users.
194. The new regulation, which extends the block
exemption for a further ﬁve years, includes amend-
ments designed to clarify it in line with the
Commission’s interpretation of Regulation (EC) No
870/95. Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 thus provides
inter aliathat the block exemption also applies to con-
sortia operating on more than one trade (Article 1(1))
and that the market share thresholds are required to
be met in respect of each market on which such a con-
sortium operates (Articles 6 and 7).
195. The most important change that Regulation
(EC) No 823/2000 makes to the block exemption
as compared with Regulation (EC) No 870/95 is
in referring to market share thresholds instead of
trade share thresholds (i.e. the share of trade held
by the consortium between the pairs of ports that
it actually serves). Market share is the usual indi-
cation of market power used in competition legis-
lation. The trade share criterion was adopted in
the previous regulation because shipping compa-
nies had considered that market shares would be
difficult to calculate; experience had however
shown that shipping companies were able to pro-
vide market shares.
196. Eleven consortia were exempted under the
opposition procedure of Regulation (EC) No 870/95
for a period lasting until the expiry of that regula-
tion. The procedure enabled the Commission to
check that the consortia were subject to effective
competition. There was no indication that cir-
cumstances had changed such that the consortia
were shielded from effective competition. In order
to avoid the burden of renewed notifications,
Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 therefore provides
that such consortia continue to be exempted (Recital
27; Article 13(2)); the agreements remain subject
to obligations (Article 9) and to the Commission’s
power to withdraw the exemption (Article 12).
2.6.2. Grand Alliance Consortium
197. In March, the Commission granted an exemp-
tion to the Grand Alliance Consortium, an agree-
ment between Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie,
Malaysia International Shipping Corporation,
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Orient Overseas Container
Line Limited and P&O Nedlloyd. The consortium
provides a joint liner shipping service between
ports in northern and southern Europe and ports in
the Far East. Having examined conditions on the
markets covered by the consortium service, the
Commission concluded that the consortium met
the criteria for exemption under Regulation (EC)
No 870/95. It noted in particular that the parties had
made considerable investments in the consortium
service and that there was evidence that the con-
sortium would remain subject to effective com-
petition from other shipping lines.
2.6.3. FETTCSA
On 16 May, the Commission adopted a decision
ﬁnding that the members of the Far East Trade
Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement
(FETTCSA) had infringed the cartel prohibition
enshrined in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. This
case is discussed in the cartels section of this report
(Section I.B, Chapter 1.1).
2.7. Railways
198. Over the last 30 years, rail transport has been
in steep decline in the Community in spite of the
fact that during this period both passenger and
freight transport in general have grown by 2.5 to
3 % annually. Cross-border freight transport in
particular has enjoyed strong growth with the cre-
ation of the single market. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the rail sector has not beneﬁted from this
development. During the period 1990–98, meas-
ured in tonnes/kilometres, freight transport by road
increased by 35% while rail freight transport actu-
ally fell by 6 %. It is striking that rail’s market
share has even decreased in a market segment
where it should be particularly competitive, namely
long-haul transport of voluminous goods.
199. While there are a number of reasons for this
development, the sector suffers from the fact that
a single market in railways has yet to be created.
So far, the impact of Directive 91/440/EEC on the
introduction of competition in the railway market
has been negligible. While national ﬂag carriers
cooperate in cross-border trafﬁc, newcomers have 43
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the slow pace of liberalisation, Member States
have agreed in principle to open up further the EC
freight railway transport market, and agreement
on a new infrastructure package was reached
between the Council and the European Parliament
in November. These measures may be expected
to allow the railway sector to gain momentum. As
a result, competition policy should in future play
a more important role in this sector. Flag carriers
have taken the initiative to merge in the cargo ﬁeld.
The Commission has also recently received com-
plaints from new competitors operating in both
the passenger and the freight rail transport sectors.
A number of these complaints are currently being
investigated.
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Box 3: Services of general interest in Europe and competition
On 20 September, responding to an invitation made by the European Council at its meeting in Lisbon in
March, the Commission adopted an updated version of its communication on services of general interest in
Europe. The new text marks a signiﬁcant step forward in the Commission’s efforts to explain more clearly
the relevant EC rules and its policy in applying them. An important aim of the new communication is to
address as concretely as possible the concerns which gave rise to the European Council’s request and to improve
legal certainty for operators of services of general interest.
To that end, the new communication illustrates the scope of existing EC law, as well as the ﬂexibilities
which the current legal framework offers in order to take account of the special features of services of gen-
eral interest in the Member States. This is of particular signiﬁcance given the fact that many concerns have
been expressed that EC competition law and single market law could destroy services of general interest
that are functioning satisfactorily, particularly at local and regional level. From this point of view, the most
important aspects of the new communication are as follows.
— The Commission ﬁrst explains that market mechanisms often provide satisfactory services of general
economic interest and that the application of competition and single market principles does not endan-
ger and often even improves the provision of these services. This does not prevent the State imposing
by way of non-discriminatory regulation certain standards of security, quality and regularity on all
operators if and as long as they want to provide services of general economic interest.
— Moreover, the communication conﬁrms Member States’ general freedom, subject to checks by the
Commission for manifest errors, to deﬁne what they regard as services of general economic interest
within the meaning of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty and to entrust the provision of such services to
speciﬁc undertakings. In this context, the options open to Member States for ensuring the operation of
these services by speciﬁc measures which are compatible with the EC Treaty are set out in detail. The
communication also recalls that, in accordance with Article 295 of the EC Treaty, the Community is
neutral as to the public or private ownership of undertakings.
— Finally, the communication explains the full range of reasons why services of general interest can fall
outside the scope of the EC competition rules (and the single market rules) or can be deemed compat-
ible with those rules. This is the case where the activities in question:
• are of a non-economic nature, or
• have no effect on trade between Member States (or no cross-border aspects), or
• come under a de minimis rule, or
• qualify for a special exception (such as Article 87(3)(d) for State aid to promote culture and her-
itage conservation), or
• come under Article 86(2) in which any conﬂict with the EC competition rules or the EC single 
market rules is settled in a way which allows the service of general economic interest to continue
in operation.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
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On this basis, the new communication shows how within its scope of application Community law guaran-
tees for the beneﬁt of citizens the satisfactory operation of services of general economic interest of a high
standard and combines this with the advantages of more open and competitive markets.
In this context, the new communication highlights the case-law of the Court under which compensation granted
by the State to an undertaking for the performance of services of general economic interest constitutes State
aid which can be compatible with the EC Treaty if all the requirements of Article 86(2) are met. This means
in particular that the compensation must not exceed the net extra costs of the particular task assigned to the
recipient undertaking. For the transport sector, this approach is speciﬁcally laid down in Article 73 of the
Treaty. Moreover, the Commission states in its communication that whenever the compensation is ﬁxed for
an appropriate period following an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure, it will presume
that such aid is compatible with the State aid rules of the Treaty. This approach avoids distortions of com-
petition and ensures that services of general economic interest entrusted to an undertaking function correctly.
The new communication also develops ideas on how, building on the new Article 16 of the EC Treaty and
respecting both the principle of subsidiarity and Member States’ freedom to deﬁne services of general 
economic interest, the Community can develop a proactive policy at European level, in partnership with 
local, regional and national authorities, to ensure that all citizens in Europe have access to the best possible
services.
Finally, the new communication describes experience with the liberalisation of certain services of general
economic interest (telecommunications, transport, energy) and the state of play in further individual sec-
tors. The communication shows how:
— in its efforts to open up markets and introduce competition, the Commission always adapts its approach,
as well as the pace of its proposals and actions, to the speciﬁc features of the sector in question and the
requirements of public service tasks in that sector;
— this method of liberalising markets has maintained and often even improved the quality and affordability
of services of general economic interest.
Following its adoption, the new communication was favourably received at the two internal market Council
meetings, which agreed a statement on services of general economic interest. The statement stresses the impor-
tance of Article 16 of the EC Treaty, without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87 of that Treaty, and wel-
comes the Commission’s communication for its basic approach and the detailed explanations it contains.
However, the statement once again emphasises the need for services of general economic interest to 
perform their tasks under conditions of legal certainty and economic viability. In this context, it calls for
further clariﬁcation of the relationship between methods of funding services of general economic interest
and application of the rules on State aid.
At its meeting in Nice on 7–11 December the European Council approved the Council’s statement and
invited the Council and the Commission to continue their discussions within the framework of these guide-
lines and the provisions of Article 16 of the EC Treaty. Against the background of point 36 of the commu-
nication, the European Council noted the Commission’s intention to consider, in close cooperation with the
Member States, ways of ensuring greater predictability and increased legal certainty in the application of
competition rules relating to services of general interest. In this context, the European Council voiced its
expectation that the Council and the Commission would report on the implementation of these guidelines
for the European Council in December 2001.3. Services
3.1. Financial services
200. On 1 January 1999, a single currency was
introduced in 11 Member States. Introduction of the
euro will greatly enhance competition in ﬁnancial
services. The most immediate effect is to remove
the obstacles to trade represented by the for-
eign-exchange risk and transaction costs associ-
ated with converting one currency into another. As
a result, trade flows between the participating
Member States are likely to increase, thereby deep-
ening the single market and strengthening the need
for further integration within the Union. In this con-
text, it is more vital than ever to improve the ﬂex-
ibility and efﬁciency of the market so as to over-
come structural weaknesses on the supply side.
201. Competition policy is a fundamental lever
in this respect, with a view to taking full advantage
of the beneﬁts of economic and monetary union.
202. To take one sector as an example, the single
currency, in combination with the introduction of
new technologies, will enable banks to compete for
retail deposit business in countries where they have
no physical presence. On the assets side, within the
euro zone, lending operations in any Member State
can be ﬁnanced from deposits obtained in any other
Member State. Competition should therefore inten-
sify in homogenised segments of the loan market,
where direct customer contact is less important (con-
sumer credit, standard mortgage loans). All in all,
stronger competition in the ﬁnancial sector should
lead to easier access to and lower cost of funding.
This should provide further incentives to ﬁrms to
increase investment or entrepreneurial activity.
203. The process cannot, however, be left to unfold
alone. There is a risk that companies might react by
attempting to reduce the level of competition. This
conduct will be made easier by the introduction of
the euro, as increased price transparency will facil-
itate the monitoring of competitors’ prices. It will also
be more difﬁcult to deviate from agreed prices and
hide this fact behind exchange-rate ﬂuctuations. It
is the Commission’s responsibility to challenge these
practices. Greater competition in the ﬁnancial sec-
tor already beneﬁts customers, who suffer most from
suppliers’ market power and restrictive practices.
Enhanced competition in the ﬁnancial sector will
have positive spillover effects in other sectors.
204. During the year the Commission showed its
determination to take action against prohibited
agreements and improve competition in the ﬁnan-
cial sector. As already mentioned (1), proceedings
were opened against nearly 120 banks and bank-
ing associations with regard to their possible par-
ticipation in agreements concerning charges appli-
cable to the exchange of currencies in the euro
zone. Another example of this is the Cartes ban-
cairescase concerning the rules and internal deci-
sions of this card group.
Groupement des cartes bancaires
205. On 30 October, the Commission sent
Groupement des cartes bancaires a comfort letter
announcing the closure of its investigation into a
number of rules and internal decisions notiﬁed by
the grouping and adopted between 1988 and 1998.
Groupement des cartes bancaires is the main 
payment card organisation in France; it adopts 
the rules governing the ‘CB’ payment card sys-
tem and manages its infrastructure. Cards issued
by banks that are members of the grouping account
for over 90 % of card payment transactions in
France.
206. The comfort letter was sent only after certain
changes had been made to the notiﬁed agreements.
First, Article 10 of the contract setting up the group-
ing was clariﬁed: paragraph 5 was amended to
make it clear that approval by the Board of Directors
of the grouping, which member banks have to
obtain before issuing new cards, concerns only
conformity of the card in question with the CB
rules, with special reference to its appearance.
Paragraph 7, as amended, stipulates that the nec-
essary approval by the Board of Directors of any
agreement between a member bank and another
card network is intended solely to prevent any
damage to the image, integrity and security of the
CB system.
207. A decision taken by the Board of Directors
in 1995 concerning the cross-border issue of cards
was amended to clarify the conditions in which
transactions by means of a card issued by a foreign
bank may be processed using the grouping’s infra-
structure (infrastructure referred to as ‘the CB sys-
tem’). Where such cards are used in the CB sys-
tem on a minority basis in relation to their total
use, the issuing bank is not required to join the
grouping; from the moment that most of the pay-
ments made using the card are processed within the
CB system, the issuing bank is required to join the
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grouping, comply with its internal rules and pay the
appropriate fees for use of the CB system. The
Commission has established that the CB system is
not an essential facility and therefore that the group-
ing can decide whether or not to grant access to its
competitors (provided that it does not discrimi-
nate between them).
208. As regards the interbank payment commis-
sion payable between the two banks involved in
processing a payment transaction using a CB card,
the Commission found that Article 81 is not appli-
cable since the commission is charged at a purely
domestic level and does not affect trade between
Member States.
3.2. Information society and the Internet
209. The Commission’s overall priority with
regard to Internet markets is to create the condi-
tions for an open, competitive environment for the
development of the Internet, thereby ensuring
that it remains an open medium. It should be made
clear that the Commission’s basic approach to
Internet and related cases is that developments
are often procompetitive, but that the fundamen-
tal goals of competition policy are nevertheless
relevant to the old and new economy alike.
Competition problems can and do arise in the
new economy.
210. The majority of cases which have raised con-
cerns relate to the infrastructure used for electronic
commerce or the control of upstream content.
Concerns over infrastructure have focused partic-
ularly on telecoms infrastructure, but concerns also
became apparent in the area of domain names.
Avoiding speculative, discriminatory and abusive
registration of Internet domain names is crucial
for securing the removal of geographic barriers to
competition. Competition concerns have not so
far focused on the electronic commerce services
themselves.
211. The lack of competition in the local access
market in all Member States is a major issue that
must be tackled to ensure the success of the Internet
in Europe. The Commission communication (1)
(adopted on 26 April), the regulation on 
unbundled access to the local loop (2) (adopted 
on 5 December), and the sector inquiry 
launched on the issue are important policy steps 
in this respect. The same holds true for the 
sector inquiry on leased lines, as leased lines 
are vital to the creation of e-Europe as they provide
the underlying transmission capacity for the
Internet.
212. Specific cases involving telecommunica-
tions infrastructure concerns include MCI
Worldcom/Sprint, and the Vizzavi joint venture.
In the latter case, although the concern was the
potential creation of dominance in a market on the
boundary between infrastructure and e-commerce
(that for portals), the source of the concern was
the parties’ control over infrastructure — 
the mobile networks of Vodafone and the set-top
box infrastructure of Canal+. Cases involving 
the control of upstream content, with the concern
that it could be leveraged into downstream 
markets, include AOL/Time Warner and
Vivendi/Seagram.
213. E-commerce services provided via domestic
television sets, mobile phones or PCs lead to dif-
ficult market definition questions, and the
Commission will, independently of speciﬁc cases,
be examining these in more detail in the coming
year.
214. Both business-to-consumer (B2C) and busi-
ness-to-business (B2B) services have the poten-
tial to increase competition and boost efﬁcien-
cies. Developing a clear understanding of the 
possible benefits of B2B/B2C is therefore 
an important prerequisite to any antitrust analy-
sis (see Box 4 below). With the exception of some
high-proﬁle cases where competition concerns
were raised, such as AOL/Time Warner, Vizzavi
and Vivendi/Universal, the majority of cases 
have been unproblematic, leading to positive out-
comes under either the merger regulation or
Regulation 17.
215. However, moves by manufacturers to protect
their traditional distribution channels from the pro-
competitive effects of electronic commerce will
be challenged. In this context it can be mentioned
that in December the Commission opened formal
proceedings against B&W Loudspeakers Ltd as,
among other things, this company prohibits its
authorised dealers from engaging in distance sell-
ing — including sales over the Internet — without
objective reasons. Such behaviour prevents the
beneﬁts of electronic commerce from being fully 47
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its position can be expected to be clariﬁed in the
course of 2001.
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Box 4: Web-based business-to-business (B2B) trading and B2B electronic
marketplaces
The Commission is increasingly called upon to assess the competitive impact of B2B electronic market-
places. These are software systems that allow buyers and sellers of similar goods to carry out procurement
activities using common computer systems. The Commission has already assessed and cleared a number
of such marketplaces in a wide variety of industries. Examples include electronic markets for aircraft com-
ponents (MyAircraft.com — UTC/Honeywell/i2), services to the chemical industry (Chemplorer.com —
Bayer/DT/Infraserv Hoechst),ofﬁce equipment (emaro.com — Deutsche Bank/SAP),public administration
services (Governet.com — SAP/Siemens), foreign currency options (Volbroker.com — Deutsche
Bank/UBS/Goldman Sachs/Citibank/JP Morgan/Natwest), and mutual funds (Cofunds.com —
Newhouse/Jupiter/Scudder/M&G).
There are four general market types, all with numerous variations: buyer-managed exchanges are set up by
large buyers, often in conjunction with technology partners. Supplier-managed exchanges are set up by
suppliers. Market-makers are independent exchanges not controlled by buyers or sellers. They tend to be
backed by venture capital and were often early innovators. Content aggregators are sites that go beyond set-
ting up a mere exchange. Instead they build and maintain multi-vendor catalogues which allow customers
to access the offerings of several suppliers using a common search structure.
B2B electronic markets can have major procompetitive effects. Their main effect will be to increase mar-
ket transparency. This will not only exert downward pressure on prices, it will also contribute to further inte-
gration of separate geographic markets, as the Internet removes the geographic barriers to buyers and sell-
ers efﬁciently discovering each other. Online exchanges that allow buyers to aggregate their demand may
be of particular beneﬁt to small and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, B2B electronic marketplaces are
expected to be a source of substantial efﬁciencies, as they allow transaction costs to be reduced and inven-
tory management to be improved.
These positive effects could, however, in certain cases be offset by possible competition concerns. They 
are in fact not new; the question is to what extent these concerns stemming from the old economy are 
valid in the new economy. The following non-exhaustive list of possible competition problems can be drawn
up.
(a) Network dominance: Network effects and potential problems of network dominance are present when
the value of a system to the individual user increases with the number of users. They can lead to mar-
ket ‘tipping’ and the creation of a dominant position if the network effects are strong enough to induce
all market participants to use the same network. This problem could potentially arise in the context of
B2B electronic marketplaces as the beneﬁts will often increase with the number of buyers and suppli-
ers linked to the same system.
(b) Exchange of information:This concern relates to the ability of the buyers or sellers to exchange or dis-
cover sensitive information on prices and quantities. It is linked to the design of the system, in partic-
ular its openness in terms of individual data originating from other parties.
(c) Joint purchasing/joint selling: This concern relates to the question whether the participants in an 
electronic market can effectively bundle purchasing or selling volumes. If this is the case, a competi-
tion concern would arise if they were able to coordinate their behaviour as buyers or sellers. This con-
cern can in principle arise equally in ‘normal’ joint purchasing or selling. The discussion of these ques-
tions in the new horizontal guidelines would therefore constitute a good starting-point for the assess-
ment.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
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3.3. Media
216. The past 12 months have seen an increase in
merger and antitrust activity in the media sector.
217. The preparation and development of digital
television services, often combined with interac-
tive services, has led to a number of joint ventures
combining resources and skills of two or more
companies — such as Kirch/BSkyB and
Microsoft/Telewest. The trend towards vertical
integration has also increased, as illustrated by
cases such as AOL/Time Warner and
Vivendi/Universal. Finally, in the ﬁeld of interac-
tive services, the increased scope for such serv-
ices being made available via television sets, mobile
phones and PCs led to the Vizzavi joint venture
between Vodafone, Vivendi and Canal+. A num-
ber of these cases have led to concerns that mar-
ket power at one level of the market could be used
to create or strengthen dominance at other levels,
and stringent conditions were imposed to guard
against this.
218. In the antitrust ﬁeld this concern is mirrored
in a number of other cases and the Commission
will be scrutinising developments in the coming
year to ensure that existing market power is not
used to foreclose the development of new mar-
kets.
219. The Commission has, for example, received
an increasing number of informal complaints in
relation to the licensing of rights to various forms
of media and media-related content for use in new
services, including on the Internet. These new serv-
ices are clearly challenging existing market struc-
tures and licensing arrangements: the Commission
will be examining these problems very carefully,
ensuring that the interests of rightholders and new
service providers are being adequately addressed.
220. The licensing of sports broadcasting rights has
again proved to be a major source of competition
concerns. Apart from Formula One, there has been
considerable work in the football sector. The most
prominent of these cases has been Telefónica/
Sogecable/Audiovisual Sport, in which the
Commission adopted a statement of objections,
pursuant to Article 15(6) of Regulation 17, with a
view to lifting the immunity from fines which
Telefónica and Sogecable enjoyed as a result of
having notiﬁed their agreement. Following the
statement of objections, the parties entered into a
number of sublicensing arrangements, which
removed the need for a formal decision.
Examination of the substance continues.
3.4. Professions
221. At the European Competition Day held in
Lisbon in June, the Commission had an opportu-
nity to highlight the advantages for consumers of
its competition policy towards the professions.
222. The Commission’s policy, geared to main-
taining purely ethical rules while abolishing restric-
tions on prices and advertising in particular, is
widening the range of prices and service quality on
offer, making services more accessible to citizens
and improving the provision of information,
enabling the user to make a conscious and objec-
tive choice of practitioner. 49
(d) Discrimination/foreclosure:This concern relates to the ownership of B2B electronic marketplaces and
the rules governing them. These rules could be used, for instance, to exclude certain participants from
the most efﬁcient marketplace, thus putting them at a competitive disadvantage. An issue of discrim-
ination could arise if certain market participants (e.g. the founders) received privileged information about
transactions in the market. This issue arose in the Volbrokercase, the ﬁrst B2B exchange cleared under
Article 81. In this case, six major banks set up a joint venture offering an electronic brokerage service
for trading foreign currency options. The case raised concerns regarding the access to conﬁdential
information by the parent companies. To deal with this concern, the owners of the Volbroker.com
exchange gave the Commission the assurance that they would set up ‘Chinese walls’ to impede any
information ﬂows between the parent companies and the joint venture.
The competition assessment of B2B exchanges is still evolving. The Commission will need to analyse care-
fully the workings of any proposed B2B trading system and its effects on the market. In view of the global
nature of many exchanges, this will be done in close cooperation with other competition authorities.223. The Commission took advantage of the
opportunity in order to call on the Member States
to press ahead with liberalisation of the sector,
clarifying the legislation so that it is not applied
solely in order to protect the economic interests
of members of the professions without guaran-
teeing the quality of services; it urged practi-
tioners to continue along the path of healthy,
effective competition by setting their prices indi-
vidually and freely, giving precise information
on the terms under which they provided their
services and on their speciﬁc skills, innovating in
the services they provided and the way they pro-
vided them, and penetrating cross-border mar-
kets; it called on professional associations to stop
putting pressure on the public authorities in a bid
to prevent liberalisation and hold on to economic
advantages which were not sustainable in the long
run given the evolution of services markets world-
wide; and it invited consumers and consumer
associations to become more demanding as
regards the information available on professional
services and prices thereof with a view to being
able to compare them before taking a decision, and
also to report practices that distorted competition
to the national competition authorities or the
European Commission.
224. By order dated 22 February 2000, the Court
of First Instance rejected an application, by the
French-speaking Brussels bar association, for per-
mission to intervene in Case T-144/99 EPI v
Commission, a case in which the Institute of
Professional Representatives before the European
Patent Ofﬁce (the EPI) is seeking a partial annulment
of the Commission decision of 7 April 1999 (Case
NoIV/36.147 — EPI code of conduct)( 1). The CFI
took the view that, any interest that the professional
association in question had in the case, was indi-
rect and remote and was therefore not sufﬁciently
manifest to justify it intervening in the dispute. In
support of its decision, the CFI made it clear that each
case and each sector called for a speciﬁc assess-
ment. In the instant case, even a judgment con-
ﬁrming the Commission decision would have no
direct bearing on the members of the professional
association making the application, since the sector
represented by that association was entirely differ-
ent to the sector subject to the Commission deci-
sion (paragraphs 15 to 17 of the order).
225. In its judgment of 18 June 1998 (2) the Court
of Justice declared that, by adopting and main-
taining in force a law requiring the National
Council of Customs Agents (Consiglio Nazionale
degli Spedizionieri Doganali — CNSD) to set a
tariff for all customs agents, Italy had failed to
fulﬁl its obligations under Articles 5 and 85 of the
Treaty. After receiving a reasoned opinion from
the Commission, Italy complied with the Court
judgment by adopting Law No 213 of 25 July
2000. The provision of the Law of 22 December
1960 requiring the tariff to be drawn up by the
CNSD was repealed. The tariff in question was also
the subject of a Commission decision, adopted on
30 June 1993 (3), finding that it infringed the
Community competition rules. The CNSD’s appeal
against that decision was dismissed by the Court
of First Instance on 30 March 2000 (4).
3.5. Sport
226. In applying the EC Treaty competition rules
to this sector, the Commission has continued to
put into practice the general principles outlined in
its report to the European Council on sport (5).
227. Although certain restrictive practices of sport-
ing organisations are still being investigated, the
Commission’s actions to date demonstrate it recog-
nises the speciﬁc nature of sport and that it takes
account of sport’s social, educational and cultural
dimensions with a view to preserving sport’s social
role. The Commission also attaches the utmost
importance to encouraging the training and pro-
tection of young sportsmen and women, solidar-
ity between large and small clubs or between ama-
teur and professional sport, preserving the integrity
of competitions and guaranteeing the uncertainty
of the outcome of competitions.
228. Through its action in the competition ﬁeld the
Commission ensures that these legitimate objec-
tives are achieved by the least restrictive means in
accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty,
and in particular by means that do not dispropor-
tionately restrict the freedom of movement of play-
ers within the EEA. With this in mind, it has entered
into a constructive dialogue with the sporting organ-
isations some of whose rules have been challenged,
with a view to reaching solutions that are satis-
50
(
1) OJ L 106, 23.4.1999.
(
2) Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851.
(
3) Commission Decision 93/438/EEC in Case IV/33.407 CNSD (OJ
L 203, 13.8.1993).
(
4) Case T-513/93.
(
5) COM(1999) 644 ﬁnal.I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 81 AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIES AND
MONOPOLY RIGHTS: ARTICLES 31 AND 86
factory for all the parties concerned as well as
improving legal certainty in the ﬁeld of sport.
229. Lastly, the Commission applies the compe-
tition rules in this sector in a manner that does not
undermine the regulatory authority of the sport-
ing organisations with respect to sporting rules per
se, i.e. rules which are intrinsic to a particular sport
or are necessary for its organisation or for the
organisation of competitions. It therefore takes
account of the principles derived from the Court’s
judgments in Deliège (1)and Lehtonen (2)and thus
shares the general principles outlined by the
European Council in its declaration on the speciﬁc
characteristics of sport (3).
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1) Judgment of 11 April 2000 in Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97
[2000] ECR I-2549. 
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2) Judgment of 13 April 2000 in Case C-176/96 [2000] ECR I-2681. 
(
3) Annex IV to the Presidency conclusions, Nice, 7, 8 and 9 December
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A — Introduction
230. Many of the features highlighted in last year’s
annual report remain as relevant now as they did
then. The number of cases is high and continues
to grow; the cases have involved an increasingly
wide range of different products and services, and
the increasingly global effects of the mergers have
meant that more of the cases required cooperation
with competition authorities in other countries.
231. The statistical results of merger activity are
as follows. Overall, 345 new cases were notiﬁed
during 2000 (+ 18 %) and in total, 345 ﬁnal deci-
sions were taken during the year, 28% up on 1999.
Of these, 321 were cleared in Phase I (+26%), 28of
which were cleared conditionally (+47%), in other
words cleared but with undertakings attached
(Article 6(2) decisions), and 293 were cleared
unconditionally (Article 6(1)(b) decisions). During
the year, the Commission took 17 decisions fol-
lowing an in-depth investigation, up from 10 in
1999. Three of these cases were cleared uncondi-
tionally, 12 cleared with conditions attached, and
two were prohibited. In addition, six Phase II cases
were withdrawn before a ﬁnal decision was taken.
232. As this statistical review of the year 2000
indicates, the Commission’s experience in apply-
ing the dominance test has necessarily continued
to expand. Whilst there have not been any judg-
ments from the Court of First Instance that have led
to revolutionary substantive or analytical devel-
opments (1) in the Commission’s analysis, devel-
opment has continued on an evolutionary,
case-by-case, basis.
233. Technological development and the com-
mercial developments that accompany it have con-
tinued to impact on the nature of the Commission’s
work. For example, this year has seen the ﬁrst cases
involving business-to-business, or B2B, electronic
marketplaces on the Internet (2). These exchanges
can lead to substantial efﬁciencies and have pro-
competitive impact, but can also have negative
implications for competition, such as enabling
incumbents to exclude individual companies or to
impose joint selling or purchasing conditions on
others. Assessment of these factors will therefore
continue to be an important part of the
Commission’s analysis in future cases.
234. Experience in assessing remedies has also
continued to grow rapidly. In 2000, remedies were
offered and accepted in 40 cases, 28 in Phase I and
12 in Phase II. Remedies were offered but not
accepted in both Volvo/Scania and  MCI
Worldcom/Sprint. The Commission’s under-
standing of how to ensure that the remedies offered
are implemented has also grown considerably dur-
ing the year, as the total number of cases with
undertakings to implement and monitor has con-
tinued to rise. Much of this experience in both
assessing and monitoring remedies is reﬂected in
the notice on the Commission’s treatment of reme-
dies which was adopted in December 2000 (3). The
signiﬁcance of the notice can be seen in the fact that
no other competition authority elsewhere in the
world has issued any guidelines on how they deal
with remedies. The aim of the notice is to set out
clearly and objectively not only the procedural,
but also the substantive principles on which the
Commission will base its assessment of remedies.
The main points in the notice are discussed in the
section on remedies below.
235. This year has seen evidence of the growing
public profile of the European merger regime.
Some of this debate has focused on the
Commission’s analysis of particular cases, such
as the dual investigation into the proposed deals
between Time Warner and both AOL and EMI.
The prohibition decisions that have been taken this
year have also led to some criticism. For exam-
ple, following Volvo/Scania, criticisms were raised
about bias against mergers between large compa-
nies operating in smaller Member States. And fol-
lowing its prohibition of the MCI WorldCom/Sprint
deal, some concerns were expressed that the regime,
and the way it is implemented, is biased against
mergers between non-European, and in particular
US-based, companies.
236. The same reply can be made to both these
concerns, namely that the purpose of any compe-
tition-based merger control system is to ascertain
the absence of negative effects on any relevant
market that is either in the EEA or includes the
EEA. This is regardless of that market’s size or of
the country in which the companies involved in
the proposed deal are based. The crucial factor is
that the need for industry restructuring does not
justify any harm to the consumer, and that when
55
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1) The CFI judgment in Airtours/FirstChoice has not yet been deliv-
ered.
(
2) Case M.1969 — UTC/Honeywell/i2/MyAircraft.com;Case M.2027
— Deutsche Bank/SAP/JV.
(
3) Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation
(EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC)
No 447/98 (OJ C 68, 2.3.2001).business needs to restructure, there are ways and
means to achieve this without damaging compe-
tition. Companies seeking to restructure have to
recognise the importance that the Commission
places on protecting competition in the EU, whether
it takes place on a local, national, European or even
global basis.
237. There has also been a considerable degree
of comment about the pressures that the
Commission faces in relation to its merger regime
and the possible adverse effects that the current
pressure on resources could have on the quality
and therefore the credibility of the regime. Relief
from this pressure is arriving from two sources.
Firstly, the Merger Task Force is continuing to
seek ways to improve the efﬁciency of its oper-
ations. This year has seen an important develop-
ment in this respect, namely the adoption on
26July of the notice on a simpliﬁed procedure (1),
which aims to simplify the treatment of certain cat-
egories of cases which do not create competition
concerns. Full details of the categories of cases
covered by the simplified procedure are given
below in Box 5. Since it was introduced, the
Commission has taken 41 decisions under the
simpliﬁed procedure.
238. The second source of relief from pressure
on resources will come following the
Commission’s peer review process, completed
in June. As a result of the review, the Commission
has decided that the Directorate-General for
Competition will be given increased resources to
support its commitment to a strong competition
policy, in particular to implement the merger reg-
ulation. The additional resources will enable the
MTF to employ additional case handlers over the
next two to three years. As Commissioner Monti
stressed in his speech to the conference organ-
ised to celebrate the merger regulation’s 10th
anniversary, President Prodi’s active support is
an acknowledgement of the vital role that the
application of competition law has played — and
continues to play — in driving forward the sin-
gle market.
239. The conference, held in September, pro-
vided an excellent opportunity not just to take a
retrospective look at the first 10 years of 
EC merger control, but also to look to the future.
The conference was organised jointly by
the Commission and the International Bar
Association. A book including all the papers 
prepared for the conference and the speeches
made at the conference will be published early in
2001.
240. The conference also provided a further oppor-
tunity to discuss a wide range of issues, many of
which are now being explored in the context of
the merger review. The review followed the report
that the Commission made to the Council in June,
providing an initial examination of the turnover
thresholds incorporated in the regulation. The
report fulﬁlled the legal obligation introduced when
the merger regulation was last amended in June
1997. During the process of preparing the report,
it became clear that there were a number of fun-
damental issues which warranted further review.
As a result, the Commission launched a wide-rang-
ing review exercise with the aim of ensuring that
the merger regulation is as relevant and adequate
a tool as it can possibly be. The following questions
are examples of the types of issue that are being
examined: are the turnover thresholds that are
established in the merger regulation set at the most
appropriate level? How can the potential beneﬁts
of the work-sharing arrangements incorporated in
the referral systems (Articles 9 and 22) be max-
imised? Is the concept of a ‘concentration’ as estab-
lished in the merger regulation still adequate in a
world of strategic alliances, minority shareholdings
and production joint ventures?
241. In relation to the turnover thresholds, the
assessment must be seen in the light of one of the
fundamental principles underlying the EU merger
regime, namely the ‘one stop shop’ principle for
the examination and control of mergers and other
concentrations that affect markets in Europe. In
particular, the Commission is concerned that there
appears to be a signiﬁcant number of operations
with cross-border effects that continue to fall out-
side the scope of the regulation. To give an exam-
ple, two stock exchange cases (Euronext and iX)
— both of which clearly have a European interest
— either did not, or would not have been regarded
as having a Community dimension on the basis of
the thresholds in the merger regulation. From the
Commission’s viewpoint, this raises the question
whether such transactions involve a Community
interest and, if so, whether this interest is ade-
quately preserved. From an industry viewpoint,
this raises concerns mainly relating to having to deal 56
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1) Commission notice on a simpliﬁed procedure for treatment of cer-
tain concentrations under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89
(OJ C217, 29.7.2000). Also available on http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/mergers/legislation/simpliﬁed_procedure/.II — MERGER CONTROL
with multiple notiﬁcations, which increases legal
uncertainty as well as effort and cost.
242. The 1997 amendments to the merger regu-
lation also included changes to the referral proce-
dures between the Commission and national com-
petition authorities (Articles 9 and 22 respectively).
These provisions were designed to enable the
Commission to ﬁne-tune its work-sharing prac-
tices with the Member States. However, the fact that
not a single joint reference under Article 22 has been
made since this option was introduced in March
1998 is a clear indication that the system is not
working as it was intended.
243. The Commission is now at the fact-ﬁnding
stage of the process, in consultation with Member
States and, signiﬁcantly, with the applicant countries,
as well as with the business and legal communities.
During 2001 the Commission will produce a formal
consultation document setting out its conclusions and
recommendations for change. This will then form
the basis of a further round of consultations before
any of the recommendations are implemented.
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Box 5: The simpliﬁed procedure
The introduction of the simpliﬁed procedure aims to increase the efﬁciency with which the Commission deals
with certain categories of mergers that do not normally raise competition concerns. The system was intro-
duced by the adoption of a notice, and it was put into practice on 1 September. The full text of the notice is
available on the Commission’s web site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/sim-
pliﬁed_procedure/.
The Commission notice on a simpliﬁed procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 identiﬁes three categories of cases which would qualify for a short-form
decision adopted by the Commission at the end of the usual one-month review. The notice applies to con-
centrations where:
— two or more undertakings acquire joint control over a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has
no, or negligible, actual or foreseen activities within the EEA territory (turnover of less than EUR
100 million and assets of less than EUR 100 million in the European Economic Area);
— none of the parties is engaged in business activities in the same product and geographic market (hori-
zontal relationships), or in a product market which is upstream or downstream of a product market in
which any other party to the concentration is engaged (vertical relationships);
— two or more of the parties are engaged in business activities in the same product and geographic mar-
ket or upstream or downstream market, provided that their combined market share is not 15% or more
for horizontal and 25 % or more for vertical relationships.
The short-form decision will contain information about the parties, the nature of the concentration and eco-
nomic sectors concerned together with a statement to the effect that the concentration is declared compati-
ble with the common market because it falls within one or more of the categories contained in the notice,
with the applicable category(ies) being explicitly identified. As with all full clearance decisions, the
Commission will publish a public version of the decision. There will be no press release, but clearance will
be announced in the Commission’s Midday Express.
The simpliﬁed procedure can reduce the administrative burden on notifying parties. It will still give the Member
States and third parties the same opportunities to comment or intervene as under the ordinary procedure.
The Commission may also, if necessary, revert at any time to the ordinary investigative procedures.B — Application of the dominance
test
244. As laid down in Article 2(3) of the merger reg-
ulation, a concentration which creates or strength-
ens a dominant position as a result of which effec-
tive competition would be signiﬁcantly impeded
in the common market or in a substantial part of it
must be declared incompatible with the common
market. The Commission has applied this test in
cases where the concentration would result in a
single dominant market player but also in cases in
which the proposed operation would create col-
lective dominance.
1. Single dominance
Volvo/Scania
245. The creation of single dominance was
analysed in Volvo/Scania (1), one of the year’s
most prominent cases. Having established that, for
a number of reasons (different technical require-
ments and purchasing habits as well as signiﬁcant
price discrimination even in neighbouring coun-
tries), markets for heavy trucks and buses are still
national in scope, the Commission’s investigation
revealed that the new entity would reach a market
share of 90% in Sweden and of between 50% and
70 % in Ireland, Norway and Finland. In this
straightforward case of classical horizontal over-
laps and large market shares, the unilateral effects
of the concentration were also carefully investi-
gated on the basis of sophisticated econometric
tools. The proposed concentration would have
brought together two companies with stable and
largely symmetrical market positions in the past.
Besides leading to the creation of a company sev-
eral times stronger than its closest competitor, the
operation would have eliminated competition
between two particularly close competitors. In this
decision the Commission also made it clear that the
consistent application of the dominance test to any
relevant geographic market independently of its
size, besides being within the letter and the spirit
of the merger regulation, guarantees consumers
protection from the effects of dominance, in small
and large markets alike. As regards the commit-
ments proposed by Volvo, the Commission’s inves-
tigation showed that they would not resolve the
competition concerns raised by the concentration
in question. The Commission ﬁnally prohibited
the operation. Following the prohibition both com-
panies have successfully found alternative part-
ners (Renault and Volkswagen respectively).
Framatome/Siemens/Cogéma
246. On 6 December, the Commission cleared a
joint venture combining the nuclear activities of
Framatome SA of France with those of Siemens
AG of Germany. The joint venture, as initially
notiﬁed, also involved the participation of Cogéma,
a second French company active in the nuclear
sector. In its original form, the joint venture oper-
ation threatened to create or strengthen dominant
positions in the markets for fuel assemblies used
in nuclear reactors. Regulatory clearance was pos-
sible after it was agreed that Cogéma would not be
part of the joint venture. A statement by France
that it would ensure that Electricité de France
divested its holding in Framatome and would open
up its procurement policy for fuel assemblies was
a further alleviating factor. In this way, Europe’s
largest nuclear electricity market, France, becomes
accessible to competitors of the new joint venture.
AstraZeneca/Novartis
247. The Commission also authorised this year
an important merger between the agrochemical
businesses of AstraZeneca and Novartis into a
newly incorporated company, Syngenta. Against
the background of a rapidly concentrating indus-
try, the Commission found it necessary to open a
Phase II investigation into the creation of Syngenta,
the world’s largest company in the sector. In close
cooperation with the FTC, authorisation was given
after substantial commitments had been offered. As
initially notiﬁed, the operation would have led to
the creation or strengthening of dominant posi-
tions on 39 markets for crop protection products,
the most important ones being the markets for
cereal fungicides and maize herbicides. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Commission did not rely
exclusively on the existing market position of the
parties, but focused also on the projected future
developments of their product portfolios. The deter-
mination of the relevant product markets proved
particularly difﬁcult in this case (as in related Case
No M.1932 — BASF/American Cyanamid), as it
involved the determination of ‘chains of substitu-
tion’, issues of ‘one-sided substitution’ and the
competitive position of multi-purpose products. 58
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248. The dominance test has proved to be a suit-
able tool with which to examine the effects of con-
centrations not only in the classic, old economy
markets, for instance those involving manufac-
turing industry, but also in various service sectors,
most notably telecommunications, the Internet and
the media (including the various cross-sector com-
binations). In such markets, merger control instru-
ments should always be applied with a view to
safeguarding progress achieved with liberalisa-
tion and allowing space for the ﬂow of innovation,
both aims ultimately to the beneﬁt of consumers.
249. Vertical integration situations and the ensuing
market foreclosure effects also had to be looked at
closely. Besides reinforcing the new entity’s posi-
tion at one level of the supply chain, thus foreclos-
ing other suppliers’ access to one or more vertically
related markets, vertical integration often changes
the economic incentives of the merging companies,
leading to a substantial change in the functioning of
the market. Most characteristically in the services
mentioned above, where access to networks is essen-
tial for the provision of a wide range of services,
the so-called ‘gatekeeper’ effects can become a
major concern. The Commission has been con-
fronted this year with such ‘gatekeeper’ effects
resulting from both horizontal and vertical opera-
tions. The prohibited WorldCom/Sprint concentra-
tion is a good example of a case where the gate-
keeper effect is produced by a horizontal overlap,
i.e. the combination of two operators’ networks (see
below the analysis in Box 6).
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Box 6: MCI WorldCom/Sprint
Introduction
The Commission decided on 28 June to prohibit the proposed merger between the two US telecommuni-
cations companies MCI WorldCom and Sprint because it would have created a dominant position for the
merged entity on the market for the provision of top-level or universal Internet connectivity.
Top-level or universal (Internet) connectivity
The proposed merger raised similar issues to the 1998 merger between WorldCom and MCI (
1) where the
Commission found that the merger between WorldCom and MCI would have created a dominant position
on the market for the provision of top-level or universal (Internet) connectivity.
The notifying parties argued that the market deﬁnition used by the Commission in the WorldCom/MCI
decision needed to be reconsidered given the dramatic changes during the last few years in the Internet
sector. These alleged changes were, in particular, the liberalisation of the EC telecommunications 
markets with the resulting increase in the number of European Internet service providers (ISPs) and 
content providers; increased used of multihoming (the use of at least two connectivity providers to 
obtain Internet connectivity); content delivery techniques (such techniques enable the regulation and lim-
itation of the ﬂow of Internet trafﬁc that is exchanged over the Internet) and lowered leased lines prices.
As a result, the parties argued, the Internet could not be identiﬁed as being hierarchical and European ISPs
were no longer dependent on the largest (US) Internet connectivity providers to obtain global Internet
connectivity.
The Commission’s investigation showed, however, that none of the factors raised by the notifying parties
had had any signiﬁcant impact on the structure of the market. The Commission acknowledged that there
had been some decrease in the dependence on top-level connectivity providers and that due to increased
European content and build out of European networks, more Internet trafﬁc was intra-European. However,
even the largest European Internet connectivity providers were still very dependent on the top-level providers
for global connectivity and were unable to place any competitive constraint on the top-level providers. The
(
1) Case M.1069 — WorldCom/MCI (8.7.1998).60
Commission concluded that the Internet had maintained its hierarchical structure and the relevant market
for the purposes of the assessment of the case was the market for the provision of top-level or universal (Internet)
connectivity.
With regard to competition in this market, the Commission’s investigation showed that MCI WorldCom
had kept its leading position as a provider of top-level Internet connectivity, with Sprint being one of its main
competitors. The investigation also showed that the merger would, through the combination of the merg-
ing parties’ extensive networks and large customer base, have led to the creation of a company of such
absolute and relative size compared to its competitors that both competitors and customers would have been
dependent on the new company for universal Internet connectivity. This would have allowed the merged
company to behave independently of both its competitors and customers and given it the ability to control
technical developments, raise prices and discipline the market by selective degradation of its interconnec-
tions with competitors. The Commission therefore concluded that the merger, as originally notiﬁed, would
have raised serious competition concerns by creating a dominant position or strengthening the dominant posi-
tion of WorldCom in the global market for the provision of top-level Internet connectivity. Given the hier-
archical structure of the Internet and the global nature of the market, this would have affected consumers
everywhere in the world.
In order to remedy the Commission’s concerns, the parties proposed to divest a Sprint Internet business from
Sprint’s other activities. This undertaking was broadly similar to the undertaking accepted by the Commission
in the WorldCom/MCI decision. In the previous case, the Commission accepted the divestiture of an MCI
Internet business to remedy its concerns. However, drawing from the experience gained from this divesti-
ture and from the investigation in the MCI WorldCom/Sprint case, the Commission found that the proposal
was insufﬁcient to resolve the competition concerns resulting from the merger. In particular, the Commission
found that the proposal failed to ensure with enough certainty that the remedy would restore effective com-
petition in the market for top-level Internet connectivity. The parties withdrew their proposed remedies at
a late stage in the proceedings.
Other markets
During the course of its investigation, the Commission also examined other potential competition concerns
relating to the provision of global telecommunications services and international voice telephony services.
Other than certain issues to which the Commission drew the US authorities’ attention in relation to these
markets, no competition concerns affecting Europe were discovered. The issues examined, and the
Commission’s conclusions in relation to these other markets, are explained in more detail in the press release
available on MTF’s web site.
Procedure
The day before the Commission was scheduled to take its decision on the proposed merger, the parties
withdrew their proposed undertaking and their notiﬁcation to the Commission. However, given that the
parties only withdrew the notiﬁcation but did not abandon the underlying agreement which triggered the
obligation to notify the proposed transaction, the Commission felt compelled nevertheless to adopt its 
decision.
Cooperation with the US Department of Justice
The proposed merger between MCI WorldCom and Sprint was dealt with in parallel by the European
Commission and the US Department of Justice. Pursuant to the bilateral agreement of 1991 on antitrust coop-
eration between the European Commission and the United States of America, the two authorities conducted
independent and separate investigations but the Commission and the US Department of Justice enjoyed a
good working relationship at all stages of the procedure. For example, representatives of the US Department
of Justice attended the oral hearing in Brussels, and a representative of the Commission was present in oneII — MERGER CONTROL
Vodafone-Airtouch /Mannesmann
250. Another case that is also in this category is
Vodafone/Mannesman, which raised competition
concerns on the emerging market for pan-European
seamless mobile telephony services. The provi-
sion of these services is heavily dependent on the
ability of operators to precisely locate their cus-
tomers when the latter are outside reach of their own
network. The Commission investigation showed
that there is an emerging demand for such services
from internationally mobile customers, in partic-
ular large corporations with substantial amounts of
European cross-border business. The merger would
give the new entity a unique footprint in the com-
mon market, with sole control of mobile opera-
tors in eight Member States and joint control in
three. Through the large footprint it appeared that
the merged entity would be in a unique position to
build an integrated network which would enable
a quick implementation of the provision of
advanced seamless pan-European services, at least
in those Member States where it had sole control.
On the other hand, the merged entity’s competitors,
because of their segmented footprints and the dif-
ﬁculties in integrating their networks into a seam-
less one, would not be able to duplicate this in the
short or medium term (on average three to ﬁve
years). The concentration was ﬁnally cleared fol-
lowing undertakings given by the parties. The rem-
edy accepted in relation to this speciﬁc problem
consisted in other mobile operators being given
the possibility of providing pan-European advanced
seamless services to their customers by using the
integrated network of the merged entity. Due, how-
ever, to the fast developments in the sector, espe-
cially the award of UMTS licences and the fact
that competitors will in all likelihood try to build
up alternative infrastructure, this undertaking has
been limited to a period of three years.
AOL/Time Warner
251. In cases of vertical integration, it is impor-
tant to recognise that foreclosure effects may arise,
especially where one of the merging parties enjoys
signiﬁcant market power in an upstream or down-
stream market. In the America Online Inc
(AOL)/Time Warner case the Commission was
concerned that AOL, because of the merger with
Time Warner (which in turn had planned to merge
its music recording and publishing activities with
EMI), and because of its European joint ventures
with Bertelsmann, would have controlled the lead-
ing source of music publishing rights in Europe.
AOL is the leading Internet access provider in the
US and the only such provider with a pan-European
presence. Time Warner is one of the world’s biggest
media and entertainment companies with interests
in television networks, magazines and book pub-
lishing, music, ﬁlmed entertainment and cable net-
works. The concentration created the ﬁrst Internet
vertically integrated content provider, distribut-
ing Time Warner’s branded content (music, news,
ﬁlms, etc.) through AOL’s Internet distribution
network.
252. Because of AOL’s structural and contrac-
tual links with Bertelsmann, the new entity would
also have preferred access to Bertelsmann’s con-
tent and, in particular, to its large music library. As
a result, the new company would have controlled
the leading source of music publishing rights in
Europe, a market of which one third is held by
Time Warner and Bertelsmann together. In these
circumstances it was likely that the new entity
would have become dominant in the emerging 61
of the pitch-meetings that took place at the US Department of Justice. On 27 June, the Department of Justice
ﬁled a complaint in a US court where it opposed the proposed merger on grounds that included the market
for the provision of top level connectivity.
Subsequent developments
On 13 July, MCI WorldCom and Sprint announced that they had cancelled their merger agreement.
On 27 September, MCI WorldCom (now WorldCom) ﬁled an application under Articles 230 and 231 of the
EC Treaty for the annulment of the Commission’s decision.market for Internet music delivery online by becom-
ing a ‘gatekeeper’ and thus being able to dictate the
conditions for the distribution of audio ﬁles over
the Internet. It would also have been possible for
the new entity to format Time Warner’s and
Bertelsmann’s music in such a way as to be com-
patible only with AOL’s music player (Winamp),
but not with competing music players. On the other
hand Winamp would have been able to play the
music of competing record companies which gen-
erally use non-proprietary formats. Thus, because
of the technical limitations of other players, the
new entity would also have been able to impose
Winamp as the dominant music player.
253. The Commission was able to approve the
transaction thanks to a package of commitments
aiming principally at severing the links between
Bertelsmann and AOL. This will be done gradu-
ally, under the supervision of an appointed inde-
pendent compliance monitor. A series of interim
measures will ensure that the relationships between
the two companies will be kept at arm’s length
until Bertelsmann’s exit has been completed.
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram
254. Similar problems of vertical integration 
and foreclosure were raised in Vivendi/
Canal+/Seagram. The Commission’s competition
concerns focused on the markets for pay-TV (in
which Canal+ is Europe’s dominant player), on
the emerging pan-European market for portals and
on the emerging market for online music. In the
pay-TV market the Commission found that
Canal+’s likely exclusive access to the premium
ﬁlms(1) produced and co-produced by Seagram’s
Universal would have strengthened its existing
dominant position in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium
and the Netherlands and created a dominant posi-
tion in the same market in the Nordic region.
255. The package of commitments offered includes
access for competitors to Universal’s ﬁlm pro-
duction and co-production. The parties undertook
in particular not to grant to Canal+ the so-called
‘ﬁrst-window’ rights (2) for more than 50 % of
Universal’s production and co-production. This
commitment applies in certain European countries
and has a ﬁve-year duration.
256. By adding Universal’s music content to
Vivendi’s multi-access portal (Vizzavi) the trans-
action also raised serious doubts as to the creation
of a dominant position on the emerging pan-
European market for portals and on the emerging
market for online music. This problem was reme-
died by Vivendi’s offer to give rival portals access
to Universal’s online music content for ﬁve years.
TotalFina/Elf
257. Vertical integration concerns have been
equally raised in old economy concentrations.
The takeover of Elf-Aquitaine by TotalFina called
for an analysis of the single dominance issue as
raised through the regrouping of first league
national players and the risk of the creation of
real ‘national champions’. The Commission’s
concern was to identify and eliminate activity
overlaps and also bottlenecks that would enable
the new entity to partition the market to its advan-
tage by controlling import logistics and the trans-
port and distribution of reﬁned petroleum prod-
ucts. In particular, in the wholesale fuel and
domestic heating oil markets, the new entity,
besides endangering the balance of competition
in the French market, would also have effectively
controlled the ‘logistical chain’, i.e. most French
import depots, the three main pipelines supply-
ing every corner of France and a substantial num-
ber of local depots. In addition, the combined
entity would have gained a dominant position on
the market for the sale of motor fuel on French
motorways. In the market for liqueﬁed petroleum
gases (LPG) the new entity would have acquired
a dominant position in the market, in particular
through its control of the logistical infrastructure
for imports, storage and bottling which would
make it completely independent across the whole
of France, freeing it from the need to have
recourse, as is normal practice in the sector, to
infrastructure-access swaps with its competitors.
The operation also called for careful assessment
due to its expected signiﬁcant impact upon vital
markets for consumers, i.e. the markets for motor
and domestic fuels and energy resources in gen-
eral. Remedies for the various competition con-
cerns, besides those mentioned above, allowed
the Commission to clear the case. TotalFina has
mainly undertaken to sell off a large proportion
of its investments in transport and storage logis-
tics (an operation which is expected to lead to a 62
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1) In order to compete effectively in the pay-TV market, pay-TV oper-
ators must acquire key inputs such as premium ﬁlms.
(
2) Premium ﬁlms showed on pay-TV shortly after cinema exhibition
and video rental are said to be released on ‘ﬁrst window’, that is before
they are available more widely on television.II — MERGER CONTROL
fundamental transformation of oil logistics in
France), to give up 70 service stations on motor-
ways and to sell off Elf Antargas, which will have
the effect of eliminating any overlap between the
merging parties’ LPG activities. At the end of
2000, most of these divestments had taken place.
258. On 13 September, the Commission rejected
a package of purchasers proposed by TotalFina
Elf to purchase the motorway service stations it
had undertaken to divest. In view of the market
structure resulting from the proposed package,
the Commission decided that two of the proposed
purchasers did not provide enough certainty as
to their viability as potentially or actually pres-
ent in the markets in question and their ability to
maintain and develop effective competition. On
7 November, the Commission accepted a new list
of purchasers proposed by TotalFina Elf that
included a new entrant in the market, the super-
market chain Carrefour. One of the two compa-
nies, Le Mirabellier, initially rejected by the
Commission, was not retained by TotalFina Elf
in its ﬁnal list of proposed purchasers. It ﬁled an
application under Article 230 of the EC Treaty for
the annulment of the Commission’s decision and
for interim measures asking for the suspension
of the contested decision and requiring the
Commission to order TotalFina Elf to suspend
the execution of its commitments. The applica-
tion for interim measures was rejected by the
Court on 17 January 2001.
2. Collective dominance
259. The Commission has applied the dominance
test as laid down in Article 2(3) of the merger reg-
ulation in cases where the result of the concentra-
tion would be the creation of collective dominance.
The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
have supported the Commission’s approach. In
examining collective dominance and its effects,
the Commission is conscious of the particularities
of each sector and very much sticks to an analysis
carried out without preconceptions and on a case-
by-case basis. An interesting corpus of precedent
is being built up which will eventually form the
basis of a forthcoming notice on collective domi-
nance.
260. The issue of collective dominance was dis-
cussed in a number of cases this year including
cases in the services sectors such as Veba/Viag
and the withdrawn operation EMI/Time Warner.
VEBA/VIAG
261. The Commission considered the Veba/Viag
case in parallel with the Bundeskartellamt’s inves-
tigation of RWE/VEW. Following these two oper-
ations the two new entities would have controlled
well over 80 % of the German market for elec-
tricity delivered from the interconnected grid. A
series of factors would have established a market
structure conducive to coordinated effects, notably
the total homogeneity of the product, the market
transparency, similar cost structures owing to a
similarly composed stock of power stations and
a number of jointly operated large power stations,
numerous interrelationships between Veba/Viag
and RWE, expected slight growth in demand and
low price elasticity of electricity as a product.
Both operations were cleared due to commitments
given by the parties to the respective authorities.
The undertakings given consisted mainly in divest-
ments affecting numerous holdings especially in
the eastern part of Germany, thus severing impor-
tant links between the two new groups, and trans-
forming VEAG, a major electricity producer
jointly controlled by the duopolists, into an inde-
pendent competitor. The undertakings also 
provided for improvements to the basic rules 
governing transmission through the network 
operated by the two leading interconnected 
entities.
Outokumpu/Avesta Shefﬁeld
262. The Commission does not automatically
apply the criteria for the assessment of collec-
tive dominance (i.e. criteria aimed at establish-
ing whether the market is prone to collective
dominance such as degree of market concentra-
tion, market transparency, product homogene-
ity, market growth, barriers to entry, counter-
vailing buyer power, structural links, etc.). In
Outokumpu/Avesta Shefﬁeld, the operation would
have resulted in a reduction in the number of pro-
ducers of hot and cold rolled ﬂat steel products
in the EU from six to ﬁve. Despite the relatively
transparent market and high entry barriers, the
Commission’s investigation highlighted a high
growth rate (over 5% a year) resulting in growth
of capacity utilisation. It was concluded that these
factors in combination with the different cost
structures of the companies would not have been
conducive to the emergence of coordinated effects
on the market. 63Alcan/Pechiney/Alusuisse
263. A series of mergers in the aluminium sector
which came under scrutiny this year, although rais-
ing mainly problems of single dominance, allowed
the Commission to reﬁne its thinking in relation to
coordinated effects in the market and collusion
issues. In Alcan/Pechiney, the Commission’s
assessment was essentially based on the idea that
the merging parties could use an existing struc-
tural link, in this case a joint venture, with a com-
petitor, as a retaliation mechanism to dissuade this
competitor from engaging in a price war.
264. The three-way merger between Alcan,
Pechiney and Alusuisse would have brought
together companies involved in all aspects of the
aluminium industry and would have created the
second largest aluminium producer worldwide.
Due to Alcan’s share-exchange offers towards the
two other companies, one merger could happen
without the other and the Commission was able to
investigate in depth the two cases separately and
on their own merits. The Alcan/Pechiney operation
did not go through and was abandoned by the par-
ties in view of a prohibition decision which the
Commission was considering adopting. On the
other hand, the Commission approved, subject to
divestment undertakings, the Alcan/Alusuisse oper-
ation.
Alcoa/Reynolds, Rexam/American 
National Can
265. In another case involving single dominance
(Alcoa/Reynolds) valuable experience was acquired
in the functioning of bidding markets. This expe-
rience, as applied in Rexam/American National
Can, enabled the Commission to conclude that a
collective dominance situation could be created
and sustained in markets where business is done
by way of frequent tenders.
3. Potential competition
Air Liquide/BOC
266. Finally, it should be mentioned that the
Commission has had the opportunity to analyse
a so-called indirect effect of a merger, i.e. its
impact upon potential competition in the Air
Liquide/BOC case. Timely, likely and sufﬁcient
potential competition is put forward as a defence
argument which could militate in favour of the
approval of a merger.
267. It was found that the proposed merger would
have strengthened BOC’s dominant position in
the United Kingdom and Ireland by removing the
threat of entry from the most likely challenger and
by reducing the likelihood of entry by other sup-
pliers. BOC’s dominance was extremely strong,
since in some product markets it almost reached a
100 % market share. Both parties were found to
hold a number of additional advantages in their
home market, not least through vertical integra-
tion. Another effect of the merger was that the new
entity would have created an unparalleled distri-
bution network in Europe, which would have given
it additional power to deter others from market
entry. Against this background, the removal of Air
Liquide as the most credible potential entrant to the
UK market was found to strengthen the dominant
position held by BOC. The deal was eventually
abandoned by the parties following unsuccessful
negotiations on remedies with the Federal Trade
Commission in the US.
C — Remedies
268. In December, the Commission adopted 
a notice on the subject of remedies (1), thereby
becoming the ﬁrst competition authority to issue
any such guidelines or advice on this subject. 
The notice aims to set out clearly and objectively
the administrative and substantive principles on
which the Commission will base its assessment
of remedies and follows extensive consultations
carried out over recent months with the Member
States and with the business and legal communi-
ties.
269. While the notice sets out the underlying prin-
ciples, it should be noted that the Commission’s
practice in the remedies area is evolving very fast
and that in order to deal with the issues on a
case-by-case basis the Commission must retain a
degree of ﬂexibility. In addition, the sheer number
of merger cases involving remedies is growing at
such a fast pace that it is becoming increasingly dif-
ﬁcult to keep abreast of developments in this area.
To put the following discussion into context, in
the last two years alone there have been around
50 cases in which the Commission has accepted
64 (
1) OJ C 68 of 2.3.2001, p. 3. The notice is available on the Internet:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/ competition/mergers/legislation/.II — MERGER CONTROL
remedial commitments from merging parties before
allowing transactions to proceed.
270. The notice underlines the general principles
that underpin the Commission’s procedures. In
particular, it stresses that, while it is for the
Commission to show that a concentration creates
or strengthens a dominant position, which can
impede competition, it is the responsibility of the
parties to show that the remedies they offer will
eliminate the problems identified by the
Commission.
271. The Commission must take into account a
variety of factors in reaching a conclusion on
whether or not the remedy will restore competition.
The type of remedy proposed is one vital factor,
but the Commission must also consider the risk
that a proposed remedy will not be able to be imple-
mented in full and in a timely fashion.
272. As the experience in dealing with remedial
proposals has shown, remedies must not only
appear appropriate to restore competition, but they
must do so effectively. For example, it is no longer
sufﬁcient for the Commission to accept that the
divestment of overlapping assets will necessarily
solve competitive problems brought about by a
particular merger. Even if suitable assets can be
identiﬁed, a commitment simply to divest those
assets — regardless of who buys them — may not
be adequate. Not only must the assets to be divested
represent an ongoing business, but they must also
be sold to someone who has the right incentives to
compete in the market.
273. One case from this year (TotalFina/Elf
Aquitaine (1)) clearly illustrates both these points.
Firstly, the Commission rejected a group of buy-
ers proposed by TotalFina Elf because they did
not have the incentives to bring competition effec-
tively to the market for French motorway petrol
sales. Secondly, the parties had proposed to sell sev-
eral assets to eliminate competition concerns in
the LPG industry. However, on account of nega-
tive feedback from the Commission’s market test
about the viability of the proposed remedies, they
had to undertake to divest a full subsidiary, a rem-
edy which went clearly beyond the elimination of
the overlap.
274. There are cases where the viability of the
divestiture package is, according to the assets con-
cerned, to a large extent dependent on the identity
of the purchaser. In such circumstances, the
Commission may not clear the merger unless the
parties agree not to complete the notiﬁed operation
until they have entered into a binding agreement
with a purchaser for the divested business (known
as the ‘upfront buyer’), approved by the
Commission. The first and, so far only case in
which the Commission imposed this condition was
Bosch/Rexroth (2). To address the Commission’s
concerns about potential pre-sale weakening of
the business, as well as concerns about the very
existence of a strong buyer, Bosch agreed to ﬁnd
an ‘upfront buyer’.
275. The notice recognises that while divestiture
is the preferred remedy, it is not the only type of
remedy acceptable to the Commission. There might
be situations where divestiture is not possible or
where the competition problems in question derive
from speciﬁc features of the deal such as the exis-
tence of exclusive agreements, the combination
of networks, or the combination of key patents.
An example of a case where the remedies package
incorporated such factors in addition to divest-
ments was Astra Zeneca/Novartis (3), a concen-
tration which led to the world’s leading crop pro-
tection business. In order to obtain clearance, the
parties to that case submitted an extensive pack-
age of remedies. This consisted not only of divesti-
tures of products, representing total sales world-
wide in excess of EUR 250 million this year, but
also of out-licensing of products and the termina-
tion of distribution agreements for third-party prod-
ucts.
276. Another example of a case where a solution
was found to a problem which could not have been
solved by divestiture but by lowering entry 
barriers occurred in Vodafone Airtouch/
Mannesmann (4). In this case, the remedy was
aimed at solving the problems with the emerging
seamless pan-European mobile telecommunica-
tions service market for corporate customers and
the markets for pan-European wholesale roaming.
These concerns were addressed by undertakings
aimed at giving other mobile operators the possi-
bility of providing these services to their customers
by using the integrated network of Vodafone
Airtouch/Mannesmann. Owing to rapid develop-
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1) Case M.1628, 9.2.2000.
(
2) Case M.2060, 13.12.2000.
(
3) Case M.1806, 26.7.2000.
(
4) Case M.1795, 12.4.2000. .ments in the sector, the award of third generation
UMTS licences and the fact that competitors will
try to build up alternative infrastructures, the com-
mitments have been limited to a period of three
years.
277. The degree of complexity of transactions
increases the uncertainties attached to assessing
the effectiveness of proposed remedies. Parties,
therefore, should hesitate before making a pack-
age of remedies too complex. To do so can cast
doubt on the viability of the whole exercise. An
important principle which has been emphasised
by Commissioner Monti several times during the
year is that the solution cannot be more complex
than the problem it is trying to solve.
278. An additional feature of some of the reme-
dies accepted this year is that the Commission has
insisted on eliminating minority shareholdings or
links among competitors that could prevent effec-
tive competition in certain markets. This was done
in Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram(1) by eliminating the
shareholding in BSkyB, and in AOL/Time
Warner(2) by severing the link with Bertelsmann.
This is an issue that also arose in Generali/INA(3),
where approval was contingent on the elimination
of minority shareholdings in competing insurance
undertakings, and in Volvo/Renault VI (4), which
was cleared only after Volvo agreed to sell the
minority stake that it had bought in Scania, its
major competitor in the Nordic countries.
D — Cooperation
1. Cooperation with Member States
279. An achievement that has become so much a
matter of fact that it is easily overlooked is the spe-
cial way in which EU merger control incorporates
the approaches and views of the competent com-
petition authorities of the EU’s 15 Member States.
In Phase I investigations (4–6 weeks) Member
States are forwarded a copy of each notiﬁcation
under the merger regulation, are informed about any
commitments submitted by companies to address
competition problems and can express their views
at any point during the proceedings including the
possibility of asking for referral of a case if the
criteria of Article 9 of the merger regulation are met.
In 2000 the Commission took six Article 9 deci-
sions during the year, two full referrals (5) to the
UK authorities, and four partial referrals, to France,
Spain and the UK (6).
280. Cooperation in Phase II investigations (an
additional four-month period) is even closer.
Member States are kept closely informed about
the Commission’s decision to initiate Phase II pro-
ceedings, about the Commission’s objections and
the parties’ reply to it, are invited to the hearing,
informed of any remedies proposed and the
Commission’s views on them and, ﬁnally and most
importantly, are consulted on the draft decision on
each Phase II case at an Advisory Committee meet-
ing. An Advisory Committee meeting is also held
for important non-case-related aspects such as
Commission notices providing guidance and deﬁn-
ing the Commission’s policy on various aspects
of the merger regulation and for cases involving
fines. In 2000, no fewer than 18 Advisory
Committee meetings (sometimes combining more
than one case or issue) were held.
281. In 2000, the combined efforts of the
Commission and Member States have resulted in
a vast majority of the votes taken on individual
merger cases by the Advisory Committee unani-
mously supporting the Commission’s position, the
remaining points being approved by simple major-
ity (measured by votes on individual points). In
more than half of the cases the Advisory Committee
agreed with the Commission unanimously on all
points, while in others it agreed on some points
unanimously and on some by majority.
282. There are numerous cases in which an indi-
vidual Member State has a particular interest and
in which it therefore remains in close contact with
the Commission. In many of these cases Member
States have provided useful input into the compe-
tition assessment. An outstanding example of col-
laboration between a Member State and the
Commission in 2000 was the Veba/Viag case. In
that case, the German Bundeskartellamt and the
Commission in fact achieved an extraordinary
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(
2) Case M.1825, 11.10.2000.
(
3) Case M.1712, 12.1.2000.
(
4) Case M.1980, 1.9.2000.
(
5) Case M.1779 — Anglo American/Tarmac and M.1827 —
Hanson/Pioneer.
(
6) Two in Case M.1684 — Carrefour/Promodès, one to the French
authorities, one to the Spanish authorities; Case M.2044 —
Interbrew/Bassand Case M.2154 — C3D/Rhône/GoAhead,both to
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twinning of cases, the Bundeskartellamt investi-
gating in parallel a closely linked case in the elec-
tricity sector, RWE/VEW. The fruits of this close
cooperation were fully consistent and satisfactory
results which will have a major positive impact on
the liberalisation process in this sector. Another
example was Generali/INA, in which the Italian side
very much supported the Commission’s investi-
gation, particularly as regards the assessment of the
proposed remedies.
2. The international dimension of
merger control
283. Owing to the combined effects of interna-
tionalisation, technological change and restruc-
turing, the global increase in merger activity has
continued, giving further impetus to the need to
strengthen the international dimension of EC
merger control. More than 60 countries now have
pre-merger notification requirements and the
steadily rising number of competition authorities
applying national laws to merger operations has
resulted in some ﬁrms having to seek clearance
for proposed operations from up to 40 different
authorities; this not only raises the ﬁrms’ transac-
tion costs signiﬁcantly but also increases the risk
of inconsistent rulings. Calls for promoting effec-
tive international cooperation, particularly in the
ﬁeld of mergers, were made on various occasions
in 2000 on both sides of the Atlantic (1).
2.1. Cooperation with the United States
and Canada
284. Close bilateral cooperation with the compe-
tition authorities of the EU’s main trading part-
ners, most notably with the US Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission and with
the Canadian Competition Bureau, continued dur-
ing 2000. These issues are discussed in more detail
in Chapter IV (International activities).
2.2. Cooperation with EFTA countries and
applicant countries
285. EU merger control encompasses not only the
competition systems of its 15 Member States but
also to a large extent, via cooperation with the
EFTA Surveillance Authority, those of the other
European members of the European Economic
Area, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In regard
to in-depth Phase II investigations, that coopera-
tion reached its highest level ever in 2000.
286. Contacts with applicant countries have been
further developed. Their competition authorities
have also been invited to comment in the context
of the Merger Review 2000 exercise and have
offered valuable contributions. The coming years
will see a further strengthening of this coopera-
tion, which is viewed by the Commission as an
important step towards eventual accession.
E — Other procedures
1. Fines; Articles 14 and 15 of the
merger regulation
287. On a separate note, for the first time the
Commission imposed fines on a non-notifying
party for failing to supply information under the
merger regulation. The fines were imposed on
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for failing to supply
information on a joint venture last year between
Kvaerner and Ahlström. The first fine, of
EUR 50 000, was for failing to comply with the
Commission decision pursuant to Article 14(1)(c)
of the merger regulation. The second ﬁne was a peri-
odic penalty payment totalling EUR 900 000. This
is the ﬁrst time the Commission has ﬁned a com-
pany other than a notifying party (or a party fail-
ing to notify) in merger proceedings. It is also the
ﬁrst time that a periodic penalty payment has been
imposed on a ﬁrm in such proceedings. The action
was taken because the Commission considered
that Mitsubishi’s behaviour was a very serious
infringement of EU law as the information
requested was necessary for the proper assessment
of the Ahlström/Kvaerner operation. In adopting
this decision, the Commission wanted to stress its
determination to enforce the merger control rules
in the European Union, which presupposes the
supply of correct information by both merging par-
ties and competitors requested to assist it in its
task. 67
(
1) See Commissioner Monti’s speech at the Japan Foundation
Conference, Washington DC on 23 June; Assistant Attorney General
Joel Klein’s, Director-General Schaub’s and Commissioner Monti’s
speeches at the 10th Anniversary Conference of EC Merger Control
in Brussels on 14–15 September; Commissioner Monti’s and DoJ
Acting Assistant Attorney General Melamed’s speeches at Fordham,
New York on 19–20 October and Commissioner Monti’s speech at
the European University Institute in Fiesole on 27 October. The
need to take a fresh look at the problems arising from multi-juris-
dictional merger ﬁlings was also examined in some depth by the US
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, which pre-
sented its ﬁnal report to US Attorney General Reno and US Assistant
Attorney General Klein in February.2. Prevention of barriers to cross-
border mergers; Article 21 of the merger
regulation
288. The Commission is also vigilant in prevent-
ing mergers of a Community dimension from being
blocked by Member States for protectionist or
other unacceptable reasons. In this context, the
Commission adopted a decision under Article 21
of the merger regulation against measures taken by
the Portuguese authorities. This followed similar
action taken against the Portuguese Government
last year in the BSCH/A. Champalimaud case (1).
In the decision taken this year, the Commission
found that, in blocking the proposed acquisition by
Secil Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimentos SA and
Holderbank of the Portuguese company Cimpor
Cimentos de Portugal SGPS, the Portuguese
Government had breached its obligations under
Article 21 of the merger regulation. The
Commission found that the ministerial decisions
opposing the bid were not meant to protect any
legitimate interest as recognised under Article 21
of the merger regulation. Both the above cases
clearly indicate that the Commission intends to
protect its exclusive right to review mergers with
a Community dimension and that it will challenge
any other similar infringements.
68
(
1) Case M.1616.II — MERGER CONTROL
F — Statistics
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A — General policy
289. In the ﬁeld of State aid, the Commission con-
tinued throughout 2000 its rationalisation and mod-
ernisation activities initiated in previous years,
giving them an increased focus. In this area its
adoption of three regulations on aid to small and
medium-sized enterprises, aid for training and the
application of the de minimis rule, is making a
major contribution to the attainment of its objec-
tives (see below). In addition to this rationalisation
and modernisation, it has also emphasised the
proper enforcement of Commission decisions, par-
ticularly concerning the recovery of State aid that
has been unlawfully granted (see Box 7).
290. The eighth survey of State aid in the Union(1),
adopted by the Commission in April, covers the
years 1996–98. During that period, grants of aid
amounting to an average of EUR 93 billion per
year were paid by the 15 Member States to the
manufacturing, agricultural, ﬁsheries, coal min-
ing, transport and ﬁnancial services sectors. While
this constitutes a considerable amount in absolute
terms it nevertheless represents a reduction of 11%
in relation to the previous period, 1994–96.
291. In relation to the previous period, the man-
ufacturing sector remains the principal beneﬁci-
ary of grants of aid, receiving EUR 33 billion as
an annual average, equivalent to 2.3 % of value
added (EU-15). In the period 1996–98, 57 % of
aid granted to the manufacturing sector was for
regional development purposes. Aid for hori-
zontal objectives and for particular sectors rep-
resented 35 % and 8 % of aid to the manufactur-
ing sector. Moreover, aid granted on an ad hoc
basis to speciﬁc enterprises now accounts for less
than 10 % of aid to the manufacturing sector.
292. However, despite the downward trend that has
developed over several years, the eighth survey
stresses that in absolute terms the level of aid
remains high. The differences between Member
States, in terms of the relative levels of aid paid,
remain signiﬁcant. Between the various Member
States, the aid granted to the manufacturing sec-
tor varies from 0.7 % to 4.9 % of value added.
Those differences are even more signiﬁcant if the
criterion taken is the amount of aid paid per
employee, which varies from EUR 188 to
EUR 1 955.
1. Modernising State aid control
293. On 6 December, the Commission agreed in
principle to the adoption of three regulations on the
basis of the enabling provisions in Regulation (EC)
No 994/98 (2), which allows the Commission to
target its activities in the modernisation of State aid
control measures. These instruments consist of
two regulations creating exemptions for aid to
small and medium-sized enterprises (3) and train-
ing aid (4) and a regulation codifying the applica-
tion of the de minimisrule (5). Member States will
therefore be able in future to grant aid that meets
the conditions ﬁxed by those regulations without
the need for giving prior notiﬁcation to and secur-
ing the agreement of the Commission. The regu-
lation on the de minimis rule codiﬁes the applica-
tion of that rule, which was initially set out in the
form of a Commission notice on 6 March 1996.
Under that rule, aid to an enterprise that is below
the threshold of EUR 100 000 over a period of
three years is not considered State aid for the pur-
poses of the Treaty provided that it does not affect
trade or distort competition. Such aid is thus exempt
from the obligation of notiﬁcation.
294. The positive effects of these regulations are
not of beneﬁt to the Commission alone but also
extend to the Member States, which can grant aid
covered by the regulations much more quickly
than before. However, this procedural simpliﬁca-
71
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5) Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001).tion does not entail a lesser degree of control in or
a relaxation of the rules on State aid: Member
States remain under an obligation to inform the
Commission, regarding each aid award, of the
detailed provisions involved and to submit sum-
mary reports each year on all aid they have granted.
Moreover, in so far as the regulations, which are
directly applicable in the Member States, fix
accounting criteria that must be met, the monitor-
ing role of the national courts will be expanded.
295. The reduction in the number of notiﬁcations
will in time allow the Commission to reinforce its
monitoring in the ﬁeld of State aid, especially by
enabling it to concentrate its resources on really seri-
ous cases of distortion of competition.
2. Increased transparency
296. The monitoring of State aid cannot be rein-
forced without introducing greater transparency
into the Commission’s activities. With that in view,
the Commission is establishing a public register and
a scoreboard for State aid. This initiative forms
part of the policy of reducing the volume of State
aid reafﬁrmed at the Lisbon European Council,
when the Commission, the Council and the Member
States were invited to proceed with their efforts to
foster competition and reduce the general level of
aid. The Council meeting on the internal market on
16 March made suggestions along the same lines,
proposing in its conclusions that a strategy should
be developed for reducing the general level of aid,
paying particular attention to monitoring, the level
of aid and the calculation of its economic impact,
especially by means of statistics.
297. Transparency in the accounting of some
enterprises will also be necessary if the Commission
is to cope with the increasing number of cases
involving cross-subsidies. Thus the amendment
introduced on 26 July(1) to Commission Directive
80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency
of ﬁnancial relations between Member States and
public undertakings (2) requires enterprises oper-
ating services of general economic interest (for
which they receive compensation) and carrying
on ordinary commercial activities, to keep separate
accounts for those different activities.
298. However, in order to avoid imposing dis-
proportionate burdens, this amendment, which
applies to both public and private enterprises, does
not affect small and medium-sized enterprises,
enterprises providing services that cannot distort
competition or affect trade and enterprises for
whom the amount of compensation for the opera-
tion of services of general economic interest has
been ﬁxed on the basis of an open, transparent and
non-discriminatory procedure.
3. Aid for environmental protection
299. Environmental protection is a major concern
of the European Union. The Commission has long
recognised that the grant of State aid for environ-
mental protection may be necessary, in certain cir-
cumstances, as an incentive for enterprises to take
action in this area.
300. By giving its agreement in principle on
21 December for the adoption of new Community
guidelines on State aid for environmental protection,
the Commission, as well as clarifying the applica-
tion of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, aims to pro-
vide a greater incentive to protect the environment
by means of State aid. Thus, although the new guide-
lines no longer allow the grant of aid that is designed
to facilitate an enterprise’s compliance with new
Community standards, except for aid for SMEs for
a limited period, they expressly allow the grant of
aid for ﬁrms improving on existing standards.
301. Regarding renewable energy sources, which
are given a high priority, Member States will in
future be able to grant inter alia aid to cover the dif-
ference between the cost of producing energy from
renewable sources and the market price of that
energy up to the amount required for the deprecia-
tion on the installations in question. A flexible
approach has been adopted regarding tax reduc-
tions. Member States’ options include the grant of
non-degressive exemptions for 10 years for enter-
prises that have signed voluntary agreements on
environmental protection. While enterprises that
have not signed voluntary agreements can in fact
qualify for reductions, it is a condition that they con-
tinue to pay a signiﬁcant part of the taxes in ques-
tion.
B — Concept of aid
302. According to the deﬁnition in Article 87(1)
of the EC Treaty, State aid is incompatible with the 72 (
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common market if it (a) is granted by a State
through State resources, (b) distorts competition by
conferring an economic advantage on the recipi-
ent and granting aid selectively to ‘certain under-
takings’ or for ‘the production of certain goods’ and
(c) affects trade between Member States. The form
in which the aid is granted (interest rebate, tax
relief, loan, guarantee, supply of goods or serv-
ices on preferential terms, capital injections on
terms not acceptable to a private investor, etc.) is
irrelevant.
1. Origin of resources
303. For a measure to be considered aid, it has to
be established that it confers an advantage which
is State-ﬁnanced. In addition, the Court of Justice
held in Ladbroke Racing and Commission (1) that
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty covers all the ﬁnan-
cial means by which the public sector may actu-
ally support undertakings, irrespective of whether
or not those means are permanent assets of the
public sector. The fact that the sums involved
remain constantly under public control, and there-
fore available to the competent national authori-
ties, is sufﬁcient for them to be categorised as State
aid and for the measure to fall within Article 87(1).
304. The question whether public means are
involved arises a fortiori where a Member State or
a publicly owned holding corporation intends to
take a holding in the capital of a company. The
State is acting as a public investor, a role that in itself
is perfectly legitimate under the Treaty. As State
aid has to be assessed on the basis of its effects, the
Commission developed the criterion of the private
investor in a market economy: in each case it has
to be established whether the public holding in the
company’s capital is intended to earn a return, and
has consequently been acquired by the State or
public holding corporation in the same way as it
might have been acquired by a private buyer, or
whether it has been acquired in the public interest,
so that the acquisition has to be considered a form
of assistance by the State in its capacity as public
authority. When public capital is to be injected
into a business, the question arises whether a pri-
vate investor would do the same. The test is satis-
ﬁed where the capital invested can be expected to
produce a normal return on the investment in the
form of dividends or capital gains.
305. In Parco Navi (2), the Commission decided
that, since a capital injection by a public holding
company was designed to earn a reasonable return
on the capital invested within a reasonable time,
it did not constitute State aid.
306. In Électricité de France (EDF) (3), the
Commission considered whether rebates granted
to paper mills by EDF constituted State aid. It con-
cluded that a private operator would prefer to sell
an additional unit of electricity although he did
not cover the total cost for that unit rather than not
sell it at all. EDF’s behaviour was therefore con-
sidered justiﬁed on commercial grounds. However,
the Commission stressed that the decision should
be seen in light of the particular circumstances pre-
vailing on the French market (the investigation
concerned the period 1990–96, i.e. before the ongo-
ing liberalisation of the electricity market. At that
time, EDF had overcapacity in nuclear energy).
307. In Siciliana Acque Minerali (4) the Commission
adopted a negative decision, since in the circum-
stances no private investor would inject capital to
recapitalise the company for privatisation because
it lacked any prospect of ﬁnancial viability.
308. Regarding the recapitalisation of a Crédit
Lyonnais subsidiary in TASQ (5), the Commission
again considered that the resources were public as
the public shareholding allowed the State to exer-
cise control over Crédit Lyonnais. It recognised
that generally, without considering the timescale,
the State assistance complied with the principle
of sound management aimed at minimising losses
and safeguarding the interests of the State and thus
no State aid was involved.
309. In Georgsmarienhütte und Gröditzer (6), the
Commission opened the formal investigation pro-
cedure owing to its doubts whether a private
investor would have agreed to the payment of a
holding service fee, since Gröditzer was on the
brink of insolvency.
310. The Commission initiated a procedure con-
cerning SEPI(Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones
Industriales) (7) as it doubted whether SEPI’s acqui-
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a genuine market transaction and considered that
it amounted to a capital injection constituting State
aid since SEPI was already the ultimate share-
holder of the assets acquired.
311. In  Kaha Porzellan in Germany (1) the
Commission doubted whether a market-economy
investor would have provided ﬁnancial support
for a company on the brink of insolvency.
312. In its ruling in Spain v Commission (2) con-
cerning aid in favour of Tubacex, the Court of
Justice introduced the new criterion of a public
creditor in order to determine whether a repay-
ment and rescheduling agreement concluded by
the State formed State aid. It noted that in such
cases the State did not act as a public investor
whose conduct must be compared to that of a pri-
vate investor laying out capital with a view to real-
ising a proﬁt but as a public creditor who, like a pri-
vate creditor, seeks to recover sums due to it. On
the basis of this new assessment criterion, the
Commission revised its recovery decisions con-
cerning Tubacex (3) and SNIACE (4), concluding
that the public creditors had acted as a private cred-
itor would have done in order to maximise the rate
of interest on arrears by applying the legal rate of
interest on debts. Consequently, it took the view
that the measures did not constitute aid.
313. In Ganzliner Beschichtungspulver (5), the
Commission considered that the waiver of repay-
ment of part of loans by public banks complied
with the private creditor principle, as the settle-
ment agreement produced a proportionate net gain
for all creditors compared to the alternative of 
liquidation.
2. Advantage to a ﬁrm
314. Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty deﬁnes the
source and effects of State aid but does not deﬁne
aid or list the types of prohibited measures. The def-
inition has, however, been mapped out by the
Commission and the Court of Justice. The Court
of Justice has specified that aid constitutes an
advantage conferred on a ﬁrm by the public author-
ities without payment or against a payment which
corresponds only to a minimal extent to the ﬁgure
at which the advantage can be valued. A deﬁnition
of this kind covers the allocation of resources and
the grant of relief on charges that the ﬁrm would
otherwise have to bear, enabling it to make a 
saving.
315. The Court underlined in its ruling in Germany
vCommission (6) concerning the German Income
Tax Act that the origin of the advantage indirectly
conferred on undertakings by the Act had to be
seen in the renunciation by the Member State of tax
revenue which it would normally have received,
inasmuch as it was this renunciation which enabled
investors to take holdings in undertakings on con-
ditions which were more advantageous in tax terms.
The fact that investors then take independent deci-
sions does not mean that the connection between
the tax concession and the advantage given to the
undertakings has been eliminated since, in eco-
nomic terms, the alteration of the market conditions
which gives rise to the advantage is the conse-
quence of the public authorities’ loss of tax revenue.
316. An economic advantage may be conferred
through a variety of means and circumstances, for
example the terms on which undertakings have
access to or exploit infrastructure, e.g. by erect-
ing a business park and making such infrastructure
available. The Commission found in the case of
Lenzing Lyozell (LLG) (7) that no State aid was
involved as the prices that LLG paid for basic
process media including electricity, process-steam,
process-water, cooling, pressurised air, water treat-
ment, and waste disposal constituted normal mar-
ket prices. Furthermore, it concluded that there
was no State aid in the form of provision of spe-
ciﬁc infrastructure, since LLG paid its fair ﬁnan-
cial share for beneﬁting from the connections to the
infrastructure.
317. In order to overcome a historically low
demand creating low market values for property
throughout Wales, which prevented private
investors from obtaining a sufﬁcient return lead-
ing to a market failure in the provision of business
premises and an insufﬁcient supply of suitable
business property, the United Kingdom consid-
ered setting up a ‘Business infrastructure devel-
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opment scheme’ (1). The Commission, proceed-
ing on the basis of its communication on State aid
elements in sales of land and buildings by public
authorities (2), came to the conclusion that no State
aid was conferred, since the market price of the
developed land and buildings was determined by
public tender or through evaluation by independ-
ent experts.
318. The sale price for a public shareholding does
not contain State aid elements when it is sold in an
open, unconditional and non-discriminatory ten-
der procedure. The Commission observed in its
decision in Kali und Salz (3) that Member States are,
however, not obliged to follow that procedure to
dispose of their public shareholdings. Although
there was no call for public tenders the ﬁnal price
was obtained following a procedure in which no
potential investor was arbitrarily excluded from
the sale. The negotiations between all interested par-
ties acting with a view to their economic interests
took place according to market principles.
319. Regarding support for the ﬁnancing of cable-
way installations in the Province of Bolzano (4), the
Commission found that generally such aid has to
be considered State aid to the owners and opera-
tors, since the objective of this service was tourism
and as such clearly commercial and competitive.
The ﬁnancing of those facilities cannot be exempted
under Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty as they nor-
mally do not provide a service of general economic
interest in that they are not intended to satisfy the
general and basic needs of the population but to gen-
erate proﬁts from tourism.
3. Speciﬁcity
320. To be caught by Article 87(1) of the EC
Treaty, a measure must not only be a State meas-
ure but must also be selective, thus affecting the
balance between the recipient ﬁrm and its com-
petitors. This selective character distinguishes State
aid measures from general economic support meas-
ures which apply across the board to all ﬁrms in all
sectors of economic activity in a Member State. As
long as they do not favour a particular area of activ-
ity, such general measures derive from Member
States’ power to determine their economic policy.
Consequently, measures that have a cross-sectoral
impact, being equally applicable throughout the
territory of a Member State and favouring the whole
economy, do not constitute State aid for the pur-
poses of Article 87(1).
321. In 1992 the Commission considered that a
Danish scheme (5) granting a lower ﬂat rate for
income tax constituted State aid, since it had the
potential to confer beneﬁts only on certain sectors
of industry. However, the data submitted showed
that the scheme was actually being applied to both
the private and the public sector, to manufacturing,
trade and services and to large companies as well
as SMEs. Consequently, the measure did not in
practice favour certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods and the Commission there-
fore approved the Danish scheme as well as a
Swedish scheme (5)to reduce the income tax base
for experts recruited abroad.
322. Regarding the taxaid scheme concerning tax
reductions to promote investment at Madeira (6),
the Commission held that the measures conferred
a selective advantage as the tax relief could only
be obtained if the beneﬁciary was registered in
Madeira and reinvested his proﬁts wholly or par-
tially in the region of Madeira. Consequently, the
measure constituted aid within the meaning of
Article 87(1).
4. Effect on trade between 
Member States
323. Once it has been established that a measure
confers an advantage, is State-ﬁnanced and is selec-
tive in character, that measure is deemed to con-
stitute State aid pursuant to Article 87(1) of the
EC Treaty. For this article to apply, the measure
must also distort competition and affect trade
between Member States. In order to establish the
impact of this distortion on trade between Member
States it is sufﬁcient that the beneﬁciary carries on
activities, even partially, involving trade between
Member States.
324. However, the effect on competition must be
appreciable. The Court of Justice reiterated in its
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tively small amount of aid or the relatively small
size of the undertaking which receives it does 
not as such exclude the possibility that
intra-Community trade may be affected. When aid
granted by a State or through State resources
strengthens the position of an undertaking com-
pared with other undertakings competing in
intra-Community trade, the latter undertakings
must be regarded as affected by that aid. That was
so in this case, since any undertaking other than
those to which the measure in issue applied could
increase its own resources only on less advanta-
geous terms, whether it was established in Germany
or in another Member State.
C — Assessing the compatibility of
aid with the common market
1. Horizontal aid
1.1. Small and medium-sized enterprises
325. Regarding assistance for small and
medium-sized enterprises, which is provided under
various national aid schemes, doubts over the enter-
prise’s real independence, measured against the
criteria for aid to SMEs, led the Commission to
suspect that there had been an infringement of the
rules on aid. Consequently, it decided, in Solar
Tech (2), to reduce the aid intensity because the
ﬁrm was closely linked to a large group. Since
Solar Tech was directly and indirectly controlled
by a large enterprise in the building sector, it was
not affected by the typical handicaps of SMEs in
its access to capital and credit, information sources,
new technologies, etc. The Commission accord-
ingly decided that the ﬁrm was not eligible for the
‘bonus’ under the relevant regional aid scheme as
the criterion of independence in the SME guide-
lines had not been fulﬁlled.
1.2. Research and development aid
326. In applying the 1996 Community framework
for State aid for research and development, among
the evidence requested by the Commission is that
of the incentive effect of the aid. The closer research
and development is related to competition the more
strictly that principle applies. Consequently fun-
damental research work carried out by public insti-
tutions does not constitute aid, whereas funda-
mental research carried out by companies falls
under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. However,
since this type of research is far from the market,
it may comply with the Treaty if the results are in
principle widely available for exploitation on a
non-discriminatory basis.
327. The Commission affirmed the incentive
nature of the measures in Plan Technologique
Ferroviaire (3), the ITEA programme (4), the
German mobility and land transport research pro-
gramme (5) and Tax Credit (6).
328. The Plan Technologique is designed to fos-
ter studies with a view to launching technologies
to improve trafﬁc safety. In ITEA, notiﬁed jointly
by France and the Netherlands, the Commission
recalled that it had underlined on a number of occa-
sions the importance of the information-technol-
ogy industry, which was crucial for the informa-
tion society of the 21st century. Consequently, it
considered that the programme at that stage was in
the Community interest. The German programme
will focus on the development of new transport
structures, which, through inter-modal coopera-
tion, can ensure mobility while reducing transport
expenditure and relieve overall trafﬁc pressure
while increasing transport safety. In addition, new
‘intelligent’ information, communication and guid-
ance technologies should be developed with the
help of transport telematics. In Tax Credit, the UK
granted a tax credit on expenditure on R&D. The
Commission considered that the aid had an incen-
tive effect, especially as it was exclusively for
small and medium-sized enterprises.
329. The Commission initially had doubts about
the proximity to the market and incentive effect of
the project concerning colour ink-jet printing tech-
nology and therefore opened proceedings to carry
out more detailed investigations. However, it con-
cluded that the research undertaken by Océ (7)
could be considered a pre-competitive develop-
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ment having an incentive effect on the company and
as such compatible with the EC Treaty.
330. As to the compatibility of industrial research
and development with the Treaty, the Commission
found in the case Fondo Speciale Rotativo per la
Ricerca Technologica (1) that it may be eligible
under the framework on condition that it is ancil-
lary to the pre-competitive stage of research.
1.3. Employment and training
331. As it had undertaken, on 21 December the
Commission adopted a report on the application of
the guidelines on aid for employment (2). It pointed
out that, although the application of the guidelines
had not given rise to particular difﬁculties, many
grants of State aid directly or indirectly aimed at
promoting employment had been considered in
another context, that of aid for investment. This pro-
vided some explanation for the relatively low num-
bers of schemes notiﬁed since 1995, on average 10
to 12 per year.
332. In addition to the relation between aid for
employment and aid for investment, which can
have the same objective, the report identiﬁes three
areas calling for clariﬁcation in future. These are
the quantiﬁcation of the terms for and the levels of
permissible grants of aid, the deﬁnition of the spe-
ciﬁc categories of workers (long-term unemployed,
young workers, etc.) eligible for more favourable
conditions and the application of aid schemes appli-
cable to employment in sensitive sectors (steel,
motor vehicles, shipbuilding, etc.).
333. The Commission will have to take account of
all those aspects in drawing up new provisions,
which will consist either of new guidelines for noti-
fied cases of aid or of a regulation exempting
Member States from notifying aid that meets cer-
tain criteria. The current guidelines will remain in
force (3) until the Commission decides whether the
latter approach, which has already been adopted for
aid to SMEs, training and the de minimis rule (see
above), is also appropriate to aid for employment.
334. The framework on training aid (4) provides
that aid intensity must be tailored according to the
size of the beneﬁciary enterprise, the region in
question, the type of training in view and the type
of persons to be covered (disadvantaged workers).
The Commission authorised the implementation of
the French scheme entitled Commitments for
expanding training (5) inasmuch as it met all the
criteria and other conditions laid down in the
framework.
1.4. Environment
335. The Commission had various opportunities
during the year to explain its interpretation of the
guidelines on State aid for environmental protec-
tion, which were extended until 31 December and
are to be replaced by the new guidelines on which
the Commission agreed in principle on
21 December (see above Section III.A.3) (6).
336. With regard to a Swedish aid scheme for
improving the environment inside buildings (7),
the Commission ﬁrst stressed that, in so far as they
were undertaken by individuals or public institu-
tions, such measures did not fall within the scope
of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the beneﬁciar-
ies not having any link with commercial activi-
ties. But the Commission expressed strong doubts
as to the compatibility of the aid where it was
intended for owners of real estate or public or pri-
vate real estate agencies. The Commission started
proceedings in order to scrutinise the measures
with special reference to the objective of public
health as set out in Article 152 of the EC Treaty (see
also point 411 below).
337. On 29 March, the Commission decided not
to raise any objections to a scheme concerning
tradable CO2 emission permits proposed by
Denmark (8) to allocate emission permits to elec-
tricity producers established in Denmark on the
basis of their historical emissions over the period
1994–98, on the grounds that the scheme would
contribute to the development of environmental
protection. The Commission assessed the scheme
against the background of the Kyoto Protocol to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
adopted in December 1997. Under the protocol,
the European Community has committed itself to
reducing its emissions by 8 % over the period
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11.11.2000).2008–12. Burden sharing has been agreed internally
in the EU, which for Denmark implies a 21 %
reduction during that period. At the same time, the
Commission emphasised the importance of safe-
guarding the freedom of establishment. As the
Danish authorities ensured that new entrants to the
Danish electricity market would receive emission
permits based on objective and non-discrimina-
tory criteria, the Commission found the scheme
compatible with the common market.
338. As regards environmental measures pursued
through tax legislation, the Commission autho-
rised continuation of the ecological tax reform (1)
in Germany, recognising that the introduction of
environmental taxes and charges may need to be
accompanied by State aid because some ﬁrms may
not be able to bear the extra ﬁnancial burden imme-
diately and may require temporary relief. The main
feature of the extension is the gradual annual
increase in electricity tax and fuel tax. The
Commission approved the system taking into
account the exceptional circumstances, especially
the fact that at present not all EU Member States
levy such comprehensive energy taxes, which can
therefore affect the competitive position of the
ﬁrms concerned.
339. In this context, the Commission also approved
operating aid in the form of a ﬁve-year exemption
of highly efﬁcient gas and steam turbine power
stations (2) from the mineral oil tax, in view of their
achievements in terms of protecting the environ-
ment. The Commission came to the conclusion
that aid was involved as not all market participants
could beneﬁt from the measure, as the regulation
favoured particularly existing generating compa-
nies feeding power into the network. However,
the tax exemption was considered compatible with
the Treaty as it is aimed at creating incentives for
investment in gas and steam power stations which
are more energy-efﬁcient and therefore contribute
to environmental protection.
1.5. Rescue and restructuring aid
340. On 8 July 1999, the Commission adopted
revised Community guidelines on State aid for res-
cuing and restructuring ﬁrms in difﬁculty (3). By
this revision, the Commission intended to tighten
up the rules in force especially with regard to
repeated restructuring aid. The ‘one time, last time’
principle thus rules out any further payment of
restructuring aid to a company, the rationale being
to prevent situations where ﬁrms which would not
normally survive in the market are artiﬁcially kept
alive by continuous restructuring. It also stresses
that new ﬁrms (including ﬁrms formed out of the
assets of previous ones) are not eligible. Lastly, it
put an end to the special treatment given to cases
concerning companies in the new German Länder.
The ‘one time, last time’ principle will apply in
full after 31 December 2000.
341. The Commission had to deal with the ques-
tion whether a company taking over all the assets
of a bankrupt company could be deﬁned as a new
company or had to be held liable to reimburse
incompatible aid. This was the case with Graf von
Henneberg Porzellan (4) and Kahla Porzellan (5)
The Commission initiated proceedings as it had
serious doubts that new companies were involved,
given that they took over all the assets and still
carried on the business under the same name.
342. As regards prolonged restructuring processes,
the Commission had to assess whether they should
be treated as a single ongoing restructuring oper-
ation or as a number of subsequent restructuring
processes. In the Lintra case (6), restructuring
involved the holding company and eight sub-
sidiaries. The restructuring plans for the surviv-
ing subsidiaries were clearly different from the
original plan. The Commission therefore split up
the process into several restructuring operations.
In the case of privatisation measures involving the
transfer of selected assets from Babcock Wilcox (7)
to a private company, the Commission decided to
extend the proceedings initiated in April 1998 (8)
in order to assess whether the various restructur-
ing programmes could be seen as one integrative
measure, generally allowable only in the event of
force majeure.
343. In several cases the Commission made it
clear that the three key criteria, namely viability of
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the restructuring plan, the absence of undue dis-
tortion of competition and proportionality of the
aid, must be strictly respected. One of these con-
ditions not being fulﬁlled, it opened proceedings
in respect of Hirschfelder Leinen und Textil (1),
SKL-Motoren und Systemtechnik (2) and 
Holzmann (3), while it approved aid to Wildauer
Kurbelwelle (4) given the substantial increase in
the investor’s contribution, and to Bau Union Ost
Group (5), the aid being limited to the minimum
required to implement the restructuring programme.
2. Regional aid
344. Regional aid is by far the largest single cat-
egory of State aid in the Community. Between
1996 and 1998, Member States granted
EUR 18.8 billion in State aid pursuing regional
objectives. This represented 57.6 % of all State
aid granted to industry and services in the Union.
Over the years, the Commission has witnessed a
sharp increase in regional aid measures through-
out the Community.
345. With the introduction of the guidelines on
national regional aid (6), the Commission sought
to tighten control of this important type of State aid.
When adopting the new guidelines the Commission
also proposed that Member States take appropri-
ate measures in order to bring existing aid schemes
into line with the new rules before 1 January 2000.
It also invited Member States to adopt new regional
aid maps with effect from 1 January 2000. At the
same time, the Commission wanted to use the
opportunity to implement a sizeable reduction in
the coverage of the regional aid maps in the
Community, notably to take into account recent
economic developments in the Member States and
also with a view to the forthcoming enlargement
of the European Union.
346. All maps have been drawn up on the basis of
a transparent and objective method ensuring equal
treatment for all 15 Member States. At the same
time, the Commission has succeeded, with the help
of the Member States, in reducing the population
coverage of the regional aid maps from 46.7 % to
42.7 % of the Community’s population. Strict
application of the eligibility criteria has resulted in
a tighter demarcation of the assisted regions. This
has enabled Member States to focus their regional
assistance on the regions suffering from the most
severe economic problems.
347. The Commission has also reduced the max-
imum aid intensities applicable in regional aid
areas. The 1998 guidelines provide that aid inten-
sity ceilings in the least favoured regions (referred
to as Article 87(3)(a) regions) should not normally
exceed 50 % after tax (down from 75 % in the
past). For other regional aid areas (known as Article
87(3)(c) regions), this ceiling is set at 20 % after
tax (compared with 30 % in the past). In 1999 the
Commission already approved the regional aid
maps for the ﬁve new German Länder, Finland,
Denmark, Ireland, Greece and the Article 87(3)(a)
regions of Portugal. In 2000, the remaining maps
were approved after the Commission was able to
convince Member States to set the aid intensity
ceilings at levels well below those upper limits.
As a result, the average aid intensity ceiling dur-
ing the period 2000 to 2006 will be limited to only
39% in Article 87(3)(a) regions and to only 17%
in Article 87(3)(c) areas.
348. As regards operating aid under regional aid
schemes, the Commission stressed the importance
of aid being degressive and limited in time. The aid
must moreover be justiﬁed by its incentive effect
on regional development, its nature and its pro-
portionality to the handicaps it is intended to over-
come. The Commission thus opened the proce-
dure concerning a Portuguese scheme of tax aid for
the free-trade zone of Madeira (7) and adopted a
negative decision on Article 29ter of the Walloon
Region Decree of 25 June 1992 (8), which pro-
vided for operating aid that was neither degres-
sive nor limited in time. A negative decision was
also taken on 21 December on a Swedish scheme
reducing by eight percentage points social secu-
rity contributions payable in respect of each per-
son employed in an establishment in northern
Sweden (9).Here the Commission concluded that
the key condition regarding transport aid, namely
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9) Case C-15/2000, not yet published.that there had to be a direct link between the aid
granted to individual beneﬁciaries and the addi-
tional transport costs they incurred, was not satis-
ﬁed, and that the scheme could therefore not be
accepted as its stood.
349. However, to take account of the entry into
force of the new Article 299(2) of the EC Treaty
concerning the outermost regions of the European
Union, on 26 July the Commission revised the
guidelines on national regional aid (1). Operating
aid which is not degressive and not limited in time
may now be granted in outermost regions which
are eligible for regional aid, where the aid is
intended to compensate for the additional costs
inherent in their speciﬁc handicaps.
350. In order to allow more systematic control of
regional aid to large-scale mobile investment proj-
ects and avoid subsidy races between Member
States, in 1998 the Commission adopted a multi-
sectoral framework on regional aid for large invest-
ment projects (2). The framework was introduced
for a trial period of three years with the aim of lim-
iting aid for large-scale projects to a level which
avoided adverse effects on competition as much as
possible but maintained the attraction of the assisted
area. As provided by the framework, the
Commission started to assess the experience it had
gained since the rules entered into force with a
view to deciding what adjustments should be pro-
posed for after the framework expires in 2001 and
whether it should be renewed, revised or repealed.
351. The Commission has taken 14 decisions on
the basis of the multisectoral framework. In six
cases the aid intensity was reduced after the pre-
notiﬁcation by between 2 and 10 %. In the Solar
Techcase (3) the Commission decided for the ﬁrst
time to initiate proceedings, and reduced the aid
intensity signiﬁcantly in its ﬁnal decision.
352. In the Pilkington Glass France and Interpane
Glass Coating France case (4) the Commission
applied two different competition factors, as there
were two relevant markets (ﬂoat glass and lami-
nated coated glass). The project being a completely
integrated plant, the Commission weighted the
two factors, based on the respective additional
capacities that would be put on the market, and
came to the conclusion that the envisaged aid inten-
sity complied with the multisectoral framework.
3. Sectoral aid
3.1. Sectors subject to speciﬁc rules
3.1.1. Shipbuilding
353. In its third report on the situation in world
shipbuilding, adopted on 15 November, the
Commission noted that the industry was facing
persistent difﬁculties and that price levels remained
low despite the fact that orders had picked up. The
report found that this was due mainly to the very
low prices offered by South Korean shipyards. The
Commission decided that, if an agreement could
not be negotiated with South Korea by 1 May 2001,
it would take the matter to the World Trade
Organisation. With that in mind, it would also pro-
pose putting in place a defensive system of tem-
porary support designed to counter unfair behav-
iour by South Korea, pending the outcome of 
the WTO procedure. On 29 November, the
Commission reiterated its opposition to any exten-
sion of operating aid linked to shipbuilding con-
tracts beyond 31 December 2000, the elimination
of which is provided for by Council Regulation
(EC) No1540/98 establishing new rules on aid to
shipbuilding (5).
354. On 12 July, the Commission started a for-
mal investigation into the acquisition by Sociedad
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI),
for EUR 60 million, of the Juliana and Cádiz ship-
yards and the Manises diesel engine plant belong-
ing to its subsidiary Astilleros Españoles (6). In
the light of the information in its possession and
in the absence of any reaction by the Spanish
authorities to its repeated requests for information,
the Commission takes the view at this stage that
the transaction did not take place under normal
market conditions and appears to be a capital injec-
tion possibly constituting State aid.
355. During the year the Commission adopted
three decisions concerning the German company
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH (KWW), a sub-
sidiary of the Norwegian group Kvaerner a.s. On
2 February it opened a formal investigation into aid
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received by the company in the context of its
restructuring between 1993 and 1995 (1). The EUR
262.2 million which the company received as part
of the restructuring process in order to cover future
losses exceeded the losses it actually incurred by
EUR 61 million. The Commission therefore voiced
doubts as to the compatibility of that excess pay-
ment. On 16 February, it required KWW to reim-
burse EUR 6.3 million as it had exceeded its max-
imum capacity by a wide margin in 1997 (2). The
company was made subject to capacity limitations
as a condition for allowing it to receive DEM 1247
million in aid when it was privatised in 1992. On
29 March, the Commission closed the formal inves-
tigations opened in 1998, ﬁnding that KWW had
complied with the capacity limitations in 1999 (3).
356. The Commission was also particularly atten-
tive to application of the rules on development aid
in the shipbuilding industry. On 18 January it there-
fore initiated a formal investigation into develop-
ment aid which the Netherlands planned to grant
Indonesia in connection with the supply of sev-
eral vessels (4). The decision was prompted by
doubts as to the openness of the procedure whereby
this development aid contract was awarded to sev-
eral shipyards. Following the provision of docu-
mentary evidence and assurances by the Dutch
authorities in the course of the procedure, the
Commission decided on 13 December to autho-
rise the aid project (5).
3.1.2. Steel
357. The sixth steel aid code, which remains in
force until the ECSC Treaty expires in July 2002,
allows aid to be granted in only a limited number
of cases, namely for research and development,
for environmental protection and to ﬁnance social
measures in connection with plant closures.
358. Under the code, the Commission decided on
15 November that the aid amounting to
EUR 13.8 million paid by Belgium to Cockerill
Sambre SA was incompatible with the common
market (6). The aid, which was intended to defray
the additional cost incurred by the company as a
result of a reduction in working hours, did not qual-
ify for any of the exemptions allowed by the sixth
steel aid code. The Commission ordered the recov-
ery of amounts already disbursed and the suspen-
sion of payments still outstanding.
359. Under the 1971 German law on the devel-
opment of areas bordering on the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia
(Zonenrandförderungsgesetz), Salzgitter AG,
Preussag AG and their subsidiaries enjoyed
between 1980 and 1995 a number of tax beneﬁts
in the form of exempt reserves or accelerated depre-
ciation. Although the Commission had approved
the law under the relevant provisions of the EC
Treaty, that approval did not concern steel ﬁrms,
which are covered by the ECSC Treaty and the
steel aid code. The Commission consequently
found that the aid paid was incompatible with the
common market and ordered it to be recovered
from Salzgitter AG-Stahl und Technologie, the
ﬁrm which now holds the assets of the above two
companies (7).
3.1.3. Coal
360. Four Member States currently produce coal
in the EU; owing to unfavourable geological con-
ditions most EU mines cannot compete with
imported coal, but the Member States concerned
chose to support their coalmining industry mainly
on social and regional grounds. Aid to the coal
industry is governed by Decision No 3632/93/
ECSC, which lays down the terms and conditions
under which such aid may be granted. The Member
States notify the aid on an annual basis; the
Commission carefully screens the applications and
authorises them. This framework will remain in
place until the ECSC Treaty expires.
361. During the year the Commission authorised
State aid schemes allowing Germany (8), France (9),
Spain (10) and the UK (11) to grant the necessary
public funding for coal production. The combined
amounts authorised exceeded EUR 6.8 billion for
the year 2000. The aid covers the difference
between production costs and the price of inter-
nationally traded coal and includes compensation
for the payment of social security contributions
and for some exceptional costs. On 13 December,
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Longannet mine under the general scheme (1).
362. Similar schemes were authorised in 
Germany (2) for the year 2001 as well as in 
France (3) for the period 1997–99. The approval of
German aid involved lengthy discussions owing to
differences of opinion as to the long-term viabil-
ity of some mines. The Commission also withheld
authorisation from France on account of allegedly
undeclared aid. The Commission sent a letter of for-
mal notice to the French Government on 9 July
1999; the issue was ﬁnally settled in September
after complex negotiations.
363. On 18 January, the Commission sent a let-
ter of formal notice to the German Government
raising the issue of allegedly illegal State aid in
connection with the merger of RAG and
Saarbergwerke (4). The Commission is currently
investigating the case on the basis of information
sent by the German Government at the turn of the
year.
3.1.4. Motor vehicle industry
364. On 13 June, the Commission decided to
extend for one year, i.e. until 31 December 2001,
the period of validity of the Community frame-
work for State aid to the motor vehicle industry (5).
This should enable the Commission to examine in
detail the possibility of replacing it with the mul-
tisectoral framework on regional aid for large
investment projects (6).
365. If it is to be compatible with the common
market, regional aid in the motor industry must be
necessary to the implementation of the investment
project in the assisted region concerned.
Application of this principle prompted the
Commission to take a negative decision on a plan
to grant ITL 46 billion (EUR 24 million) in regional
aid for modiﬁcation of the Fiat plant at Rivalta
(Piedmont). The location study forming the basis
for Fiat’s decision to invest at Rivalta was carried
out in 1993–94. However, it was not until March
1995 that Rivalta was classed as an assisted area
qualifying for exemption under Article 87(3)(c)
of the EC Treaty. The Commission therefore con-
cluded that the Italian Government had not demon-
strated that Fiat had regarded the grant of regional
aid as a necessary condition for choosing the Rivalta
site. A partly negative decision was adopted on
the same grounds with regard to a plan to grant
Fiat aid for its Miraﬁori Carrozzeria plant (7). The
Commission prohibited the grant of EUR 2.9 mil-
lion (ITL 5.63 billion) in aid but found that aid
intended to ﬁnance innovative investments and
amounting to EUR 3.56 million (ITL 6.9 billion)
was compatible with the common market.
366. In addition to assessing the need for aid and
the innovative nature of the investments, the
Commission has to ensure that the aid is propor-
tionate, that the costs are eligible and that the
scheme does not increase production capacities.
Doubting whether those conditions were fulﬁlled,
the Commission decided on 20 September to open
a formal investigation into the plan to grant GBP
40 million for the reorganisation of Nissan Motor
Manufacturing Ltd’s Sunderland plant (8).
367. The Commission also decided to initiate for-
mal proceedings in respect of an EUR 16.3 million
(ITL 31.58 billion) R&D aid project for Iveco (9),
a Fiat subsidiary, on account of doubts as to the
incentive effect of the planned aid and classiﬁca-
tion of the project as precompetitive research.
368. During the year the Commission terminated
two formal investigations following withdrawal
of the notiﬁcations. In the wake of the sale by the
BMW group of the Rover car manufacturing busi-
ness to the Phœnix consortium, the UK authorities
informed the Commission that they were with-
drawing their notiﬁcation concerning the Rover
Longbridge site (10). The Commission opened a
formal investigation into that project on
22 December 1999.
369. Also in response to doubts voiced by the
Commission concerning a plan to grant regional
aid to the Ford plant at Genk in the Region of
Flanders (11), the Belgian authorities withdrew their
notiﬁcation.
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3.1.5. Synthetic ﬁbres industry
370. In view of the very short period of time in
which the code on aid to the synthetic ﬁbres indus-
try will remain in force, as the extension of its
validity will end on 31 August 2001, the
Commission started to assess whether special treat-
ment of this sector could still be justiﬁed. As the
multisectoral framework on large investment proj-
ects is also to expire on the same date, the
Commission began to reassess both frameworks in
the light of the experience it has gained over the
last three years.
371. With regard to a substantial investment by
Delon Filament GmbH (1)in Germany, accompa-
nied by a significant capacity reduction, the
Commission adopted a positive decision on the
grounds that although no structural shortage of
supply had been identiﬁed in the relevant market,
the aid resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction of capac-
ity.
372. Similarly, the Commission approved aid to
Exporplás (2) in the polypropylene sector, since,
although there is no structural shortage of supply
of the product, the project will result in a reduction
in the production capacity of the company con-
cerned.
3.1.6. Transport
373. On 26 July, the Commission adopted two
proposals for Council regulations dealing with
public funding in the land transport area, which
will transpose into secondary legislation the exemp-
tions laid down in Article 73 of the EC Treaty.
374. The first instrument will replace Council
Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 (3) and is intended
to provide a legal basis for the exemption of State
aid in the context of the ﬁnancing of transport infra-
structure and the grant of aid in connection with the
use of certain types of infrastructure. The second
instrument, to replace Council Regulation (EEC)
No1191/69 (4), will provide a framework tailored
to ongoing developments that are taking place in
the passenger transport market with a view to meet-
ing public needs. It will lay down rules for non-
discriminatory market access and create transpar-
ent conditions for the public ﬁnancing of such serv-
ices.
3.1.6.1. Inland waterway transport
375. One of the objectives of the common trans-
port policy is to promote inland waterways as a
safe, clean and energy-efﬁcient means of trans-
port offering considerable residual capacity. The
development of activities redirecting goods trans-
port away from road haulage and towards other
transport modes such as inland waterway trans-
port is in the common interest within the meaning
of Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. A speciﬁc
Community instrument has thus since 1999 encour-
aged Member States to take certain measures to pro-
mote inland waterway transport (5).
376. Aid granted to the sector during the year, 
in particular by Belgium (6), France (7) and
Germany (8), is intended to help carriers adjust to
the full liberalisation of the market that came into
effect on 1 January 2000 in accordance with
Directive 96/75/EC.
3.1.6.2. Air transport
377. The Commission continued to implement in
the civil aviation sector the policy framed in the
December 1994 guidelines. It cleared social aid
schemes, investment aid and ﬁnancial arrangements
in connection with the restructuring of airlines.
378. On 1 March, the Commission decided that the
social aid scheme introduced for certain categories
of passenger, in particular all persons with their
main place of residence in Corsica, on the eight
‘shore-to-shore’ links between Corsica and main-
land France (9) was compatible with the EC Treaty.
379. On 4 October the Commission decided not
to raise any objection to the payment of individ-
ual aid amounting to ESP 2 350 000 to the Spanish
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Catalonia.
380. The Commission examined the conditions
in which the first phase of privatisation of the
Portuguese carrier Transportes Aéreos Portugueses
SA (TAP) (2) was carried out and found on 
20 September that it did not involve any State aid.
381. By a decision it adopted on 4 October (3), the
Commission amended its previous decision of 
14 August 1998 (4) on restructuring aid granted to
the Greek carrier Olympic Airways.
3.1.6.3. Road transport
382. As in previous years the Commission pursued
a policy favouring aid which facilitates the devel-
opment of a sector and which can be exempted
under Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty. It regards as
compatible with the common market aid for fund-
ing investments by small and medium-sized road
transport companies both in the passenger and the
goods market which help increase their overall
economic efficiency and cooperation between
them.
383. In a ruling on a Spanish State aid measure for
the purchase of vehicles, Renove I (5) the Court of
First Instance conﬁrmed the Commission’s pol-
icy of not allowing State aid to be granted for the
purchase of vehicles in transport markets with sur-
plus capacity.
384. The Commission took several decisions in the
ﬁeld of passenger and goods transport in line with
the established State aid policy for those areas.
The decisions concerned in particular a Dutch
research and development scheme (6), the ﬁnanc-
ing of Dutch parking facilities accessible to the
public (7) and a scheme allowing investment aid for
public passenger transport in La Rioja (8). On 
26 July the Commission also took a ﬁnal negative
decision on several measures forming part of
Spain’s Renove II scheme and required Spain to
recover aid for the purchase of commercial vehi-
cles (9) which had been granted in 1997 in a way
not considered compatible with the common mar-
ket. This case was the follow-up to the above-
mentioned decision on the Renove I scheme, which
covered the period from August 1994 until the end
of 1996.
385. Aid to Asetra (10), a non-proﬁt-making asso-
ciation grouping together road and urban trans-
port undertakings, to enable it to set up a system
providing information and services in the trans-
port field was cleared by the Commission on 
31 March. In so far as Asetra is not an undertak-
ing carrying on economic activities, measures sup-
porting it cannot be classed as State aid.
386. Applying Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty for
the ﬁrst time to aid in the land transport sector, on
4 October the Commission decided not to raise
any objection to the reform of the operating arrange-
ments of the French motorway concessions (11).
3.1.6.4. Combined transport and rail transport
387. As in previous years the Commission took a
favourable view of aid which facilitates the devel-
opment of the combined transport sector and has
a positive impact on modal shift. It also allowed
investment aid for building combined transport
infrastructure.
388. On 31 October, the Commission closed the
investigation which it had opened in 1999 into
Dutch aid to NS Cargo for its Rotterdam–Prague
shuttle (12). The Dutch authorities had informed
the Commission that NS Cargo had paid back the
aid, which was held to be incompatible with the EC
Treaty.
389. In a decision adopted on 14 September, the
Commission raised no objections to a Dutch aid
scheme for constructing inland terminals (13). The
aid intensities are based on commercial research
and the scheme provides sufficient safeguards
against distortions of competition between termi-
nals.
390. The Commission cleared on 4 October an
individual grant of aid by the Dutch Government
to two intermodal terminal operators in the Port 
of Rotterdam (14). Applying precedents, the
Commission also raised no objection to two aid
schemes set up by the Italian province of 
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Bolzano (1) and the Italian region of Piedmont (2).
It thereby allowed investment aid to be granted
for combined transport as well as to road transport
companies.
391. Acting on a complaint, on 15 November the
Commission opened proceedings with regard to
the commercial and financial involvement of
Deutsche Bahn in the freight-forwarding operator
BahnTrans (3), as it suspected that the transaction
involved illegal State aid.
3.1.6.5. Maritime transport
392. In the maritime transport sector, the
Commission authorised under the Community
guidelines on State aid to maritime transport (4) a
number of State aid measures designed to reduce
the tax and social security burdens on shipping
companies. The question of subsidisation for pub-
lic service obligations was also examined by the
Commission, which adopted the ﬁrst decision based
on Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty in the sector.
393. On 15 February, the Commission authorised
the implementation of a Swedish State aid scheme
for training seafarers (5). A similar scheme in
Finland (6) was authorised on 11 August.
394. On 12 July, the Commission cleared the UK’s
proposed tonnage tax regime (7), a tax measure
aimed at promoting the competitiveness of UK
shipping in the global shipping market by creating
a positive tax environment for shipping in line with
other major maritime countries. For those com-
panies subject to UK corporation tax which opt
into the scheme, proﬁts from qualifying shipping
activities would be calculated by reference to the
net tonnage of each of the ships they operate. The
notional proﬁt thus derived would replace the nor-
mal tax assessment of UK and foreign income from
qualifying activities, and this notional proﬁt would
then be liable to UK corporation tax. This is the
fourth such scheme to be introduced in the
Community after those in Greece, the Netherlands
and Germany.
395. On the same date, the Commission ordered
Italy to provide information on an aid scheme in
the port sector (8) to enable it to assess the com-
patibility of the scheme with the Treaty.
396. On 19 July, the Commission closed by means
of a negative decision proceedings under Article
88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of unnotiﬁed aid
to Compañía Trasmediterránea (9), ﬁnding that
Spain had unlawfully implemented the aid con-
trary to Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
397. On 27 July, the Commission authorised
Belgium to exempt merchant shipping, dredging
and towing companies from paying the tax deducted
at source on the wages of Community seafarers
employed on board vessels flying the flag of a
Member State (10).
398. On 14 August, the Commission allowed
Finland to grant, in respect of the year 2000 only,
aid equivalent to 40% of the contributions payable
by shipping companies to the seafarers’ pension
scheme (11).
399. On 15 November, the Commission decided
not to raise any objections to the proposed modi-
ﬁcation and extension of a Danish maritime train-
ing aid scheme for seafarers (12).
400. On 29 November, following annulment by
the Court of First Instance of its decision of 7 June
1995, the Commission adopted a negative 
decision on aid to the ferry operator Golfo de
Vizcaya (13).
401. On 7 December, the Commission authorised
France to extend beyond the year 2000 the arrange-
ments for reimbursing the maritime part of busi-
ness tax (14), the introduction in 1990 and subse-
quent extensions of which had been approved by
the Commission.
402. The Commission decided on 13 December
to allow France to ﬁnance feasibility studies prior
to launching new short-distance shipping routes (15);
on the other hand, it opened an investigation into
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ture linked to the creation of such routes (1).
3.1.7. Agriculture
403. From 1 January, the Commission applied the
Community guidelines for State aid in the agri-
cultural sector (2) adopted on 24 November 1999
to new State aid measures introduced after that
date. Consequently, Member States had to adjust
their existing aid schemes to comply with the new
rules during the year.
404. The new guidelines consolidate and simplify
the rules applied by the Commission in the past. In
addition, a number of important changes have been
made to ensure that the State aid rules are consis-
tent with the new rural development policy (3)intro-
duced as part of the Agenda 2000 reforms.
405. The starting point for the new guidelines is
that any State aid for the agricultural sector must
be compatible with the EU’s common agricultural
policy and with the EU’s international obligations,
in particular the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
As the Council decided to rule out the possibility
of individual Member States distorting the deli-
cately balanced EU support for product prices or
rural development schemes, any State aid which
interferes with the mechanisms of the common
market organisations is prohibited. In addition to
these new guidelines, the Commission is reﬂect-
ing on a new framework for aid for promoting and
advertising agricultural products.
406. The Commission received during the year
some 250 notiﬁcations of State aid planned in the
agricultural sector and decided on 261 cases, most
of which came from Italy, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain and France. The cases con-
cerned mainly: (i) investments and other kinds of
intervention, e.g. forestry reconstruction in France;
the dioxin crisis in Belgium; the pig sector in
France, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, and the sugar, citrus and tobacco
sectors in Italy; (ii) tax measures linked to envi-
ronment-friendly initiatives in the Netherlands,
and some cases of privatisation, rescue and restruc-
turing in Germany and Portugal.
3.1.8. Fisheries
407. On account of its social and economic fea-
tures, the ﬁsheries sector is still receiving large
amounts of public assistance both from the
Community and from national sources.
408. The Commission examined the compatibil-
ity of national aid schemes in the light of the guide-
lines for the examination of State aid to ﬁsheries
and aquaculture (4). With the entry into force in
January of Council Regulation (EC) No2792/1999
of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed
rules and arrangements regarding Community
structural assistance in the ﬁsheries sector (5), the
Commission revised the guidelines in order to
bring them into line with the new structural rules.
409. The new guidelines spell out the rules more
clearly in certain areas. They thus provide that the
guidelines on national regional aid do not apply in
the ﬁsheries sector and that aspects of regional aid
schemes that concern ﬁsheries will be examined
in the light of the ﬁsheries guidelines. They also
provide further details for assessing training aid,
aid for consultancy services and aid to experi-
mental ﬁshing and set out more precisely the con-
ditions for granting aid for rescuing and restruc-
turing ﬁrms in difﬁculty. More detailed rules and
conditions are likewise set out for aid intended to
improve the management and control of ﬁshing
activities and aid in connection with the purchase
of used vessels. As far as special cases are con-
cerned, more detailed rules are set out for income
aid (measures linked to exceptional circumstances
are to be examined on a case-by-case basis, and for
temporary cessations of activity reference is made
to the relevant point of the guidelines), the point
dealing with operating loans has been deleted and
speciﬁc points have been added to cover aid to
compensate for damage caused by natural disas-
ters or other exceptional occurrences, insurance
premiums, the outermost regions and employment
aid. The new guidelines contain two annexes which
will make for closer monitoring of approved
schemes: one setting out the information to be sup-
plied when aid schemes are notiﬁed, and the other
specifying the information which must appear in
the annual report to be submitted to the Commission
on all existing aid schemes or all individual aid
measures granted outside an approved scheme that
are not made subject to a speciﬁc reporting obli-
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gation by a conditional decision. The Member
States were consulted on the amended guidelines,
which were adopted by the Commission in
November. They will apply to all schemes notiﬁed
from January 2001 onwards.
410. A large number of schemes were notiﬁed to
the Commission, especially during the second half
of the year, owing to notiﬁcation of all national
joint financing measures adopted under the
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance and
as part of the preparatory work on measures imple-
menting the new Community support frameworks.
3.2. Speciﬁc sectors not subject 
to special rules
3.2.1. Public health
411. In the context of the approved Swedish envi-
ronmental scheme (1), the Commission found that
the Community guidelines on State aid for envi-
ronmental protection could not apply. But as the
scheme was designed to contribute to improving
public health in general, including the health and
safety of workers, the Commission adopted a pos-
itive decision based on the provisions of the EC
Treaty on the health and safety of workers, public
health and environmental protection in general
(Articles 137, 152 and 174 respectively), these
being recognised as Community objectives.
3.2.2. Financial sector
412. The Commission continued to strive for strict
application of the State aid rules in the ﬁnancial sec-
tor. For the ﬁrst year since 1994 the Commission
did not have to deal with cases of aid to an ailing
institution and focused its attention on ongoing
aid to banks in France, Italy and Germany.
413. In France, the Commission made signiﬁcant
steps forward in the particularly complex economic
evaluation of the aid derived by Crédit Mutuel (2)
from the monopoly right to distribute the Livret
Bleu, a tax-free savings book. The restructuring
of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, by sep-
aration of its commercial from its public service
activities, was brought to the Commission’s atten-
tion. While welcoming the greater transparency
of the new organisation, the Commission consid-
ered that it was not necessary to comment on the
guarantee mechanism, given that this would be
examined at the appropriate time in the broader
context of the European banking world.
414. In the case of Italy, the Commission decided
on 4 October to initiate formal Article 88(2) pro-
ceedings against tax aid to Italian banks and bank-
ing foundations (3). The aid measures, introduced
by Law 461/98 and the related Decree 153/99,
allow inter alia for tax beneﬁts to banks which
undertake a merger or similar restructuring.
415. As regards Germany, the Commission exam-
ined a complaint lodged by the European Banking
Federation against the system of public guaran-
tees for credit institutions governed by public law,
i.e. mainly savings banks and Landesbanken.
Although the examination was still continuing at
the end of the year, the preliminary assessment
indicated that the guarantee system did in fact con-
stitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1)
of the EC Treaty. The Commission intends to take
appropriate action in the near future once the pre-
liminary investigations have been completed.
3.2.3. Exceptional occurrences
416. Following the disaster caused by the sink-
ing of the oil tanker Erika (4), the French
Government proposed an aid scheme intended to
assist small and medium-sized enterprises which
had suffered damage in the course of the disper-
sion of the oil slick. The costs arising from the
replacement of damaged facilities, the destruction
of stocks and exceptional ﬁnancial losses should
be eligible for aid. The aid concerned the costs not
covered by insurance. As the aid to remedy the
damage suffered was deemed proportionate, the
Commission approved the scheme under Article
87(2)(b) since the damage was caused by a natu-
ral disaster and the sinking of the oil tanker con-
stituted an exceptional occurrence within the mean-
ing of that provision.
D — Procedures
417. Since the procedural rules were laid down
in Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (5) the
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number of opportunities to apply and spell out in
greater detail the procedural rights of interested
parties, the obligation on Member States to recover
illegal aid and the Commission’s obligation to pro-
ceed in the case of complaints.
1. Rights of third parties
418. On several occasions, third parties asked for
access to the ﬁle in State aid cases. The Commission
refused this on the grounds that the legal party to
the proceedings is the Member State. This practice
was explicitly confirmed by the Court of First
Instance in Ufex v Commission (1).
419. In Comité d’entreprises de la Société fran-
caise de production v Commission (2), the Court
rejected an appeal by a works council and a trade
union representing the sector in question against
a Commission decision that, being persons other
than those to whom the decision was addressed,
they were not individually concerned within the
meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of
the EC Treaty. In the State aid ﬁeld, an undertak-
ing cannot therefore rely solely on its status as a
competitor of the undertaking in receipt of aid but
must additionally show that its circumstances dis-
tinguish it in a similar way to the undertaking in
receipt of the aid, account being taken of the extent
of its possible participation in the procedure and
the magnitude of the prejudice to its position on the
market. The status of negotiators with regard to
the social aspects within the company constituted
only a tenuous link with the actual subject-matter.
2. Recovery of aid
420. During the year the Commission was called
on to give its opinion as to whether the obligation
to recover illegal aid should follow the assets 
sold by the beneﬁciary of the aid to another com-
pany.
(1) The separate sale of assets: the Commission
takes the view that the obligation to repay
State aid remains with the selling company,
as the assets are replaced with cash which is
available to repay the creditors, including the
State.
(2) Cases where the assets are sold on a ‘going
concern’ basis: this second group of cases con-
cerns the sale of the assets as a going concern
with a view to continuation of the company’s
economic activity. A distinction can be drawn
between two situations: (a) the buyer takes
over some of the liabilities of the former com-
pany. In this context, the creditors whose lia-
bilities are transferred are privileged in rela-
tion to the recovery of debt; (b) identity of
ownership on both sides of the transaction,
i.e. the assets of the insolvent company are
acquired by its subsidiary or by another com-
pany in the same ultimate ownership. The
Commission did not follow the ‘pass through’
theory, according to which the beneﬁt of aid
is passed through to future owners, as gener-
ally no transfer of advantage can be seen when
the assets are sold on market conditions, but
took the view that the recovery obligation
would follow the assets, treating the transac-
tion as analogous to a share sale. The obliga-
tion to repay the State aid therefore attaches
to the buying company. However, as in the
case of identity of ownership between buyer
and seller combined with the impossibility of
recovery from the parent beneﬁciary, neither
of the two possible alternatives for remedying
the distortion (recovery or re-establishment
of market conditions via liquidation and sale
of the assets to competitors) would take place,
the Commission does not allow the conse-
quences of a negative decision to be avoided
using such an intra-group arrangement.
421. The latter approach was followed in the
System Microelectronic Innovation (SMI) (3) and
CDA Compact Disc Albrechts (CDA) (4) cases, in
which the Commission ordered the German
Government to recover the aid from the successor
company, which was the real beneﬁciary of the
aid since it used the assets of the insolvent com-
pany as improved by the aid (spillover). It was
necessary in all cases to prevent Germany evading
the consequences of the recovery decision. The
Commission therefore decided to extend its deci-
sion to aid measures in favour of any other under-
taking which continued the business of the initial
enterprise by using the latter’s assets and/or infra-
structure.
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422. In the Manufacture corrézienne de vêtements
case(1), the Commission started an ex ofﬁciopro-
ceeding with regard to aid intended to support a
company in difﬁculty. Nosound restructuring plan
having been provided, the Commission consid-
ered the aid to be incompatible with the EC Treaty
and ordered France to recover it from the insol-
vent company.
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Box 7: State aid to the Magefesa group — Recovery of aid
For the ﬁrst time the Court of Justice conﬁrmed(
1) the Commission’s view that the behaviour of public author-
ities with respect to a debtor company having ceased to honour its obligations, consisting in allowing it to
pursue its activities, may, under certain circumstances such as in the case in point, lead to the conclusion
that they have illegally granted State aid.
In 1987 a complaint concerning State aid to the Spanish group Magefesa was lodged with the Commission.
By decision of 20 December 1989, the Commission declared that the aid was incompatible with the com-
mon market and ordered the Spanish Government to recover it. Following several complaints in 1997 con-
cerning the advantage gained by Magefesa as a result of not reimbursing the aid received, the Commission
started proceedings against the Magefesa group and its legal successor.
On 14 October 1998, the Commission declared the aid consisting in the non-payment of taxes and social
contributions to be illegal, again ordering the Spanish Government to recover the aid with interest.
The Spanish Government appealed against that recovery decision before the Court of Justice. It argued that
under Spanish law there was no obligation on a public creditor to seek a declaration of insolvency or the
liquidation of an enterprise in order to obtain payment of amounts owed. Furthermore, so it claimed, the
Magefesa group did not obtain any advantage from public sources as the public entities concerned had not
waived the debts and had taken all legal measures at their disposal. In the Court proceedings, the Commission
stressed that the Spanish authorities had not exhausted all possible legal remedies for recovering their claims.
Although the national legislation at issue was applicable to all enterprises, and was thus a general measure,
the Commission maintained that an advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty may
also consist in the public authorities refraining from taking measures in certain speciﬁc circumstances. As
a result, the companies belonging to the Magefesa group were able to continue their activities without ful-
ﬁlling either their tax or their social security obligations.
The Court rejected Spain’s appeal, stating that the Spanish Government’s failure to take all legal measures
to recover the aid conferred an advantage on the company. The non-payment of taxes and contributions con-
stituted illegal aid incompatible with the common market and Spain had to recover it.
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423. In a case concerning Italian Law No 95/79,
which introduced a scheme derogating from nor-
mal insolvency proceedings (1), the Commission
found that the scheme was not compatible with
the EC Treaty. As regards recovery of the aid
granted illegally to some 500 enterprises over a
period of 20 years, the Commission had due regard
for the need for the recovery decision to be in line
with the general principle of Community law
expressed in Article 14(1) of Council Regulation
(EC) No659/1999, namely protection of the legit-
imate expectations that the Commission’s attitude
had raised in past years both with the Italian
Government and among the beneficiaries.
Consequently, the Commission decided not to
require recovery of the aid granted illegally dur-
ing its 20 years of implementation.
4. Non-execution of previous
Commission decisions
424. In a case concerning Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB) (2) the
Commission found that Germany had not correctly
implemented its decision of 8 July 1999 (3) regard-
ing capital injections on favourable terms. The
State aid involved was to be recovered from
WestLB immediately. The German authorities had
submitted various proposals on how to implement
the decision which proved to be unsatisfactory.
425. Concerning State aid in the form of special
tax credits awarded to publicly owned merchant
shipyards belonging to the State-owned holding
Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (4),
despite a number of reminders Spain did not com-
ply with the recovery decision which had been
communicated to it in December 1999. The
Commission decided to refer both the above cases
to the Court of Justice.
5. Commission’s obligation to start
proceedings
426. In SIC v Commission (5) the Court of First
Instance began by recalling that the Commission,
when adopting a favourable decision, may con-
fine itself to a preliminary investigation under
Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty only if it is able to
satisfy itself after an initial examination that the
aid is compatible with the common market. In
the case at issue, however, the Court deduced
from the fact that in its letters to the Member State
the Commission had repeatedly expressed seri-
ous doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with
the EC Treaty that the Commission was under
the obligation to initiate a detailed investigation
under Article 88(3) of the Treaty. As to the dura-
tion of the preliminary investigation of unnotiﬁed
aid, the Court recalled that, although the
Commission was not required to carry out an ini-
tial examination of the measures in question within
the two-month period envisaged by the judgment
in Lorenz (6), it was bound, where interested third
parties submitted complaints, to conduct a dili-
gent and impartial investigation with due dis-
patch.
6. Preliminary notiﬁcation obligation
427. In France v Commission (7) the Court
pointed out that Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty
does not contain a simple notiﬁcation obligation
but the obligation to notify prior to implementa-
tion. This conclusion is to be drawn from 
the suspensive effect stipulated in the last 
sentence of Article 88(3). Consequently, the pro-
vision does not allow the dissociation of obliga-
tions which comprise jointly the notiﬁcation obli-
gation and the temporary suspension of execu-
tion of aid.
7. Other provisions of the Treaty
428. The Court recalled that it was clear from the
general scheme of the Treaty that proceedings
under Article 88 of the EC Treaty must never pro-
duce a result that is contrary to the Treaty’s spe-
ciﬁc provisions. An aid scheme concerning German
income tax (8), of which certain conditions 
contravened other provisions of the Treaty, could
not therefore be declared compatible with the 
common market. Although direct taxation was a
matter for the Member States, the Member States
nevertheless had to exercise their direct taxation
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powers in accordance with Community law. The
Court concluded that if a Member State granted,
even indirectly, a tax advantage to undertakings
having their registered ofﬁce on its territory, refus-
ing to allow undertakings having their registered
ofﬁce in another Member State to beneﬁt from that
advantage, the difference in treatment between the
two categories would in principle be prohibited
by Article 52 of the EC Treaty, provided that there
was no objective difference in situation. There was
no such difference between a company established
in a Member State other than Germany carrying on
an economic activity in the new Länderthrough a
branch, agency or ﬁxed establishment, a company
which could not claim the beneﬁt of the contested
measure, and a company having its registered ofﬁce
on German territory, which did beneﬁt from the tax
concession introduced by the measures.
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A — Enlargement
1. Accession negotiations
429. Following the Luxembourg European
Council in December 1997, accession negotiations
were opened in March 1998 with Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
Negotiations on the competition chapter contin-
ued for all these applicant countries in 2000.
430. Following the Helsinki European Council in
December 1999, accession negotiations were
opened in February 2000 with Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. The com-
petition chapter was immediately opened for Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovakia. For Malta and Romania,
the competition chapter was opened in the autumn
of 2000.
431. The EU’s common negotiating positions
make clear that, before the competition negotiations
can be provisionally closed, three elements must
be in place in the applicant countries: (i) the nec-
essary legislative framework (for antitrust and
State aid); (ii) the necessary administrative capac-
ity; and (iii) a credible record of enforcement of the
competition acquis.
These three conditions must be met well before
accession. Applicant countries must show that their
companies and authorities have become accus-
tomed to operating in an environment such as 
that of the EU and would therefore be ready to
withstand the competitive pressures of the single
market.
432. At its meeting on 4 December, the Council
(general affairs) welcomed the ‘road map’ pre-
sented in the Commission’s enlargement strategy
paper. According to that paper, the EU should have
as its priority the deﬁnition of common positions,
including positions on requests for transitional
measures, in the second half of 2001 for a number
of chapters including the one on competition pol-
icy. The Council regarded this as: ‘… an impor-
tant reference frame which reﬂects the Union’s
commitment, for its part, to tackling problems
raised by the negotiations, including requests for
transitional arrangements, and to adopting nego-
tiating positions on chapters of the acquisbased on
a given timetable, with a view to the provisional
closure of the various chapters once the conditions
are met’.
2. Progress in alignment of competition
rules
433. The Commission reports regularly on
progress made by each of the applicant countries
towards accession. The third regular reports for
the 10 associated countries of central and eastern
Europe (CEECs), Cyprus, Malta and Turkey
adopted by the Commission in November assess
progress made since the previous reports deliv-
ered by the Commission in 1999.
434. The achievements in the area of antitrust and
mergers are generally satisfactory, both on the leg-
islative side and with regard to the creation of the
necessary administrative capacity. All the applicant
countries have adopted basic competition laws,
taking over the core elements of Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty and most of them have also estab-
lished merger control. The establishment of com-
petition authorities has also taken place relatively
quickly and without too much controversy.
435. The main challenge facing antitrust author-
ities in the applicant countries is now to allocate
their resources so as to give priority to antitrust
enforcement regarding the anticompetitive con-
duct that most seriously obstructs the proper work-
ing of the markets, such as cartels, monopolistic
acquisitions, and exclusionary practices by dom-
inant ﬁrms.
436. In contrast to the progress made in the ﬁeld
of antitrust policy, the introduction of State aid
control in the applicant countries has proved much
more controversial, slower and politically sensitive.
The start of the accession negotiations has helped
to speed up the creation of legal and procedural
frameworks for State aid control. However, the
concrete enforcement of State aid discipline is, in
general, far from satisfactory.
437. Most applicant countries have created national
State aid monitoring authorities. The Commission
has emphasised that these authorities should effec-
tively control new and existing State aid granted
by all aid-granting authorities. Monitoring author-
ities should receive prior notiﬁcation of all new
aid measures. They should have the power to col-
lect all information necessary to examine State aid
from all aid-granting authorities. Moreover, they
should have the power to give an independent opin-
ion on the compatibility of all new aid measures
with the Europe agreements before the aid is
granted. However, not all monitoring authorities
seem as yet to receive, on a systematic basis, infor- 95mation on all new aid granted that would allow
them to perform their duties in a comprehensive
way.
438. To ensure the necessary transparency, sev-
eral applicant countries still need to draw up com-
prehensive inventories of existing aid that are kept
permanently up-to-date. In addition, the
Commission has been working with the monitor-
ing authorities of the applicant countries to ensure
that their annual State aid reports conform to 
the methodology of the Commission’s State aid
survey.
439. The Commission has drawn the attention of
several applicant countries to the need to bring
their ﬁscal aid regimes, often used to attract for-
eign investment, and their State aid measures in the
so-called special economic zones into line with
the Community acquis well before accession.
3. Implementing rules under the Europe
agreements
440. With a view to further completing the legal
framework for relations between the Community
and the 10 CEECs in the competition ﬁeld, two
sets of implementing rules have been the subject
of negotiations with the CEECs. The ﬁrst concerns
the implementation of the competition provisions
of the Europe agreements applicable to firms
(antitrust) and the second relates to the rules con-
cerning State aid.
441. Implementing rules for the competition pro-
visions applicable to firms have already been
adopted for nine CEECs, namely Bulgaria (1), the
Czech Republic (2), Estonia (3), Hungary (4),
Lithuania (5), Poland (6), Romania (7), the Slovak
Republic (8),and Slovenia (9). With regard to Latvia,
the Commission has presented its proposal on
implementing rules to the Council. The wording
of the implementing rules is basically the same for
all the associated countries. They contain mainly
procedural-type rules, i.e. rules regarding compe-
tence to deal with cases, procedures for notiﬁca-
tion of cases to the other party, consultation, comity
and the exchange of information. With regard to
certain constitutional problems concerning the
application of the implementing rules in Hungary,
discussions have continued in order to try and
resolve the remaining difﬁculties.
442. The Czech Republic is the only associated
country where the implementing rules for State
aid are currently in force (10). The implementing
rules constitute a two-pillar system of State aid
control. On the Community side, the Commission
assesses the compatibility of State aid granted by
EU Member States on the basis of the Community
State aid rules. On the side of the Czech Republic,
the Czech national monitoring authority is to mon-
itor and review existing and new public aid granted
by its country, on the basis of the criteria arising
from the application of the Community State aid
rules. The implementing rules include procedures
for consultation and problem solving, rules on
transparency (i.e. the Czech Republic is to draw up
and thereafter update an inventory of its aid pro-
grammes and individual aid awards), and rules on
mutual exchange of information. After prepara-
tory work in the Council in 2000, draft State aid
implementing rules are awaiting approval by the
respective Association Councils for Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland,
and Slovenia. The Commission has also presented
to the Council its proposal on implementing rules
for the Slovak Republic.
4. Extension of Article 87(3)(a) status
under the Europe agreements
443. The Europe agreements provide that public
aid granted by the associated countries must be
assessed taking into account that they shall for a
ﬁve-year period be regarded as areas identical to
those areas of the Community described in Article
87(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. After preparatory work in the Council,
the EU–Bulgaria, EU–Lithuania, EU–Romania
and EU–Estonia Association Councils have decided
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to extend this status for a further period of ﬁve
years (1). Similar decisions are awaited by the
respective Association Councils for Latvia, the
Czech Republic and Poland. The Commission has
also presented to the Council its proposal on the
extension of Article 87(3)(a) status for Hungary and
Slovakia. With regard to Slovenia,a draft proposal
was prepared for adoption by the Commission with
a view to presenting it to the Council.
444. The Association Council decision adds that
the associated country has to submit GDP per capita
ﬁgures at NUTS II level. The State aid monitoring
authority of the associated country and the
Commission then jointly evaluate the eligibility
of regions and the maximum aid intensities, in
order to draw up the regional aid map on the basis
of the Community guidelines on national regional
aid. Thereafter, a joint proposal is submitted to the
Association Committee, which takes a decision.
5. Technical assistance to the applicant
countries
445. In view of these remaining shortcomings,
technical assistance in the ﬁeld of competition con-
tinues to be an essential tool in preparing the appli-
cant countries for accession. Speciﬁc actions are
taken under the Phare programmes. Under the
‘institution building’ (‘twinning’) arrangement,
EU Member State experts are now also providing
advice on a long-term basis to the competition and
State aid authorities in the CEECs.
446. The Commission has pursued a proactive
policy of further intensifying its contacts with the
competition authorities of the applicant countries.
On 25 and 26 September, the sixth annual com-
petition conference between applicant countries
and the Commission took place in Tallinn, Estonia.
The delegations included high-level ofﬁcials from
the respective competition and State aid authori-
ties. The annual conference serves as a forum for
the exchange of views and experience. It also helps
to establish and strengthen professional contacts
between ofﬁcials responsible for competition. This
year’s conference concentrated on enforcement
practices and the importance of ensuring effective
implementation of the rules in the ﬁelds of both
antitrust and State aid.
447. The Directorate-General for Competition
continued to hold various bilateral meetings with
the competition and State aid authorities of appli-
cant countries in 2000. Technical discussions at
expert level were held on antitrust approximation,
institution building and enforcement. Similar meet-
ings also took place on legislative approximation
in the State aid area, on the creation of State aid
monitoring authorities and on speciﬁc State aid
issues, such as the drafting of the annual State aid
reports, regional aid maps, the State aid aspects of
investment incentives and special economic zones,
and the assessment of individual cases in the sen-
sitive sectors.
6. Turkey
448. Decision 1/95 of the EC–Turkey Association
Council implementing the ﬁnal phase of the cus-
toms union being created between the Community
and Turkey, and Article 7 of the Turkey–ECSC
Free Trade Agreement require the adoption of rules
for the implementation of the competition provi-
sions. After consultation with Member States, such
implementing rules were formally proposed to the
Turkish Government and subsequently discussed
at expert level by the delegations of both sides.
Considerable progress was achieved at a ﬁrst joint
reading of the draft text, and the few outstanding
issues should be resolved in the very near future,
thus enabling the rules to be adopted in good time.
B — Bilateral cooperation
1. United States
449. Every year the Commission reports in detail
to the Council and the European Parliament on its
cooperation activities with the US under the 1991
Cooperation Agreement (2) and the 1998 Positive
Comity Agreement (3). The last report covered the
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450. During 2000 the Commission continued its
close cooperation with the Antitrust Division of
the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in an ever greater
number of cases. The trend towards the globali-
sation of markets continued apace during the year,
as most vividly illustrated by the record number and
scale of transnational mergers: the year 2000 saw
a notable increase in the number of transactions
notified to both the Commission and the US
antitrust agencies. Bilateral cooperation was par-
ticularly intensive with regard to these global
merger cases. Inter-agency discussions tend to
focus on issues such as the deﬁnition of markets,
the likely competitive impact of a transaction on
those markets, and the viability of any remedies
suggested by the merging parties.
451. Merger investigations involving close transat-
lantic cooperation included among others the
Alcoa/Reynolds, MCI Worldcom/Sprint,
Novartis/AstraZeneca, Boeing/Hughes, AOL/Time
Warner and  Time Warner/EMI cases. The
Commission also cooperated closely with its US
counterparts in a number of non-merger investi-
gations, for example in the Commission’s and US
FTC’s respective enquiries into the creation of the
Covisint business-to-business joint venture between
the manufacturers of automobile spare parts. Case-
related EU–US cooperation is discussed in further
detail in this report’s chapter on merger control, and
in the sixth report to the Council and the European
Parliament for 2000, which will be published in
2001.
452. During the course of the Commission’s coop-
eration with the US DoJ in the MCI Worldcom/
Sprintcase, a Commission ofﬁcial for the ﬁrst time
attended a ‘pitch meeting’ between the DoJ and the
parties proposing to merge; such meetings are gen-
erally held shortly before the US agencies decide
whether or not to take action to block a proposed
merger. Representatives from both the US DoJ
and FTC have already attended oral hearings in a
number of Commission cases involving important
US interests (2). In 1999, the Commission had
agreed administrative arrangements with the US
DoJ and FTC concerning mutual attendance at cer-
tain stages of proceedings in individual cases
involving the application of their respective com-
petition rules. The arrangements provide that a
request for attendance at a hearing or meeting may
be granted in appropriate cases, subject to conﬁr-
mation of satisfactory assurances or arrangements
regarding conﬁdentiality and the use of informa-
tion. Attendance is possible only with the express
consent of the persons concerned by the enforce-
ment proceedings in either jurisdiction, and the
arrangements do not in any way limit the rights
enjoyed by those persons.
453. The ﬁrst case to be initiated on the basis of
a positive comity request was concluded during
the course of the year. In July, the Commission
decided to close an investigation into Air France
for alleged discrimination against Sabre, an
American computerised reservation system (CRS),
after the French airline agreed to a code of conduct
offering Sabre terms equivalent to those offered to
its partly owned CRS Amadeus, as well as to other
CRSs. At the origin of the investigation was a com-
plaint originally ﬁled with the US DoJ alleging
that a number of companies linked to Amadeus
(including Air France, Iberia, Lufthansa and SAS)
had abused the dominance which they enjoyed in
their respective markets. Invoking for the ﬁrst time
the ‘positive comity’ mechanism provided for in
the 1991 EU–US competition cooperation agree-
ment (3) (a mechanism subsequently elaborated
on in the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement), the
DoJ had requested the Commission to investigate
the allegations under the EU competition rules.
Positive comity makes it possible for the US
antitrust agencies to request that the Commission
investigate anticompetitive conduct allegedly tak-
ing place in Europe, and vice versa. This was the
ﬁrst (and to date the only) such request to have
been made pursuant to either agreement.
454. There were numerous bilateral contacts
between the Commission and the relevant US
authorities during the course of 2000:
Commissioner Monti paid a ﬁrst, extensive ofﬁcial
visit to Washington as Competition Commissioner
in June, and took the opportunity to meet, among
others, key members of the administration and
congressional ﬁgures; the annual Commission/US
DoJ/US FTC bilateral meeting was held in
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Washington in July; meetings also took place dur-
ing the course of the year between the Commission
and the US Department of Transportation, the US
Federal Communications Commission and the US
Federal Maritime Commission (all of which US
authorities have some responsibility for the man-
agement of competition policy issues in their
respective sectors).
455. In 1999 the Commission, the US DoJ and
the US FTC agreed to set up a working group
designed to intensify transatlantic cooperation in
the ﬁeld of merger control. This working group
was mandated to focus on (1) an in-depth study
of the respective EU and US approaches to the
identification and implementation of remedies
(in particular, divestitures), and to post-merger
compliance-monitoring; and (2) the scope for fur-
ther convergence of analysis/methodology in
merger cases being dealt with in both jurisdic-
tions, particularly as regards the respective EU and
US approaches towards oligopoly/collective dom-
inance. The working group focused on remedies
during the course of 2000, and its work on that
topic is nearing completion. These discussions
were particularly useful in the context of the
preparation of the Commission’s notice on reme-
dies in merger cases adopted in December (1).
Next year the EU–US working group will study
oligopolistic dominance.
2. Canada
456. In June 1999, the Competition Cooperation
Agreement between the European Communities
and the Canadian Government (2) entered into
force. The year 2000 was the ﬁrst full year in which
the agreement was operational, and it can be con-
cluded that it has facilitated a marked increase in
the level of cooperation between the European
Communities and Canada with regard to the
enforcement of their respective competition rules.
An increasing number of cases of mutual relevance
to the EU and Canada is being examined by the
competition authorities on both sides. Every year,
the Commission reports in detail to the Council
and the European Parliament on its cooperation
activities with Canada. The ﬁrst report covered the
period from June to December 1999 (3). The report
for 2000 will be published in 2001.
457. Contacts between the Commission and its
Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Competition
Bureau, have been frequent and fruitful.
Discussions have concerned both case-related mat-
ters, and more general policy issues. The two
authorities have, for example, discussed not only
the assessment of global mergers notiﬁed to both
agencies but also a number of legislative reforms
being proposed or introduced in the two jurisdic-
tions.
458. Worthy of particular mention were trilateral
EU–US–Canadian teleconferences in the Dow
Chemical/Union Carbide case, and a trilateral
EU–US–Canadian meeting in Washington in the
context of proceedings in the Alcoa/Reynolds
merger case.
3. Japan
459. At the annual bilateral meeting between the
Commission and the Fair Trade Commission of
Japan in Tokyo on 28 and 29 October 1999, the
Commission delegation stated its interest in rein-
forcing bilateral relations with Japan in the area of
competition. The two sides therefore explored the
possibility of concluding a cooperation agreement
similar to the EU agreements with the US (1991)
and Canada (1998), and to the US–Japan agreement
(1999).
460. The Commission undertook intensive, infor-
mal exploratory talks with Japan and established
that there was a mutual interest in strengthening
bilateral cooperation in the area of competition.
On 8 June, the Commission obtained a negotiat-
ing mandate from the Council, which enabled it to
embark upon two extensive formal negotiation
sessions with the Japanese authorities on 13 to 
14 June and 3 to 4 July. The two delegations man-
aged to resolve all issues and, in particular, the
clauses relating to the use, disclosure and protec-
tion of conﬁdential information and the commu-
nication of information by the Commission to com-
petition authorities of Member States concerned by
EU–Japan cooperation aspects.
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expressed a favourable view of the negotiated text.
It was thus possible to announce at the EU–Japan
summit held in Tokyo on 19 July that the two sides
had reached ‘a mutual understanding on substan-
tial elements of their envisaged cooperation agree-
ment in the area of competition’. It is expected that
the agreement will be concluded during 2001.
462. The draft agreement covers, in particular,
the exchange of information but does not derogate
from the rules on conﬁdentiality laid down in the
regulations implementing Articles 81 and 82 of
the EC Treaty. It includes provisions on commu-
nications from the Commission to the competent
authorities of the Member States concerned. Such
communications are aimed at informing the author-
ities about notiﬁcations and other information relat-
ing to cooperation and coordination of enforce-
ment activities exchanged under the proposed
agreement between the Commission and Japan. It
also includes provisions organising the practical
aspects of cooperation between the Commission
and the Japanese competition authority and the
coordination of their respective enforcement activ-
ities. Finally, the agreement includes provisions
embodying the principles of negative and positive
comity.
463. In addition to the numerous meetings and
ofﬁcial contacts between the Commission and the
Japanese authorities in the context of the agree-
ment negotiations, the annual bilateral meeting
between the Commission and the Fair Trade
Commission of Japan took place in Brussels on
24 November.
464. The Commission ﬁnalised a new list of pro-
posals for further deregulation in Japan. The list
includes a series of proposals in the area of com-
petition. The proposals were submitted within the
framework of the two-way EU–Japan dialogue on
regulatory reform, and in accordance with the call
for comments from foreign governments under
the 30 March 1999 revision of the three-year dereg-
ulation promotion programme.
4. Other OECD countries and the EEA
465. During 2000 the Commission engaged in
cooperation with the competition authorities of a
number of other OECD countries, most notably
Australia, Korea, Norway and Switzerland. These
contacts concerned both case-related and more
general competition policy-related issues.
466. During the course of the year the Commission
also continued its close cooperation with the EFTA
Surveillance Authority, the agency with respon-
sibility for the enforcement of the Agreement on
the European Economic Area on behalf of Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway.
5. Mediterranean countries
467. Only the Euro-Mediterranean agreements
between the EU and Morocco, Tunisia and Israel
are in force. Of the other Euro-Mediterranean
agreements, the agreement with Jordan has not yet
been ratiﬁed. Negotiations with Egypt were con-
cluded and the agreement was initialled in January
2001. The interim agreement with the Palestine
Authority will be the subject of a ﬁnal renegoti-
ation. Talks were held with Lebanon and Syria
with a view to relaunching the Mediterranean
policy. The competition provisions in all the
signed and draft agreements include commit-
ments aimed at bringing the competition policies
of those countries into line with Community pol-
icy. The Directorate-General for Competition
also took part in an initial seminar on competition
in Morocco.
6. Latin America
468. The cooperation mechanism between com-
petition authorities provided for in the agreement
between the European Union and Mexico entered
into force in July. It provides for exchanges of
information, the coordination of certain activities,
investigation of restrictions of competition in the
territory of one party which have a negative impact
on the interests of the other party, and a provision
on technical cooperation. Provision is thus made
for improved transparency of agreements between
businesses and of abuses of dominant positions or
mergers.
469. Negotiations took place between the
European Union, Mercosur and Chile on the lib-
eralisation of trade. After deﬁning the objectives
of the negotiations and the organisation of work,
the question of competition was examined by
Technical Group No 3. The aim is to ensure that
the parties’ competition rules guarantee equiva-
lent treatment to companies in each country. It will
thus be possible to establish cooperation and coor-
dination mechanisms between the respective com-
petition authorities. 100IV — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
470. With regard to the Andean Community, a 
proposal was drafted by the Commission’s
Directorate-General for External Relations con-
taining provisions on technical cooperation. The
draft is being examined by the SCR and the Council
working party on Latin American and Asian devel-
oping countries before the initiation of the proce-
dure in 2001, for which the Directorate-General for
Competition is providing its expertise.
471. Direct information on Community policy
continued to be provided throughout the year, inter
alia through the Boletín Latinoamericano de
Competencia, and assistance was provided for the
Unctad–Latin American seminar on competition
in Costa Rica.
7. Russia, Ukraine, Moldova 
and the other NIS
472. The partnership and cooperation agreements
(PCAs) which the EU has concluded with Russia,
Ukraine, Moldova and most of the other former Soviet
Republics contain — to a greater or lesser extent —
a commitment by these countries to move towards
an approximation of their competition and State aid
legislation with that of the Community. Some progress
has been made with the implementation of the
EU–Russia, EU–Ukraine and EU–Moldova PCAs
over the past year. In particular, Ukraine and Moldova
have informed the Commission about activities under-
taken in order to fulﬁl their obligations under the
agreements. A number of Tacis projects, with the
task of providing relevant expertise, are also being
undertaken and planned for the coming year. The
Commission actively participated in international
conferences organised by the Ukrainian and Russian
competition authorities and held in Kiev and Moscow
respectively.
473. Close cooperation was set up between the
Commission and representatives of the Russian
Federation, in particular with the Ministry for
Antimonopoly Policy, in the context of the latter’s
fulﬁlment of its PCA obligations in the area of State
aid control. In fruitful meetings, the Russian side
informed the Commission about the progress of a
Russian draft law establishing a State aid monitor-
ing authority. The law is aimed at fulﬁlling the obli-
gation in Article 53 of the PCA according to which
the parties are required to jointly deﬁne categories
and disciplines for State aid which has a distorting
effect on trade and competition between the
European Community and the Russian Federation.
C — Multilateral cooperation
1. WTO: Trade and competition policy
474. The WTO working group on the interaction
between trade and competition policy held three
meetings in 2000 (15 and 16 June, 2 and 3 October
and 21 November). At the June meeting, the
Commission presented in detail the advantages of
the future framework for developing countries (it
would complement their economic and regulatory
reforms, and enable them to deal with international
anticompetitive practices which hamper their devel-
opment) and addressed their main concerns (the
need for ﬂexibility and progressivity in putting the
framework in place, for reinforced and coordi-
nated technical assistance, and for aid in building
the capacity necessary in order to participate mean-
ingfully in international cooperation activities in
the area of competition).
475. At the October meeting, the Commission
presented its position in a form more acceptable to
its trading partners, in particular the US and devel-
oping countries, in order to build the necessary
alliances and to intensify efforts towards a frame-
work of competition rules in the WTO.
476. WTO negotiations on trade and competition
should be realistic and focus initially on what can
be achieved in the context of a short global round.
The scope of such negotiations should therefore be
limited to three issues which appear ripe at this
stage: core principles on domestic competition law
and policy, basic cooperation arrangements, and
the development dimension as an integral part of
a multilateral framework on competition. A
Competition Policy Committee to be established
within the WTO will manage this basic frame-
work. Further efforts will be necessary to deepen
the educational and analytical work on more 
complex competition issues, in a longer-term 
perspective.
477. At the November meeting, the working group
reviewed and adopted the group’s report (2000)
to the General Council (1).
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478. The Commission continued to play an active
part in the work of the OECD committee on com-
petition law and policy, especially in the round
tables and working party meetings organised in
2000 (competition in the pharmaceutical industry,
mergers in ﬁnancial services, airline mergers and
alliances, leniency programmes, competition in
the natural gas industry, joint ventures, electronic
commerce, public and private dispute resolution
mechanisms, and competition in road transport).
3. Unctad
479. The Commission played an active role at the
4th UN review conference on the set of multilat-
erally agreed equitable business principles and
rules for the control of restrictive business practices
(‘RBP review’) held in Geneva from 24 to
29September. The resolution adopted calls for the
continuation of the annual meetings of the inter-
governmental group of competition experts (‘IGE’)
and calls for a number of issues to be considered,
such as cooperation regarding merger control and
the interface between competition policy and intel-
lectual property rights. Further, the resolution calls
upon the Unctad Secretariat to continue to study
a number of issues, including merger control, the
beneﬁts of competition law for consumers and in
contributing towards poverty alleviation, and the
links between competition and foreign investment.
Finally, the resolution calls upon Unctad to clar-
ify the ways in which possible international agree-
ments on competition might apply to developing
countries.
480. Unctad has proven generally sympathetic
towards the EC position on trade and competition
in the WTO, suggesting that current thinking by the
EC on the issue of ﬂexibility and progressivity for
developing countries could be a way forward should
other countries agree.
4. International Competition Forum
481. The increasing internationalisation of our
economies presents major challenges for compe-
tition authorities around the world. In order to
respond to these challenges, the Commission has
intensiﬁed its bilateral relations with the compe-
tition authorities of the EU’s major trading part-
ners. But, as the EU and its Member States have
recognised for some time, bilateralism has its lim-
itations: it is also necessary to pursue multilateral
approaches. One such approach consists in the pur-
suit of a multilateral competition law framework
at the WTO.
482. At the same time, Commissioner Monti pro-
posed, in a speech which he gave to the University
Institute at Fiesole (1), that a broadly based
‘International Competition Forum’ be set up which
would meet the need for a focal point for discus-
sion between those responsible for the develop-
ment and management of competition policy world-
wide. There are today over 80 countries that have
enacted some form of competition law regime,
many of which have only been introduced during
the past decade, and more are in the pipeline. There
is a clear need for a global forum in which expe-
rience in dealing with the whole range of compe-
tition policy issues (substantive, systemic and
enforcement-related) can be shared and discussed.
483. The end objective should be to achieve max-
imum convergence and consensus between par-
ticipants, through dialogue and an exchange of
experience on enforcement policy and practice.
Consensus should result from a common under-
standing about the best approach to substantive
economic problems and to enforcement issues.
Commissioner Monti has expressed his intention
of pioneering this initiative during the course of
2001.
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1. Legislative and regulatory activities
484. As markets integrate, both in the EU and
globally, it is vital that this trend be reﬂected in
the procedural and substantive rules of the
Community. The Directorate-General for
Competition will therefore continue with the revi-
sion of the procedural and substantive rules for the
enforcement of Articles 81 and 82.
Proposal for a new regulation implementing
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
485. In 2001 the work on the Commission’s pro-
posal for a new regulation implementing Articles 81
and 82 of the EC Treaty (1) will continue in the
Council under the Swedish and Belgian presiden-
cies. It is expected that the detailed work carried
out at expert level will allow a substantive progress
report to be submitted to the Council (industry) dur-
ing the second half of the Swedish presidency. The
European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee will proceed with the examination of
the proposal during the ﬁrst part of 2001. The work
on the proposed regulation in the other institutions
will be complemented by the Commission prepar-
ing initial drafts of several future notices designed
to accompany the new regulation.
Vertical agreements
486. Regulation (EC) No 240/96 sets out the con-
ditions for the block exemption of technology trans-
fer agreements, including patent and know-how
licences. Pursuant to Article 12, the Commission is
required to draw up an interim report on the opera-
tion of the regulation by the end of the fourth year
following its entry into force. On the basis of that
report, the Commission must assess whether any
adaptation to the current rules is necessary, partic-
ularly in the light of the recent policy reforms in the
ﬁeld of vertical restraints and horizontal coopera-
tion agreements. The Commission intends to pub-
lish its evaluation report before the end of 2001.
Block exemption regulation on car
distribution
487. Block exemption Regulation (EC)
No 1475/95 on car distribution expires on
30 September 2002. The Commission will con-
tinue its work on preparing for the regime for motor
vehicle distribution, basing it on the evaluation
report of November 2000 and reactions thereto.
De minimis notice
488. The Commission intends to revise its cur-
rent de minimis notice (2) before the end of 2001.
The notice describes the agreements the
Commission considers to be of minor importance
and not caught by Article 81(1). The aim of the
revision is to ensure consistency between the de
minimis notice and the recently adopted block
exemption regulations on vertical and horizontal
agreements (3). It is intended to publish a draft text
in the Ofﬁcial Journal for public consultation before
the summer.
Hearing ofﬁcer
489. A review of the mandate of the hearing ofﬁ-
cer is scheduled for adoption by the Commission
in the ﬁrst half of 2001.
2. Supervisory activities
490. The main part of the Commission’s work on
enforcing the antitrust rules will continue to con-
sist in dealing with concrete cases. It will involve
a sustained effort to build upon the already good
cooperation with national competition and regu-
latory authorities. Top priority will be given to
serious competition infringements, in particular
abuses of dominance and cartels. Moreover, par-
ticular focus will be placed on the markets recently
or in the process of being liberalised, such as the
energy, air transport, telecoms and postal sectors,
so to ensure that previous monopolists do not abuse
their traditional position or collude to maintain or
strengthen that position.
Cartels
491. In order to increase effectiveness both in the
detection and the handling of cartel cases, the
Commission adopted in 1996 a leniency pro-
gramme (‘Notice on the non-imposition or reduc-
tion of ﬁnes in cartel cases’) (4). Experience shows
that this practice has led to a substantial increase
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and punished. The programme will be further devel-
oped in order to increase its effectiveness and, if
necessary, the 1996 notice will be updated and
revised in the course of 2001.
492. Access to the ﬁle is one of the principal pro-
cedural guarantees intended to protect the rights of
the defence. In order to take account of experience
acquired to date under the Commission’s notice
on the internal rules of procedure for processing
requests for access to the ﬁle (1), and to adapt the
notice to the recent case-law of the CFI — a revi-
sion of the notice will be undertaken in 2001.
Liberalisation
493. Liberalisation is an essential objective of
Community competition policy. It should be seen
as a broad concept, i.e. the creation and safe-
guarding of fair and unrestricted market access in
highly regulated sectors or sectors where special
or exclusive rights are granted. In general, all com-
petition enforcement should underpin speciﬁc lib-
eralisation efforts so as to make these efforts effec-
tive for the beneﬁt of the consumer.
494. In the telecommunications sector all national
markets have now been liberalised. However, the
pace of effective competition still differs appre-
ciably between Member States and markets. Three
major issues will determine the evolution of the
industry.
— The incumbents are still in a position of ‘de
facto monopoly’ in the local call market, with
a market share of nearly 100% in all Member
States. The Commission will therefore ensure
that the local loop is unbundled by ensuring
access and by avoiding delaying tactics by
incumbents and the distortion of prices.
— Competition in the mobile market has been
limited mainly to the national retail market
even if, recently, new pan-European opera-
tors have started to operate. Problems remain
regarding access to and call termination on
mobile networks and roaming charges. The
Commission may therefore open proceedings
against individual undertakings.
— The spread of the Internet in the Union should
be fostered by ensuring that leased line prices
are substantially reduced throughout Europe
and that the Internet remains an open medium.
495. In the postal sector, there have been several
complaints that incumbent operators beneﬁting
from a reserved area compete in markets open to
competition without covering the additional cost
of supplying competitive services. Private com-
panies are concerned that incumbents compete
with them without allocating costs in an appro-
priate manner to the competitive markets (cross-
subsidisation). The Commission will endeavour
to resolve these issues, notably by deﬁning the rel-
evant measure of cost an incumbent has to cover
when entering competitive markets (the ‘price
ﬂoor’). Should this relevant measure of cost not be
covered by the incumbent’s revenue in the com-
petitive market, the Commission must enforce the
proper remedies. In this context, an examination
of the prices applicable in the reserved area may
become necessary in individual cases.
496. In air transport, the Commission will take a
ﬁnal position on important intra-EU and transat-
lantic alliances. It will also undertake a large and
open-ended consultation on the possible anticom-
petitive effects of the current passenger tariff con-
sultations in the IATA framework. These industry-
wide arrangements are covered by Commission
block exemption Regulation (EC) No 1617/93,
which expires on 30 June 2001.
497. Beyond the further liberalisation necessary
in the traditionally reserved areas referred to above,
a linked objective is to ensure that the establishment
of a single market in certain emerging sectors,
which have not traditionally been open to compe-
tition, is not undermined by anticompetitive prac-
tices. Such is the case with waste management,
e.g. the recycling of packaging materials. The appli-
cation of competition rules to these new markets
is aimed at ensuring that they are open and that
competition takes place within a framework which
maintains high levels of environmental protection.
3. Mergers
498. In the area of merger control, the
Commission’s priority for 2001 will be the con-
tinuation of the merger regulation review exercise
following the Commission’s report to the Council
on this matter in June 2000. The results of the
broader fact-ﬁnding exercise focusing on thresh-
olds and referrals which was launched after that
report will be analysed together with other poten- 104
(
1) OJ C 23, 23.1.1997.V — OUTLOOK FOR 2001
tial revision issues in the course of 2001. The pur-
pose is to produce in 2001 a formal consultation
document setting out the Commission’s conclu-
sions and recommendations for change.
499. Again in 2001, the Commission expects to
ﬁnalise its work on the revision of the existing
notice on ancillary restrictions (OJ C 203,
14.8.1990) with a view to enhancing the clarity
and transparency of its meaning and scope. The
Commission will also continue to prepare a new
notice providing guidance on the concept and treat-
ment of collective dominance under the merger
regulation. As regards discussions with the US,
these will be continued on the basis of two coop-
eration projects, one on remedies, the other look-
ing at collective dominance, while further areas
of cooperation in the context of the global com-
petition initiative will be explored.
500. The Commission also intends to look at its
internal working methods. Relevant action will
include internal guidelines in order to ensure the
effectiveness of commitments, as well as a stan-
dard text for trustee mandates and a system of
electronic monitoring of the parties’ compliance
with commitments. In addition, the Commission
will endeavour to improve its fact-ﬁnding method-
ology in merger investigations by drafting inter-
nal guidelines on information requests and stan-
dardised letters pursuant to Article 11 of the
merger regulation.
4. State aid
501. State aid continues to decrease as a percent-
age of GDP, but aid supporting individual sectors
and companies still remains too high. Efforts will
continue to ensure a reduction of distortions of
competition in the EU caused by national aid meas-
ures, including the continuation of the strict pol-
icy on reimbursement of illegal and incompatible
aid and improved monitoring of compliance with
conditions and obligations imposed by the
Commission in its State aid decisions. Particular
emphasis will be placed on improving transparency
through the progressive establishment of a pub-
licly accessible register of State aid and a State aid
scoreboard. This improved transparency should
generate pressure between Member States to reduce
the volume of State aid.
502. As regards horizontal issues, the Commission
will continue its efforts to reform the legislative
framework in order to streamline its procedures and
focus its resources on the most important issues.
This will involve, among other things, the revision
of several frameworks and guidelines that are due
to expire in 2001 or that need to be updated, in par-
ticular the Community framework on aid to research
and development, the multisectoral framework on
regional aid to large investment projects and the
guidelines on employment aid. Following a request
by the Member States at the informal Ecoﬁn meet-
ing held in Versailles in September 2000, the
Commission also plans to clarify the application of
State aid rules to measures relating to risk capital.
5. International activities
503. In the international sphere, the Commission
will continue to pursue its dual policy of enhanc-
ing bilateral cooperation with its foreign counter-
parts while at the same time exploring possibili-
ties for expanding multilateral cooperation.
Regarding the former, the Commission will strive
to ensure that a cooperation agreement between
the EU and Japan, providing for cooperation
between the Commission and the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission, is signed during the course of
2001, and it will also explore the possibility of
negotiating and concluding further cooperation
agreements with third countries. As regards mul-
tilateral initiatives, the Commission will continue
to pursue its efforts aimed at the creation of a WTO
competition law framework, in the ﬁrst instance by
ensuring that the subject is on the agenda for the
next round of trade negotiations. Meanwhile, a
particular priority will be the development of an
International Competition Forum, as proposed by
Commissioner Monti in 2000.
504. With the adoption of the enlargement strat-
egy paper and the so-called ‘road maps’ by the
European Council in Nice, the enlargement of the
European Union is entering a crucial phase. The
Commission’s main priority in 2001 will be to
assess the enforcement record of the applicant
countries, including the examination of a number
of test cases, both in antitrust and State aid, to see
whether it will be possible provisionally to close
the competition chapter with the applicant coun-
tries by the end of 2001.
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